Filed: Apr. 28, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1434 WILLIAM HANBACK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DRHI, INC.; D.R. HORTON, INC., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cv-01789-TSE-JFA) Argued: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 28, 2016 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western Di
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1434 WILLIAM HANBACK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. DRHI, INC.; D.R. HORTON, INC., Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cv-01789-TSE-JFA) Argued: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 28, 2016 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western Dis..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1434
WILLIAM HANBACK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DRHI, INC.; D.R. HORTON, INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01789-TSE-JFA)
Argued: March 22, 2016 Decided: April 28, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN,
Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of
North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Stephen Patrick Pierce, SUROVELL ISAACS PETERSEN & LEVY,
PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Jon Franklin Mains, JON
F. MAINS & ASSOCIATES, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: J. Chapman Petersen, SUROVELL ISAACS PETERSEN & LEVY,
PLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Hanback commenced this action against DRHI, Inc.,
for breach of a contract with which he sold DRHI a 2.14-acre
parcel of land in Fairfax, Virginia. He seeks a declaratory
judgment and $350,000 in damages.
The parties closed on the land contract in 2004, with DRHI
paying Hanback $400,000 for the 2.14-acre parcel, a price based
on the fact that 5 lots had been approved by the City of Fairfax
for the parcel’s development. When DRHI later purchased an
adjacent parcel of land, it reconstituted its development plan
to include the two parcels and thereby obtained City approval
for a total of 15 lots on the combined parcels -- 5.5 lots on
the original 2.14-acre parcel and 9.5 lots on the adjacent
parcel -- which amounted to 5 more lots than would have been
approved for the parcels separately.
In his complaint, Hanback contends that the 2.14-acre
parcel that he sold to DRHI in 2004 directly enabled the
development of these 5 additional lots. Stated otherwise, he
alleges that the 2.14-acre parcel he sold permitted DRHI to
obtain a “bonus density” of 5 additional lots on the combined
parcels. Accordingly, he seeks compensation for the additional
5 lots in the amount of $70,000 for each lot.
The district court dismissed Hanback’s breach-of-contract
claim, concluding that “nowhere in the . . . Contract is there a
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provision requiring that [DRHI] compensate [Hanback] based on
lots built on subsequently-acquired adjacent property.” We
agree and therefore affirm.
The land contract between Hanback and DRHI provided that
“[Hanback] is the owner of 2.14 acres of fee simple real
property,” which DRHI “is desirous of acquiring,” and that
“[Hanback] agrees to sell to [DRHI] [and] [DRHI] agrees to buy
from Hanback the Property.” The contract continued, “the
Purchase Price for the Property shall be $70,000.00 per approved
lot with a minimum of 6 lots. If only 5 or fewer than 5 lots
are approved, the Purchase Price shall be $400,000 for the 2.14
acres.” Finally, the contract provided that “[s]ettlement shall
take place within thirty days after approval of final
subdivision plans by the City of Fairfax or twelve months after
execution of this Contract whichever occurs first.” Following a
state-court order granting specific performance, settlement took
place in 2004, at which time Hanback transferred the deed to the
2.14-acre parcel to DRHI and DRHI paid Hanback $400,000 for the
property based on the 5 lots that, at that time, had been
approved.
While the contract did indicate that the price for the
2.14-acre parcel would be based on the number of lots approved
by the City of Fairfax at the time of settlement, even under the
redevelopment plan approved by the City in 2007 and the
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subdivision plan approved by the City in 2010, no more than 5.5
lots were ever approved for the 2.14-acre parcel. Since 6 lots
or more were never approved for that parcel, the price
established by the contract for the 2.14-acre parcel remained
$400,000, a sum that had been fully paid at the closing in 2004.
In arguing that he is entitled to compensation “for the
bonus density his land permitted,” Hanback concedes that the
“parties certainly did not specifically address ‘bonus density’
in the 2000 contract.” But he contends nonetheless that “[the
parties] clearly expressed that payment was [to be] based on the
number of lots ‘permitted’ and/or ‘approved,’” with $70,000 to
be paid for each additional lot. He fails to address, however,
the fact that he sold DRHI only the 2.14-acre parcel and that,
at most, only 5.5 lots were ever approved on that parcel. The
additional 9.5 lots approved in the final subdivision plan were
located on the adjacent parcel, which was not the subject of the
land contract between Hanback and DRHI. The contract between
Hanback and DRHI specifically defines the 2.14-acre parcel as
“the Property” subject to the contract, and the “purchase price
and payment” provision expressly concerns the purchase price
“for the 2.14 acres.” Nowhere in the contract is any adjacent
parcel or “bonus density” mentioned.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that
Hanback failed to state a claim for breach of the land contract
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between him and DRHI when he claimed compensation for lots
approved on an adjacent parcel that he never owned and that was
never mentioned in his contract with DRHI. We need not reach,
therefore, Hanback’s challenge of the district court’s
alternative ruling that his breach-of-contract claim is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.
With this conclusion, we also affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Hanback’s claim for a declaratory judgment.
Hanback’s complaint asked the court to assess the full
transactional history of the dispute between the parties,
including the effect of related state-court judgments, and to
declare his rights to “the amount owed to [him] . . . for the
bonus density [DRHI] obtained using the [2.14-acre parcel].”
But this is exactly what he sought in his breach-of-contract
claim, which the district court properly dismissed. A
declaratory judgment therefore would serve no “useful purpose in
clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue.”
Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston,
88 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC,
134 S. Ct.
843, 849 (2014) (recognizing that the Declaratory Judgment Act
is only “procedural” and does not create “substantive rights”).
The judgment of the district court is accordingly
AFFIRMED.
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