Filed: Jul. 21, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4039 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ERIC M. LYONS, a/k/a Marc, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (8:12-cr-00581-GLR-1) Submitted: July 17, 2014 Decided: July 21, 2014 Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4039 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ERIC M. LYONS, a/k/a Marc, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (8:12-cr-00581-GLR-1) Submitted: July 17, 2014 Decided: July 21, 2014 Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z. S..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4039
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC M. LYONS, a/k/a Marc,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00581-GLR-1)
Submitted: July 17, 2014 Decided: July 21, 2014
Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z. SEDDIQ, P.C., Greenbelt, Maryland,
for Appellant. John Francis Purcell, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric M. Lyons pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2012). At sentencing and with Lyons’
consent, the district court granted the Government’s motion to
strike from the indictment the drug quantity that otherwise
would have triggered a five-year mandatory minimum sentence.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced
Lyons to forty-three months’ imprisonment, which was three
months below the bottom of his advisory Guidelines range.
Counsel for Lyons has filed this appeal pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but arguing that the
district court failed to consider the sentencing disparity
between Lyons and his co-defendant in determining the extent of
the downward variance. Although advised of his right to do so,
Lyons has declined to file a pro se supplemental brief. The
Government has not filed a response brief. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for
reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.
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2012); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007).
When determining a sentence, the district court must calculate
the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range and consider it in
conjunction with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012).
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50.
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Lyons, appropriately treating the Sentencing
Guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and considering the
applicable Guidelines range, and weighing the relevant § 3553(a)
sentencing factors. Lyons complains that the district court
failed to consider the sentencing disparity between him and his
co-defendant. However, as we have repeatedly stated, the
sentencing factor addressing sentencing disparities, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6), is aimed primarily at eliminating national
sentencing inequity, not differences between the sentences of
co-defendants. United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149
(4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Simmons,
501 F.3d
620, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). Finally, we
observe that the court provided sufficient reasoning for the
downward variance it selected for Lyons.
Having discerned no procedural error, we next consider
the substantive reasonableness of Lyons’ sentence, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552
3
U.S. at 51. Because Lyons’ sentence is below the properly
calculated Guidelines range, we presume on appeal that the
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi,
674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). This presumption may only be
rebutted if Lyons shows “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes–Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Lyons claims that the district court’s failure to
account for the sentencing disparity renders his sentence
substantively unreasonable. This contention is no more
persuasive when viewed through the lens of substantive
reasonableness review. Furthermore, our review of the record
reveals no viable basis upon which to question the substantive
reasonableness of Lyons’ downward variant sentence. We thus
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
selecting this sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Lyons’ guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered and supported by an independent basis in fact. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Lyons, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
4
review. If Lyons requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Lyons. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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