Filed: Jul. 15, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4957 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. AKEEMA KHIRY PRINGLE, a/k/a Keem, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4027 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. OTIS SAMUEL, JR., a/k/a O, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (4:13-cr-00321-RBH-2; 4:13-cr-00321-RBH-1) Submitted: June 26, 2014 Deci
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4957 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. AKEEMA KHIRY PRINGLE, a/k/a Keem, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4027 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. OTIS SAMUEL, JR., a/k/a O, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. (4:13-cr-00321-RBH-2; 4:13-cr-00321-RBH-1) Submitted: June 26, 2014 Decid..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4957
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AKEEMA KHIRY PRINGLE, a/k/a Keem,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4027
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OTIS SAMUEL, JR., a/k/a O,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District
Judge. (4:13-cr-00321-RBH-2; 4:13-cr-00321-RBH-1)
Submitted: June 26, 2014 Decided: July 15, 2014
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
No. 13-4957 affirmed and No. 14-4027 affirmed in part; dismissed
in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Thomas McBratney, III, MCBRATNEY LAW FIRM, P.A., Florence,
South Carolina; William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellants. Alfred
William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to their written plea agreements, Akeema
Khiry Pringle and Otis Samuel, Jr., (collectively,
“Defendants”), pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 280 grams or
more of crack cocaine, and a quantity of marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2012). While Pringle entered into a “standard” plea agreement,
Samuel, by contrast, negotiated an agreement pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), in which the parties stipulated that a
180-month term of imprisonment was appropriate.
Pringle received both a downward departure for his
substantial assistance, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 5K1.1 (2012), and a downward variance, which resulted
in a 156-month sentence — well below Pringle’s career offender
Guidelines range of 262-327 months’ imprisonment. In Samuel’s
case, the district court accepted the sentencing stipulation,
awarded a USSG § 5K1.1 substantial assistance reduction, and
sentenced Samuel to 121 months’ imprisonment. These appeals
timely followed.
Defendants’ attorneys have filed a consolidated brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), averring
that there are no meritorious appellate issues but seeking
review of Defendants’ convictions and Pringle’s sentence.
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Counsel for Samuel notes that we lack jurisdiction to review
Samuel’s sentence because it was the result of a
Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Although Samuel filed a pro se
supplemental brief challenging the factual basis for the drug
quantity attributed to him for sentencing purposes, he has moved
to withdraw his brief. Pringle likewise was advised of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has declined to
do so. The Government has not filed a response.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the criminal
judgment in Pringle’s case (Appeal No. 13-4957), and affirm in
part the criminal judgment in Samuel’s case (Appeal No. 14-
4027). Specifically, we affirm Samuel’s conviction, but dismiss
Samuel’s appeal of his sentence for lack of jurisdiction.
Further, we grant Samuel’s motion to withdraw his pro se
supplemental brief.
Because neither Pringle nor Samuel moved in the
district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule
11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard,
Defendants must establish that an error occurred, that this
error was plain, and that it affected their substantial rights.
United States v. Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th Cir.
2009). Our review of the records establishes that the district
court complied with the mandates of Rule 11, ensuring that
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Defendants’ guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and
supported by an independent basis in fact. We therefore affirm
Defendants’ convictions.
We review Pringle’s below-Guidelines sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007). This review
requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 51. We first assess
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, considered the factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), analyzed any arguments presented by
the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49–51; see United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 575–76
(4th Cir. 2010). If there is no procedural error, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that Pringle’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. We find no error in the district court’s
computation of Pringle’s Guidelines range, including the career
offender designation, the opportunities the court provided
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Pringle and his counsel to speak in mitigation, or the court’s
explanation of the sentence imposed by reference to the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329,
341–42 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a sentencing court is
“not required to provide a lengthy explanation or robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection, particularly when
imposing a below-Guidelines sentence” (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted)). Finally, Pringle’s below-Guidelines
sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable, see United
States v. Susi,
674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012), and we
discern no basis in the record to overcome this presumption.
Finally, we agree with counsel for Samuel that we lack
jurisdiction to review Samuel’s sentence. The federal statute
governing appellate review of a sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a),
(c) (2012), limits the circumstances under which a defendant may
appeal a sentence to which he stipulated in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
plea agreement to claims that his sentence “was (1) imposed in
violation of the law, (2) imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the Guidelines, or (3) is greater than the
sentence set forth in the plea agreement.” United States v.
Calderon, 428 F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2005). None of these
exceptions apply here. Samuel’s sentence was less than the
applicable statutory maximum of life imprisonment and, due to
the downward departure, was less than the sentence that he had
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bargained for with the Government. Moreover, the sentence was
not imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
Sentencing Guidelines because it was based on the parties’
agreement — not on the district court’s calculation of the
Guidelines. United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 339–40 (4th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Cieslowski,
410 F.3d 353, 364 (7th
Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we conclude that review of Samuel’s
sentence is precluded by § 3742(c).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
records in these cases and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the criminal judgment against
Pringle and affirm Samuel’s conviction, but dismiss the appeal
of Samuel’s sentence. Finally, we grant Samuel’s motion to
withdraw his pro se supplemental brief. This Court requires
that counsel inform their clients, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If either requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this Court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on his client. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
No. 13-4957 AFFIRMED
No. 14-4027 AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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