Filed: Jun. 10, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4636 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LINDSEY DALE BOWLING, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00151-1) Submitted: May 13, 2016 Decided: June 10, 2016 Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christian M. Capece, Fede
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-4636 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LINDSEY DALE BOWLING, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00151-1) Submitted: May 13, 2016 Decided: June 10, 2016 Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Christian M. Capece, Feder..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4636
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LINDSEY DALE BOWLING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00151-1)
Submitted: May 13, 2016 Decided: June 10, 2016
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Lex A. Coleman,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Carol A. Casto, Acting United States Attorney,
Larry R. Ellis, Lisa G. Johnston, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lindsey Dale Bowling appeals from his 97-month,
within-Guidelines sentence imposed pursuant to his guilty plea
to possession of child pornography. On appeal, he asserts that
his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable
because the district court allegedly treated the Sentencing
Guidelines as mandatory, resulting in unwarranted sentencing
disparities. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Berry,
814 F.3d 192, 194-95 (4th
Cir. 2016). In determining procedural reasonableness, we
consider, among other factors, whether the district court
adequately analyzed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. When a district court has treated the Guidelines range as
mandatory, the sentence is procedurally unreasonable and subject
to vacatur. See United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212,
220 (4th Cir. 2010) (remanding when “left only to speculate as
to whether the sentence . . . was imposed as a matter of
obligation or as an exercise of judgment”).
Bowling contends that, by its purported refusal to consider
his request for a downward variance from the Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court essentially treated the
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Guidelines as mandatory. We disagree. The district court
stated that it was “not bound by” the Guidelines, but would
continue to afford the child pornography Guidelines, U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2 (2014), due consideration
until either Congress or the Sentencing Commission changed them.
The district court did not state that its discretion was
limited, or that it wished to impose a different sentence but
was unable to do so. Rather, the district court considered the
§ 3553(a) factors as well as Bowling’s request for a variance
and, after concluding that this was “one of the most egregious
instances that’s ever come before me as a judge,” determined
that a sentence at the top of the Guidelines range was
appropriate. * Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s refusal
to vary was not based upon a misunderstanding as to the advisory
nature of the Guidelines and that the sentence was procedurally
reasonable.
Bowling next asserts that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable because, contrary to the district court’s
statements, Bowling’s case was not one of the most severe child
pornography cases in the Southern District of West Virginia.
*Given the district court’s conclusion regarding the
seriousness of Bowling’s conduct, we also reject Bowling’s
argument that the sentence here created a procedurally
unreasonable disparity in child pornography sentences in the
Southern District of West Virginia.
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“Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.
Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the
sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian,
756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2014). Upon review, we conclude that the within-
Guidelines sentence was not unreasonable when measured against
the § 3553(a) factors and therefore was not substantively
unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Bowling’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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