Filed: Mar. 01, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-4519 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. KRYSTAL EILEEN SISLER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00020-JPB-MJA-4) Submitted: January 26, 2017 Decided: March 1, 2017 Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per cur
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 16-4519 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. KRYSTAL EILEEN SISLER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00020-JPB-MJA-4) Submitted: January 26, 2017 Decided: March 1, 2017 Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curi..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4519
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KRYSTAL EILEEN SISLER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (2:14-cr-00020-JPB-MJA-4)
Submitted: January 26, 2017 Decided: March 1, 2017
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
L. Richard Walker, Senior Litigator, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
Kristen Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States
Attorney, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Krystal Eileen Sisler appeals the district court’s judgment
sentencing her to 37 months’ imprisonment following revocation
of her probation. On appeal, Sisler contends that her sentence
is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
Upon revoking a defendant’s probation, a district court has
broad discretion to impose a sentence up to the statutory
maximum. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir.
2007). We apply the same standard for reviewing a sentence
imposed on revocation of probation that we employ for reviewing
a sentence imposed on revocation of supervised release.
Id. at
655. We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the
statutory maximum and is not “plainly unreasonable.”
Id. at
656. To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first assess whether the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th
Cir. 2006).
Reasonableness review involves both procedural and
substantive components. In conducting this review, we “take[] a
more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for
guidelines sentences.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A probation revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considers the
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Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter Seven advisory policy statement
range and explains the sentence adequately after considering the
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing
factors. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57; see 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)
(2012). It is substantively reasonable if the district court
states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440; see also United States v. Thompson,
595
F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (sentencing explanation in
revocation context “need not be as detailed or specific” as is
required for an original sentence). Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then
decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.”
Crudup,
461 F.3d at 439.
The revocation statutes make clear that courts “shall
consider” the “applicable guidelines or policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission” in rendering a sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B); Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656. Sisler’s
original sentence reflected a downward departure from the
original 30- to 37-month Guidelines range to an 18- to 24-month
Guidelines range and a subsequent downward variance to
probation. At the revocation hearing, defense counsel noted
that Sisler had no criminal history points, mentioned her
original downward departure Guidelines range was 18 to 24
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months, and stated that her Chapter 7 policy statement range was
3 to 9 months. Describing Sisler as a nonviolent, first-time
drug offender, defense counsel argued that a sentence within or
above the original Guidelines range would be excessive and
unnecessary. Counsel requested a sentence of imprisonment only
long enough for Sisler to gain admittance to a residential drug
treatment facility. The Government argued for the same sentence
it sought at the original sentencing: 18 months’ imprisonment,
the low end of Sisler’s downward departure Guidelines range.
In announcing Sisler’s 37-month sentence, the district
court explained that it “varied upward” from what either party
requested to a term within the original Guidelines range
calculated before the downward departure and variance. By
acknowledging the sentences requested by each party, the
district court demonstrated that it considered the parties’
arguments, which included discussions of the applicable policy
statements and advisory Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Davis,
53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining that revocation
sentence was procedurally reasonable when, although not
mentioning advisory policy statement range, court referenced
range specified in probation officer’s worksheet and counsel’s
argument, thus demonstrating that the court contemplated the
policy statement range).
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Sisler also contends that the court failed to explain its
consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Although the
district court did not specifically mention 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
in imposing the sentence, it was not required to “robotically
tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). We conclude that
the district court’s explanation reflected that it evaluated the
proper § 3553(a) factors relevant to Sisler, namely the nature
and circumstances of Sisler’s conduct that violated the
conditions of her probation. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),
3565(a). The court’s remarks that Sisler was unwilling or
unable to follow the protocol of probation demonstrate that it
considered the need for the revocation sentence to sanction
Sisler’s breach of the court’s trust. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual USSG ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b),
p.s. (2014) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.”).
Lastly, Sisler takes issue with the district court’s
conclusion that her conduct presented a danger to herself and to
others, claiming that this amounted to clearly erroneous fact
finding. Our review of the record on appeal leads us to
conclude that the district court’s findings are supported by the
record.
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Because Sisler’s revocation sentence is not procedurally or
substantively unreasonable, it is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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