Filed: Jan. 23, 2020
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4340 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BRANDON CORY LECROY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:18-cr-00480-BHH-1) Submitted: January 21, 2020 Decided: January 23, 2020 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Erica M. Soderdahl, As
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4340 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. BRANDON CORY LECROY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:18-cr-00480-BHH-1) Submitted: January 21, 2020 Decided: January 23, 2020 Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Erica M. Soderdahl, Ass..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4340
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRANDON CORY LECROY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (8:18-cr-00480-BHH-1)
Submitted: January 21, 2020 Decided: January 23, 2020
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Erica M. Soderdahl, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sherri A. Lydon, United
States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Cory Lecroy pleaded guilty to one count of using interstate commerce
facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2018).
At sentencing, the district court determined that Lecroy’s offense level was 37 and that he
had a category-I criminal history, but that his Guidelines sentence was 120 months’
imprisonment, the statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a); U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5G1.1(a) (2018). The district court imposed a sentence of 120
months. Lecroy appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court committed procedural
error by not addressing his arguments for a shorter sentence.
To avoid procedural error, a district court at sentencing must provide an
individualized assessment of the facts in the case before it, which requires consideration of
a defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a shorter sentence and an explanation of the
sentence the court chooses. See Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 49-50 (2007); United
States v. Blue,
877 F.3d 513, 517-18 (4th Cir. 2017). Lecroy contends that the district court
did not address his arguments that physical and emotional abuse he suffered as a child,
learning disabilities, and intellectual deficiencies contributed to his offense conduct and
were mitigating factors weighing in favor of a shorter sentence.
It is plain from the full transcript of the sentencing hearing, however, that the district
court did consider Lecroy’s arguments in favor of mitigation—which Lecroy also raised to
argue unsuccessfully against a three-level enhancement to his offense level for hate-crime
motivation, see USSG § 3A1.1(a)—but agreed instead with the Government that while
Lecroy had some difficulties functioning, he was competent and thought and acted clearly
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enough to formulate and embark upon a plan to kill his neighbor. See Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 358-59 (2007) (district court not required to say explicitly that it heard and
considered argument when context and record make clear it did). We thus find that the
district court did not procedurally err in imposing Lecroy’s sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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