PER CURIAM:
Michael Dean Woods appeals the district court's order committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012). We affirm.
Pursuant to the Act, "[i]f, after [a] hearing, the [district] court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General."
On appeal, we review a district court's factual findings under § 4248 for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
Here, Woods argues that the district court clearly erred in crediting the testimony of Dr. Amy Phenix, a psychologist who diagnosed Woods as suffering from Pedophilia and Antisocial Personality Disorder and determined that, as a result, Woods would have serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. Woods notes that Dr. Phenix did not meet with him personally before coming to these conclusions and suggests that she may have violated her ethical obligations by failing to explain in her written report to the court what limits, if any, the lack of an in-person interview placed on her evaluation. Woods claims that the district court clearly erred in ignoring such circumstances when crediting Dr. Phenix's conclusions over those of Dr. Richard Wollert and Dr. Joseph Plaud, who both personally spoke with Woods before finding that he does not suffer from Pedophilia and poses no serious risk of committing an act of sexual violence or child molestation. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
First, we find no support for Woods' suggestion that Dr. Phenix's failure to interview him rendered her evaluation unethical or inherently less reliable.
Moreover, Woods has not identified pertinent information that Dr. Phenix may have neglected by not speaking with him personally. To the contrary, Dr. Phenix explained that her conclusions were not altered by her review of Dr. Wollert's report, which transcribed the germane portions of his interview with Woods. Accordingly, we cannot say that Dr. Phenix's inability to interview Woods amounted to substantial evidence contradicting the reliability of her evaluation.
Our conclusion is not altered by Woods' suggestion that Dr. Phenix may have transgressed the letter of APA ethical rules by neglecting to explain in her written report to the court what limits, if any, her inability to question Woods placed on the quality of her evaluation. Without more, Dr. Phenix's admittedly inadvertent mistake when drafting her report does not, as Woods would have it, necessarily imply unreliability in her final diagnosis or assessment of Woods' risk of future sexual dangerousness. Dr. Phenix rectified her omission during Woods' § 4248 hearing, and, absent evidence to the contrary, the district court was entitled to credit Dr. Phenix's assertion that she could effectively evaluate Woods based on the information available to her.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.