Filed: Feb. 11, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-7021 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SAMUEL PARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00063-MR-7) Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2016 Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Theodore D. CHUANG, United States District Judge for the District of Marylan
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 15-7021 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SAMUEL PARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:08-cr-00063-MR-7) Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2016 Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Theodore D. CHUANG, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL PARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00063-MR-7)
Argued: December 8, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2016
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Theodore D. CHUANG,
United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,
sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Agee wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Chuang joined.
ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ross Hall Richardson,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Samuel Parris appeals the district court’s order denying
his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction based
on an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. We vacate
and remand the district court’s order because the court
erroneously found that it the lacked legal authority to reduce
Parris’ sentence below the statutory minimum term of
incarceration.
I.
A.
In 2008, Parris pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846. This offense carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120
months imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 1 The
probation office prepared a presentence report that calculated
Parris’ offense level at 29 and his criminal history category at
VI, resulting in a guideline range of 151-188 months
imprisonment.
Before sentencing, the Government moved, pursuant to
“Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United
1
This opinion omits internal marks, alterations, citations,
emphasis, or footnotes from quotations unless otherwise noted.
3
States Code, Section 3553(e),” for a downward departure from the
applicable guideline range to reflect Parris’ substantial
assistance. J.A. 28 (emphasis added). The Government’s motion
recommended that Parris receive a four-level departure, thereby
putting his guideline range at 110-137 months, with the low-end
of that range below the statutory minimum sentence of 120
months.
A substantial-assistance motion authorizes a sentencing
court to deviate from the guideline range should it deem that
course appropriate under the sentencing factors. Such a motion
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes the court to sentence a
defendant below the term otherwise required by an applicable
statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Williams, 687
F.3d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2012). A motion under § 5K1.1, by
contrast, only authorizes a departure from the calculated
guideline range, but not below the statutory minimum sentence
otherwise required. See United States v. Johnson,
393 F.3d 466,
470 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004). In other words, “[a] § 3553(e) motion
allows the district court to depart below both the statutory
minimum sentence and the low-end of the Guideline range.
However, a § 5K1.1 motion does not allow the court to depart
below the statutory minimum sentence.”
Id. “When a statutory
minimum sentence is involved in the case, a § 5K1.1 motion is
less defendant-friendly than a § 3553(e) motion.”
Id.
4
At Parris’ sentencing hearing, the court heard argument
from the Government in support of its substantial assistance
motion. The court then granted the Government’s motion without
limitation:
For the reasons set forth in the written
motion for downward departure, as well as
those orally articulated by the U.S.
attorney, the court determines that the
motion for downward departure should be and
the same is allowed. And the court
concludes that a final offense level of 25,
criminal history category VI with a
guideline range of 110 to 137 months is
correct in this case.
J.A. 21. Following further argument, the court imposed a
sentence of 120 months, equal to a 21% reduction below the
original guideline range, but at the statutory minimum.
Although the sentencing court granted the Government’s
motion in full during the hearing, the corresponding docket
entry stated “MOTION for Downward Departure pursuant to U.S.S.G.
5K1.1 – granted.” J.A. 4. In the statement of reasons form,
the sentencing court checked the box indicating that a mandatory
minimum sentence was entered, and a separate checkbox indicating
that the sentence was below the mandatory minimum pursuant to a
§ 3553(e) motion went unmarked. Thus, in contrast to the
court’s ruling stated ore tenus from the bench at the sentencing
hearing, the court’s written judgment arguably indicates that
the Government’s motion was granted only under § 5K1.1.
5
This distinction is relevant because this case ultimately
centers on whether the sentencing court granted the Government’s
substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, or both.
In turn, that finding governs whether the district court abused
its discretion in ruling on the current § 3582(c)(2) motion
under the belief it lacked the power to depart below the
statutory minimum sentence.
B.
Parris filed the instant motion seeking a sentence
reduction under Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
which generally reduces by two points the offense levels
assigned to the drug quantities described in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
The probation office prepared a resentencing report that
indicated Parris’ offense level fell to 27 using Amendment 782,
resulting in a new guideline range of 130-162 months. The
report further noted that, because Parris’ current sentence was
below the original guideline range based on his assistance to
the Government, he was eligible for a comparable reduction below
the new guideline range. Finally, the report explained that
Parris also qualified for a revised sentence below the mandatory
minimum because the substantial-assistance motion was based on §
3553(e). The probation report ultimately recommended a
comparable sentence reduction to 103 months.
6
The Government filed a response in which it agreed with the
probation report’s recommendation, noting that “[s]ince Parris
received a downward departure pursuant to the Government’s §
3553(e) and § 5K1.1 motion, a reduction comparably less to the
low-end of Parris’ amended Guidelines range results in a term of
imprisonment of 103 months.” J.A. 74.
As the judge who originally sentenced Parris had since
retired, the current sentencing proceeding was assigned to
another judge. The assigned judge denied Parris’ motion,
concluding he lacked authority to depart from the existing
sentence of 120 months because it was a statutory minimum
sentence. In relevant part, the court held:
Defendant is not eligible for a reduction.
He received the mandatory minimum sentence.
It is true that the Government moved for a
downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1
and for a sentence below the mandatory
minimum pursuant to 18 USC § 3553(e). It
appears, however, that only the 5K1.1 was
granted. There is nothing in the record to
show that the 3553(e) was granted. The text
order of January 28, 2009, reflects only the
granting of the 5K1.1, and the Statement of
Reasons does not show any § 3553(e) motion
being granted. Most tellingly, the
Government had moved for the Court to depart
downward to 110 months, which is below the
mandatory minimum, but the Court nonetheless
imposed a sentence at the mandatory minimum
of 120 months. . . . In sum, Defendant has
pointed to nothing in the record showing
that any § 3553(e) motion was ever granted.
Since Defendant received the mandatory
minimum sentence and no motion has been
7
granted allowing a sentence below that
mandatory minimum, Defendant is not eligible
for any relief pursuant to 18 USC § 3582.
J.A. 38. In sum, the district court determined that it lacked
authority to depart any further from the current sentence
because it was the statutory minimum and the original sentencing
court had not granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion which
would have permitted a departure below that threshold.
Parris timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Parris challenges the district court’s judgment on two
grounds. First, he disputes the court’s legal conclusion that a
§ 3553(e) motion must be granted before a sentence may be
reduced below the statutory minimum under Amendment 782 and the
applicable regulations. Alternatively, he contests the court’s
finding that the sentencing judge did not grant the Government’s
§ 3553(e) motion. We address only the latter argument because
it is dispositive of this appeal.
The district court’s finding at issue -- that the
Government’s § 3553(e) motion was never granted –- is based on
its interpretation of the sentencing court’s earlier judgment.
Our case law instructs that the interpretation of a prior order
is ultimately a legal question with substantial deference
8
afforded to the district court’s construction. See Anderson v.
Stephens, 875 F.2d 76, 80 n.8 (4th Cir. 1989). This
“substantial deference” essentially amounts to abuse of
discretion review. See Wolfe v. Clarke,
718 F.3d 277, 284 (4th
Cir. 2013) (“[W]e review a district court’s interpretation of
its own orders for abuse of discretion.”); see also United
States v. Luskin, 16 F. App’x 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001). 2
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is
guided by erroneous legal principles or rests upon clearly
erroneous factual findings. See United States v. Barber, 119
F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We are authorized to
review the record and reasons offered by the district court and
reverse if the “appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the
relevant factors.” Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
561 F.2d
494, 506 (4th Cir. 1977).
To be sure, we will afford a wide berth to a trial court
interpreting its own prior judgment and will question that
2There is out of circuit authority suggesting that de novo
review without any degree of deference is more appropriate when
the reviewing judge did not direct or author the first judgment,
as is the case here. See, e.g., United States v. Spallone, 399
F.3d 415, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2005). We need not wade into that
issue today because Parris prevails even applying the abuse of
discretion standard.
9
interpretation only in rare cases. This, however, is such a
case. The district court abused its discretion here by failing
to give appropriate deference to the sentencing court’s oral
findings stated from the bench.
Although a court speaks through its judgments and orders,
in federal criminal cases the general rule is that the oral
pronouncement of the sentence governs. See Rakes v. United
States, 309 F.2d 686, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1962). 3 Consequently, a
court “should carry out the true intention of the sentencing
judge as this may be gathered from what he said at the time of
sentencing.” United States v. Morse,
344 F.2d 27, 30 (4th Cir.
1965); see also United States v. Schultz,
855 F.2d 1217, 1225
(6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen an oral sentence conflicts with the
written sentence, the oral sentence controls.”). Only in the
event of an unresolvable ambiguity at the sentencing hearing
have we before authorized turning to the criminal judgment and
other written evidence to discern intent. See United States v.
Osborne,
345 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Villano,
816 F.2d 1448, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (“When an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous,
3 While the rule is the opposite in many state courts, see
Amin v. Cty. of Henrico, 63 Va. App. 203, 209 (2014) (“Because
a circuit court speaks only through its orders, we look to the
sentencing order . . . to discern its holding.”), the federal
rule is clear.
10
however, the judgment and commitment order is evidence which may
be used to determine the intended sentence.”).
Instead of letting the oral pronouncements of the
sentencing court guide its analysis, the district court below
turned immediately to the written clerical record and statement
of reasons, remarking that they “reflect[ed] only the granting
of the 5K1.1.” J.A. 38. The court’s conclusion rested entirely
on its observation that the original written sentencing order
and corresponding docket entries did not evidence the
Government’s § 3553(e) motion. This approach is contrary to the
controlling case law and is an abuse of the district court’s
discretion. See United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 383
(6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “district court abuses its
discretion when it . . . applies the law improperly”).
Focusing on the sentencing colloquy, as we must, we have
little trouble concluding that the sentencing judge granted the
§ 3553(e) motion. The Government’s substantial assistance
motion unequivocally cited both § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 as grounds
for departure. At the sentencing hearing, the court made no
distinction between the statutory and guidelines grounds for
departure, and instead endorsed the Government’s motion “[f]or
the reasons set forth in the written motion.” J.A. 21. The
clear conclusion to be drawn from the sentencing court’s oral
ruling is that the court, in fact, granted the Government’s
11
motion on both grounds. See United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d
528, 533 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he intent of the sentencing court
must guide any retrospective inquiry into the term and nature of
a sentence.”).
Moreover, after granting the Government’s substantial
assistance motion without qualification, the court recited the
applicable guideline range as 110-137 months. The lower end of
this range plainly falls below the statutory minimum of 120
months. The court’s conclusion that the applicable sentencing
range was below the statutory minimum sentence reflects that the
court did not consider itself constrained to the statutory
sentencing floor, which could only be the case if the court had
granted the § 3553(e) motion. As Parris points out, “[i]f the
court had considered itself bound by the mandatory minimum . . .
it would have stated here that the low end of the range was 120
months, not 110 months.” Opening Br. 17. We find Parris’
observation on point. See United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d
1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence was greater than the otherwise applicable
guidelines range, the statutory mandatory minimum . . . became
the guidelines range . . . .”).
On appeal, the Government has changed its position from
that taken below. It now maintains that the district court
correctly looked to the written materials in this case because
12
the record is ambiguous about the outcome of its § 3553(e)
motion. The sentencing court did not “explicitly state that
[he] was granting the . . . § 3553(e) motion,” the Government
contends. Response Br. 17. As recited above, however, the
sentencing judge wholly adopted the Government’s motion that
expressly invoked § 3553(e). That motion plainly states that
the Government moves pursuant to “Section 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United States Code, Section
3553(e)” for a downward departure to reflect Parris’ substantial
assistance. J.A. 28 (emphasis added). In turn, the district
court’s ruling ore tenus was explicit: “For the reasons set
forth in the written motion for a downward departure . . . the
court determines that the motion for downward departure should
be and the same is allowed.” Id. at 21. Nothing in the
sentencing court’s bench ruling indicates anything but a grant
of the substantial assistance motion on the grounds pled: §
5K1.1 and § 3553(e). In the context of sentencing, we often
uphold orders that are granted by reference to a written
submission without added clarification, see, e.g., United States
v. Brame,
448 F. App'x 364, 367 (4th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Trotman, 406 F. App’x 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2011), and we see no
reason to require more here.
Alternatively, the Government argues that the fact that the
judge imposed a sentence of 120 months, which falls right at the
13
statutory minimum, indicates that the § 3553(e) motion was not
granted. We are unpersuaded this point creates ambiguity, let
alone a discrepancy sufficient to allow the district court to
consult only the written record. See Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of U.S. v. Deem, 91 F.2d 569, 575 (4th Cir. 1937) (“[I]t is not
permissible for courts by a strained and over-refined
construction of ordinary words to create an ambiguity which
would not otherwise exist.”). The fact that the sentencing
court imposed the statutory minimum sentence does not prove that
the sentencing judge, who had just granted the Government’s
motion and recited a guideline range below the statutory
minimum, thought that he lacked the authority to impose a lesser
sentence. The Government fails to appreciate that nothing from
the sentencing transcript hints that the sentencing judge
thought himself constrained to impose the statutory minimum
sentence. Instead, as described, the court specifically
identified the applicable guideline range as falling below the
statutory minimum due to the Government’s motion. On this
record, we find it more likely that the sentencing judge simply
found 120 months to be the most appropriate sentence, not that
he silently rejected the § 3553(e) motion.
In sum, the district court erred when it failed to focus on
the sentencing court’s oral ruling in its inquiry as to whether
the sentencing court granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion.
14
Instead, it looked only to the written record to find an
ambiguity, and with this view of the evidence, wrongly surmised
that the § 3553(e) motion was never granted. Applying the
correct framework, we must reach the opposite conclusion: the
substantial assistance motion was granted under § 3553(e) and
therefore the district court was authorized to depart below the
statutory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the district court
abused its discretion in rejecting Parris’ 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) motion on the ground that it lacked legal authority
to award a sentence reduction. See Williams, 687 F.3d at 285-
86.
Parris appears to suggest that we should forge ahead and
award the downward departure ourselves. This we cannot do.
Parris’ eligibility for a reduction does not entitle him to a
lower sentence. Whether, and to what extent, a reduction is
warranted here are decisions left to the discretion of the
district court, as guided by the applicable sentencing factors.
See United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 263 (4th Cir.
2015).
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand this case for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED
15
