Filed: Mar. 10, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4256 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. KEVIN FORDE, a/k/a Miami Kev, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-4261 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ALANO CHRISTOBO BLANCO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-3; 4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-24) Submitted: January 30, 2
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4256 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. KEVIN FORDE, a/k/a Miami Kev, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-4261 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ALANO CHRISTOBO BLANCO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-3; 4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-24) Submitted: January 30, 20..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4256
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KEVIN FORDE, a/k/a Miami Kev,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4261
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALANO CHRISTOBO BLANCO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-3; 4:11-cr-00089-MSD-DEM-24)
Submitted: January 30, 2014 Decided: March 10, 2014
Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia; Robert C. Neeley, Jr.,
Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellants. Dana J. Boente, Acting
United States Attorney, Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States
Attorney, Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Louis A. Crisostomo, Organized Crime and Gang Section, Daniel
Steven Goodman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A federal jury found Kevin Forde and Alano Christobo
Blanco guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2012). In addition, Forde was convicted of
distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)
(2012), and use of a communication facility to commit an
offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)(2012); and Blanco
was convicted of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2012), and interstate travel
in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)
(2012). The district court sentenced Forde to 300 months of
imprisonment and Blanco to 235 months of imprisonment and they
now appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
Forde argues on appeal that the district court erred
in denying his motion to sever the trials. We review the denial
of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 367 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 1278 (2013). “[W]hen an indictment properly has joined two
or more defendants under the provisions of [Fed. R. Crim. P.]
8(b), severance pursuant to [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 14 is rarely
granted.”
Id. at 368 (citation omitted). “To successfully
challenge the district court’s refusal to sever under Rule
14(a), [Forde] faces the daunting task of demonstrating that
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there was a serious risk that a joint trial would . . . prevent
the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or
innocence.” United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 770 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “we will
not reverse a denial of a motion to sever absent a showing of
clear prejudice.”
Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 368 (citations omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal
authorities and conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Forde’s motion to sever.
Blanco argues on appeal that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict on the charge of
conspiracy to commit money laundering. We review a district
court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d
209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United
States v. Beidler,
110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The
verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’”
Smith, 451 F.3d at 216
(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
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omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court,
weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any
conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012), it is
unlawful for a person who knows that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of unlawful
activity to conduct a financial transaction with those proceeds,
knowing that the transaction is designed to conceal or disguise
the source of those proceeds.
To obtain a conviction for money laundering conspiracy
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), the Government must prove
the following essential elements: (1) the existence of
an agreement between two or more persons to commit one
or more of the substantive money laundering offenses
proscribed under 18 U.S.C § 1956(a) or § 1957; (2)
that the defendant knew that the money laundering
proceeds had been derived from an illegal activity;
and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became
part of the conspiracy.
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 371 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the Government provided substantial evidence to
support the jury’s finding of guilt.
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Blanco also argues that the district court erred in
calculating the drug weight, by including in the calculation a
conversion of an amount of currency to an equivalent amount of
cocaine. “The calculation of the amount of drugs which results
in the establishment of the base offense level is a factual
determination subject to review only for clear error.” United
States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). We will “find clear error only if, on the entire
evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Manigan,
592
F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
A district court may consider the drug equivalent of
cash seized as relevant conduct for purposes of calculating the
drug weight attributable to a defendant. Hicks, 948 F.2d at
882. The court should consider such an amount when there are no
drugs seized or the amount of drugs seized fails to reflect the
scale of the offense and when the cash was part of the same
course of conduct as the offense of the conviction. See
id. at
882-83; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1 cmt.
n.5 (2013). We conclude that the district court did not commit
clear error in calculating the drug weight attributed to Blanco.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
court and deny Forde’s motion to file a pro se supplemental
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brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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