Filed: Jan. 30, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-4356 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MAGIC C. NORMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00082-D-1) Submitted: January 24, 2018 Decided: January 30, 2018 Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, Acting
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 17-4356 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. MAGIC C. NORMAN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00082-D-1) Submitted: January 24, 2018 Decided: January 30, 2018 Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, Acting F..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4356
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAGIC C. NORMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (5:10-cr-00082-D-1)
Submitted: January 24, 2018 Decided: January 30, 2018
Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Acting Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Magic C. Norman appeals the 24-month term of imprisonment imposed by the
district court after revocation of Norman’s supervised release. On appeal, Norman argues
that the district court’s reliance on his breach of the court’s trust did not support the
13-month upward variance from the nonbinding policy statement range calculated under
Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and rendered his sentence plainly unreasonable.
We affirm.
We review a sentence imposed as a result of a supervised release revocation “to
determine whether [the sentence is] plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461
F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we first
consider whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. United States
v. Slappy,
872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017);
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. “A revocation
sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the chosen
sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding Chapter Seven policy
statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors.”
Slappy, 872 F.3d at
207 (footnote omitted). The “sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently
states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed.”
Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). If we find the revocation
sentence unreasonable, we must consider “whether it is plainly so, relying on the definition
of plain used in our plain error analysis—that is, clear or obvious.”
Id. at 208 (brackets
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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We have reviewed the record on appeal with these standards in mind. The district
court properly considered Norman’s breach of the court’s trust in determining his
revocation sentence. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2016);
United States v. Bennett,
698 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that breach of
trust is “a perfectly appropriate basis—and, in fact, the principal basis on which the
Guidelines encourage courts to ground revocation sentences”). In addition to Norman’s
breach of the court’s trust, the district court considered the seriousness of each of Norman’s
supervised release violations but did not take into account the events surrounding his arrest
for resisting a public officer. We conclude that the sentence imposed by the district court
is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s revocation judgment. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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