Filed: May 16, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1482 GERARD OUSLEY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cv-00031-WO-LPA) Submitted: April 27, 2016 Decided: May 16, 2016 Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublishe
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-1482 GERARD OUSLEY, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cv-00031-WO-LPA) Submitted: April 27, 2016 Decided: May 16, 2016 Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1482
GERARD OUSLEY,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ROBERT A. MCDONALD, Secretary of the Department of Veterans
Affairs,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cv-00031-WO-LPA)
Submitted: April 27, 2016 Decided: May 16, 2016
Before KING, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James E. Hairston, Jr., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Sharon C. Wilson, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gerard Ousley appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, which dismissed his complaint alleging that the
Department of Veterans Affairs engaged in race-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Specifically,
Ousley alleged that he was wrongly removed from his position as
Police Chief at the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical
Center in Durham, North Carolina (“DVAMC”). On appeal, Ousley
argues that the district court abused its discretion in
permitting only limited discovery before granting summary
judgment and erred, as a matter of law, in granting summary
judgment. We affirm.
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment without discovery for abuse of discretion. See Harrods
Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir.
2002). Generally, “summary judgment [should] be refused where
the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover
information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 n.5 (1986). After
reviewing the record in this case, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s decision to permit only
limited discovery before ruling on the Secretary’s summary
judgment motion. The parties engaged in substantial discovery
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before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where Ousley
was represented by counsel. Further, Ousley fails to specify
the manner in which additional discovery would alter the result
in this case.
We next review the merits of the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment
is only appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In opposing summary judgment,
“the nonmoving party must rely on more than conclusory
allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference
upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”
Dash v. Mayweather,
731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Title VII prohibits federal employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(2012). Every case in which a plaintiff alleges disparate
treatment on the basis of a protected trait poses the same
ultimate question: “whether the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics,
354 F.3d 277, 286 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds, Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar,
133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). To
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that end, an individual alleging racial discrimination must show
that the protected trait “actually played a role in the
employer’s decisionmaking process and had a determinative
influence on the outcome.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Determining the actual decisionmaker responsible for the
adverse employment action can be paramount to determining
whether the protected trait played a role in the decision. Id.
at 286-87. Generally, employers are liable only for the acts of
employees with supervisory authority who are empowered to make
“tangible employment decisions.”
Id. at 287. But form does not
triumph over substance:
When a formal decisionmaker acts merely as a cat’s paw
or rubber-stamps a decision, report, or recommendation
actually made by a subordinate, it is not inconsistent
to say that the subordinate is the actual
decisionmaker or the one principally responsible for
the contested employment decision, so long as he
otherwise falls within the parameters of the
discrimination statute’s definition of an employer or
agent of the employer.
Id. at 290.
We concur with the district court’s identification of the
actual decisionmaker in this case. The record shows that
William Dale Hendley, whom Ousley charges as the puppeteer
behind his demotion, merely acted as a consultant for Ralph T.
Gigliotti, DVAMC’s Director, who had the sole power to make the
contested decision. As a result, the district court properly
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focused on Gigliotti’s motivations in considering whether to
grant summary judgment.
With this threshold issue decided, we turn to the two means
by which a plaintiff can establish discrimination under Title
VII: (1) “through direct and indirect evidence,” also known as
the “mixed-motive” framework; or (2) “through the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 [(1973)],” also known as the “pretext” framework.
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland-Eastern Shore,
787 F.3d 243, 249
(4th Cir. 2015).
Under the “mixed-motive” framework, a plaintiff succeeds if
he “demonstrates that race . . . was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated
the practice.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416
F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The plaintiff may do so through direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Id. at 318. This evidence must both
display a “discriminatory attitude” and bear a causal
relationship with the adverse employment action. Warch v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co.,
435 F.3d 510, 520 (4th Cir. 2006).
The materials before us offer insufficient direct or
indirect evidence to suggest that race was a motivating factor
in Ousley’s demotion. The record reflects little, if any,
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“discriminatory attitude” toward Ousley’s race. Therefore, the
district court properly dismissed his mixed-motive claim.
Under the “pretext” framework, the plaintiff bears the
initial burden to show a prima facie case of discrimination.
Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2013).
If he does so, the burden shifts to the employer, who must
proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action.
Id. If the employer does so, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s
proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.
Id.
When evaluating pretext, it is not within our purview to
question whether the employer’s proffered basis for the disputed
action “was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as
it truly was the reason for” the action.
Id. at 722 (internal
quotation marks omitted). In order to succeed at this stage,
the plaintiff must “show both that the reason advanced was a
sham and that the true reason was an impermissible one under the
law.” Russell v. Microdyne Corp.,
65 F.3d 1229, 1235 (4th Cir.
1995).
In this case, the evidence does not show that DVAMC’s
proffered bases for demoting Ousley were pretextual. Ousley
fails to show that the dual investigations resulting in his
demotion were anything but independent and unbiased. These
investigations concluded that Ousley exercised poor judgment and
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that his department suffered from numerous deficiencies.
Therefore, the district court properly concluded that Ousley
failed to support his burden of showing pretext.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting
summary judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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