Filed: Apr. 01, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4601 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RICKEY LEE MILLER, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00038-CCE-1) Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2015 Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4601 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RICKEY LEE MILLER, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00038-CCE-1) Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2015 Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam o..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4601
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICKEY LEE MILLER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00038-CCE-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: April 1, 2015
Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stephen F. Wallace, WALLACE LAW FIRM, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant
United States Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rickey Lee Miller, Jr., pled guilty to failure to appear
for sentencing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). The district court calculated Miller’s
Guidelines range at 10 to 16 months’ imprisonment,
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2013), and sentenced Miller
to 14 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but raising as issues for review
whether the district court reversibly erred in accepting
Miller’s guilty plea and abused its discretion in imposing
sentence. Miller was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not done so. The Government
declined to file a brief. We affirm.
Because Miller did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P.
11 hearing is reviewed for plain error only. United States v.
Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 524-26 (4th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate
plain error, a defendant must show: (1) there was error; (2) the
error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). In
the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to
establish that a plain error affected his substantial rights by
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showing a reasonable probability that he would not have pled
guilty but for the district court’s Rule 11 omissions.
United States v. Massenburg,
564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009).
Our review of the transcript of the guilty plea hearing
leads us to conclude that the district court substantially
complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Miller’s
guilty plea and that the court’s omissions did not affect
Miller’s substantial rights. Critically, the transcript reveals
that the district court ensured that the plea was supported by
an independent basis in fact and that Miller entered the plea
knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding of the
consequences. United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 116, 120
(4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the
district court’s acceptance of Miller’s guilty plea.
Turning to Miller’s sentence, we review it for
reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007).
This review entails appellate consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
Id. at 51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we
consider whether the district court properly calculated the
defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, selected a sentence based on
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clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the selected
sentence.
Id. at 49–51.
If the sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
we review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into
account the totality of the circumstances.”
Id. at 51. Any
sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is
presumptively substantively reasonable. United States v.
Louthian,
756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct.
421 (2014). Such a presumption can only be rebutted by a
showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
the § 3553(a) factors.
Id.
In this case, the district court correctly calculated and
considered the advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from
counsel, and heard allocution from Miller. The court explained
that the 14-month sentence was warranted in light of the nature
and circumstances of Miller’s offense conduct, his history and
characteristics, and the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense and to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). Miller
does not offer any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal
that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing Miller.
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Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
remainder of the record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district
court’s judgment and amended judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Miller, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Miller requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Miller.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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