Filed: Jul. 09, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-7528 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, v. PETER M. EBEL, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-hc-02124-BO) Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 9, 2014 Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael W.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-7528 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, v. PETER M. EBEL, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-hc-02124-BO) Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 9, 2014 Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Michael W. P..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7528
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
PETER M. EBEL,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-hc-02124-BO)
Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 9, 2014
Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael W. Patrick, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL W. PATRICK, Chapel
Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United
States Attorney, R. A. Renfer, Jr., Denise Walker, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Peter M. Ebel appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (“Adam Walsh
Act”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247-48 (2012). We have reviewed the record
and affirm.
The Adam Walsh Act allows for the civil commitment of
a “sexually dangerous person” following the expiration of his
federal prison sentence. In order to civilly commit an
individual as sexually dangerous, the Government must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the individual: (1) has
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation; (2) currently suffers from a serious mental
illness, abnormality, or disorder; and (3) as a result of the
illness, abnormality or disorder, would have serious difficulty
in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation
if released. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4247(a), 4248(d).
In assessing sexual dangerousness, “it is for the
factfinder to decide among reasonable interpretations of the
evidence and determine the weight accorded to expert witnesses.”
United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); see
United States v. Francis,
686 F.3d 265, 275 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]hether an individual is mentally ill to this degree turns
on the significance of the factual information as viewed by the
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expert psychiatrists and psychologists.”). The serious
difficulty prong of sexual dangerousness refers to the degree of
an individual’s “volitional impairment, which impacts the
person’s ability to refrain from acting upon his deviant sexual
interests.” Hall, 664 F.3d at 463 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Ebel asserts three constitutional challenges to his
commitment: (1) the civil commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4248,
violates equal protection principles by limiting its application
to prisoners; (2) § 4248 levies an unconstitutional criminal
punishment; and (3) the reasonable doubt standard must apply to
findings in § 4248 hearings. As Ebel concedes, however, each of
these arguments is foreclosed by our decision in United States
v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 444-56 (4th Cir. 2012).
Ebel next contends that the district court committed
clear error in finding that he meets the requirements for civil
commitment. Ebel asserts that the district court improperly
weighed evidence presented by the government and ignored
evidence presented in his favor. Additionally, Ebel asserts
that the district court erred in finding credible the
government’s expert witnesses. We review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de
novo. Hall, 664 F.3d at 462. Where the factual findings are
based on the district court’s evaluation of conflicting expert
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testimony, we are especially reluctant to set aside its
determinations. United States v. Heyer, 740 F.3d 284, 292 (4th
Cir. 2014).
Ebel conceded below that he previously engaged in
child molestation, and he does not contest in this appeal that
he suffers from a serious mental disorder. He does contend that
the district court clearly erred in finding the necessary third
prong, that he would have serious difficulty in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. 18
U.S.C. §§ 4247(a)(6), 4248. “Evaluating the credibility of
experts and the value of their opinions is a function best
committed to the district courts,” and the district court here
did not clearly err in accepting the opinion of the government’s
expert witnesses that Ebel is at a high risk for recidivism upon
release and rejecting the testimony of Ebel’s own expert to the
contrary. See Hall, 664 F.3d at 464. Further, as we have
previously explained, in evaluating a particular individual’s
risk of recidivism the district court may rely on actuarial
tests, his participation in treatment, his ability to control
his impulses, and his commitment to controlling his behavior,
id., as well as his “deviant sexual thoughts” and “cognitive
distortions and thinking errors about the appropriateness of
children as sexual partners.” United States v. Wooden,
693 F.3d
440, 462 (4th Cir. 2012). Because these are precisely the
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factors the district court considered in Ebel’s case, we find no
clear error in its conclusions.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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