Filed: May 20, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4513 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a Cono, a/k/a Compa, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4514 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a Cono, a/k/a Compa, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4513 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a Cono, a/k/a Compa, Defendant - Appellant. No. 14-4514 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a Cono, a/k/a Compa, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. S..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4513
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a
Cono, a/k/a Compa,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4514
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IDER VAZQUEZ MATOS, a/k/a The Cuban, a/k/a I.D., a/k/a
Cono, a/k/a Compa,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00337-TDS-1; 1:14-cr-00004-TDS-1)
Submitted: April 24, 2015 Decided: May 20, 2015
Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cindy H. Popkin-Bradley, CINDY H. POPKIN-BRADLEY ATTORNEY AT
LAW, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, First Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Ider Vazquez Matos appeals
his conviction and 60-month sentence imposed following his
guilty plea to bulk cash smuggling and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1) (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2012), and the concurrent 130-month sentence imposed following
his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Matos raises two arguments
on appeal: (1) that the district court erred in accepting his
guilty plea to bulk cash smuggling and aiding and abetting
because the record failed to provide an independent factual
basis for this count, and (2) that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Matos’ request for a downward variance and
in imposing an unduly harsh sentence. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The court has broad discretion in
determining whether a factual basis exists and may rely on
anything appearing in the record. United States v. Ketchum, 550
F.3d 363, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2008). The court is not required to
“satisfy itself that a jury would find the defendant guilty, or
even that [the] defendant is guilty by a preponderance of the
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evidence,” but “must assure itself simply that the conduct to
which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the
statutory provision under which he is pleading guilty.” United
States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178-79 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court “need only be
subjectively satisfied that there is a sufficient factual basis
for a conclusion that the defendant committed all of the
elements of the offense.” United States v. Mitchell,
104 F.3d
649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997).
Because Matos did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or
timely assert any infirmity in the plea colloquy, we review his
challenge to the plea’s factual basis for plain error. United
States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007). To
establish plain error, Matos must demonstrate that (1) an error
occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected
his substantial rights. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725,
732 (1993). Even if Matos meets these requirements, we will
correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126-27 (2013)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes that an
error affected his substantial rights if he shows “a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered
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the plea.” United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2147
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). To meet this
standard, the defendant “must . . . satisfy the judgment of the
reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the
probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” United States v.
Dominguez Benitez,
542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Assuming, without deciding, that the presentence report
failed to provide an adequate factual basis for Matos’ plea to
the bulk cash smuggling offense, we conclude Matos fails to
establish that his substantial rights were affected. Rather,
our review of the record in its entirety — including the
presentence report and Matos’ statements during the plea and
sentencing hearings — establishes no reasonable probability that
Matos would not have pled guilty but for the alleged error.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because Matos does not argue
that the district court committed procedural error, our review
is limited to the substantive reasonableness of Matos’ sentence. *
*
The Government asserts that we lack the authority to
review the sentencing court’s denial of Matos’ request for a
below-Guidelines sentence. Because Matos sought a downward
(Continued)
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United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). A
sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”
to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012). In evaluating substantive reasonableness, we must
consider whether, viewing the totality of the circumstances,
“the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
We “can reverse a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even
if the sentence would not have been [our] choice.” United
States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A within-Guidelines
sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal. United States v.
Louthian,
756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct.
421 (2014). Matos bears the burden to rebut this presumption
“by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”
Id.
variance, not a departure, we retain authority to review the
court’s denial of that request. See United States v. Brewer,
520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008). That inquiry is encompassed
in Matos’ overarching argument that the court imposed an unduly
harsh sentence.
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We conclude that Matos fails to make such a showing. Matos
does not demonstrate that any deficiency in the factual basis
for his guilty plea had an appreciable impact on the court’s
sentencing calculus. The district court grounded the sentence
squarely in the relevant § 3553(a) factors, including Matos’
history and characteristics and the legitimate need to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
to provide just punishment, to deter others from similar
conduct, and to protect the public. While Matos identified
numerous mitigating facts related to his personal history and
characteristics and his acceptance of responsibility, these
facts are not sufficiently compelling to require a sentence
lower than that imposed by the district court. Thus, Matos has
not rebutted the presumption of reasonableness accorded his
within-Guidelines sentence. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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