Filed: May 10, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4548 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER NOVELL MCCAULEY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00423-TDS-1) Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: May 10, 2016 Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lisa S. Costner, LIS
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 14-4548 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER NOVELL MCCAULEY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00423-TDS-1) Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: May 10, 2016 Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lisa S. Costner, LISA..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4548
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER NOVELL MCCAULEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00423-TDS-1)
Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: May 10, 2016
Before MOTZ, KING, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Novell McCauley pleaded guilty to possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012), conditioned on his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
seized following a traffic stop. The district court sentenced
McCauley to 110 months in prison, and he now appeals. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
McCauley challenges the district court’s conclusion that
the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop to conduct a canine sniff. When considering the
denial of a motion to suppress, “we review the district court’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de
novo.” United States v. Green,
740 F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir.
2014). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the government, the prevailing party below.
Id.
“It is well established that the temporary detention of
individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police
constitutes a seizure, no matter how brief the detention or how
limited its purpose.” United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 328,
335 (4th Cir. 2008) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted). During a routine traffic stop, an officer may request
a driver’s license and registration, perform a computer check,
issue a citation, and even conduct a canine sniff “if performed
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within the time reasonably required to issue a traffic
citation.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to
extend a traffic stop beyond this scope, however, a police
officer “must possess a justification for doing so other than
the initial traffic violation that prompted the stop in the
first place” and, therefore, must have either the driver’s
consent or a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.
Id. at
336; see Rodriguez v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-16
(2015) (absent reasonable suspicion, officer may not extend
otherwise-completed traffic stop to conduct canine sniff).
An officer must have “at least a minimal level of objective
justification” and “must be able to articulate more than an
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal
activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The detaining officer must
“either articulate why a particular behavior is suspicious or
logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that
the behavior is likely to be indicative of some more sinister
activity than may appear at first glance.” United States v.
Williams,
808 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2015). Though each
relevant fact articulated by the officer “need not on its own
eliminate every innocent traveler,” the facts “must in their
totality serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent
travelers.”
Id. at 246 (emphasis and internal quotation marks
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omitted). Thus, we evaluate the facts “both separately and in
the aggregate, recognizing that our inquiry must account for the
totality of the circumstances, rather than employ a divide-and-
conquer analysis.”
Id. at 247 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In conducting our assessment, we give “due weight to
common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their
experience and training.” United States v. Perkins,
363 F.3d
317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004).
We have reviewed the record and the relevant legal
authorities and conclude that the district court did not err in
finding that, here, the officer had sufficient reasonable
suspicion to extend the stop to conduct the canine sniff.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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