Filed: Mar. 24, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4465 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MATTHEW JAMES OWENS, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4484 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DENNIS SHAQUILLE ROSS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00439-CCE-1; 1:13-cr-00439-CCE-2) Submitted: January 6, 2015 Decided
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4465 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MATTHEW JAMES OWENS, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4484 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DENNIS SHAQUILLE ROSS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00439-CCE-1; 1:13-cr-00439-CCE-2) Submitted: January 6, 2015 Decided:..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4465
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW JAMES OWENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4484
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DENNIS SHAQUILLE ROSS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00439-CCE-1; 1:13-cr-00439-CCE-2)
Submitted: January 6, 2015 Decided: March 24, 2015
Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Scott Coalter, COALTER LAW P.L.L.C., Greensboro, North
Carolina; Kathleen A. Gleason, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellants. Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Matthew Owens and Dennis Ross appeal the district
court’s criminal judgments. Owens was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment for assaulting, robbing, and putting in jeopardy
the life of a person having lawful custody of United States mail
matter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (2012). Ross was
sentenced to 155 months’ imprisonment for the same offense, and
for carrying and using, by brandishing, firearms during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
In accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738
(1967), counsel for Owens and Ross filed a brief certifying that
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court (1) plainly erred in calculating
Owens’s criminal history category (“CHC”) or (2) imposed an
unreasonable sentence on either Owens or Ross. Although
notified of the right to do so, neither Owens nor Ross filed a
pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Because Owens did not object to his criminal history
calculation in the district court, our review is for plain
error. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). To
establish plain error, an appellant must show that an error
(1) occurred, (2) was plain, and (3) affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
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2007). Even then, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise unless the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not plainly err in calculating Owens’s
criminal history category. To the contrary, the district court
properly added one criminal history point for a 2009 conviction
for shoplifting, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 4A1.1(c) and 4A1.2(d)(2)(B).
Owens and Ross both question whether their sentences
are unreasonable. Our review for reasonableness uses “an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant procedural
error,” including “improperly calculating[] the Guidelines
range, . . . failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.”
Id.
If we find no procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality
of the circumstances.”
Id. The sentence imposed must be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the
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goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume on
appeal that a sentence within a properly calculated advisory
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Allen,
491
F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see Rita v. United States,
551
U.S. 338, 346-56 (2007) (upholding appellate presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence). The defendant
bears the burden to rebut the presumption by showing “that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court here committed no procedural error,
as both Owens and Ross received adequate, individualized
explanations of their within-Guidelines sentences. We also find
the sentences to be substantively reasonable. In accordance
with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgments. Ross’s motion for substitute
counsel is denied. This court requires that counsel inform
Owens and Ross, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If either
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
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motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
appellant.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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