Filed: Jul. 07, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4802 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LOURDES TERRAZAS-SILAS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00127-LMB-1) Submitted: June 26, 2020 Decided: July 7, 2020 Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Pu
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 19-4802 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LOURDES TERRAZAS-SILAS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00127-LMB-1) Submitted: June 26, 2020 Decided: July 7, 2020 Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Pub..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4802
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LOURDES TERRAZAS-SILAS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00127-LMB-1)
Submitted: June 26, 2020 Decided: July 7, 2020
Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate Attorney,
Cadence A. Mertz, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. G. Zachary Terwilliger,
United States Attorney, Anthony W. Mariano, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Aidan Taft Grano, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lourdes Terrazas-Silas appeals her conviction for illegal reentry after being
removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2018). Terrazas-Silas challenges the district
court’s finding that her indictment was issued within the five-year statute of limitations.
She also challenges the entry of the underlying expedited removal order, arguing that it
was fundamentally unfair. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3) (2018). We affirm.
Illegal reentry cases under § 1326(a) are subject to a five-year limitations period.
United States v. De Leon-Ramirez,
925 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2019). “[T]his period starts
running when the crime is complete.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An illegal
reentry crime is “complete when a noncitizen, after being deported, is at any time found in
the United States without official permission.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Assuming that the Government bore the burden of proof, we conclude that the evidence
shows that federal authorities were unaware of Terrazas-Silas’ illegal presence in the
United States until August 2016. Thus, the April 2019 indictment was issued within the
statute of limitations.
“In a criminal proceeding for illegal reentry, the existence of a removal order usually
is enough to meet the government’s burden of establishing the defendant’s prior removal
or deportation.” United States v. Cortez,
930 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2019). In United
States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Supreme Court held that “where the
defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an
alternative means of obtaining judicial review must be made available before the
administrative order may be used to establish conclusively an element of a criminal
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offense.”
Id. at 838. If the alien is deprived of the right to have the disposition in a removal
proceeding judicially reviewed, “review [must] be made available in any subsequent
proceeding in which the result of the deportation proceedings is used to establish an
element of a criminal offense.”
Id. at 839.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2018), titled “Limitation on collateral attack on
underlying deportation order,” Terrazas-Diaz needed to show that (1) she exhausted “any
administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order,”
(2) the deportation proceedings “improperly deprived [her] of the opportunity for judicial
review,” and (3) “the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” § 1326(d). She must
satisfy all three requirements in order to prevail. United States v. El Shami,
434 F.3d 659,
663 (4th Cir. 2005).
“To demonstrate fundamental unfairness in the entry of the removal order,
[Terrazas-Diaz] must show that (1) [her] due process rights were violated by defects in
[her] underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) [s]he suffered prejudice as a result of the
defects.” United States v. Lopez-Collazo,
824 F.3d 463, 460 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Due process requires, at a minimum, that an alien be given
(1) notice of the charges against [her], (2) a hearing before an executive or administrative
tribunal, and (3) a fair opportunity to be heard.”
Id. at 461 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, to establish prejudice, Terrazas-Diaz must show that she “suffered actual
prejudice as a result of the due process violations in the removal proceedings.”
Id. at 462
(emphasis omitted) (citing El
Shami, 434 F.3d at 665 (“[A defendant] has to show under
the fundamental unfairness requirement . . . that the deficiencies in the deportation
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proceedings caused [her] actual prejudice.”)). Specifically, she “must show that, but for
the errors complained of, there was a reasonable probability that [s]he would not have been
deported.” El
Shami, 434 F.3d at 665. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Fulks,
683 F.3d 512, 517 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This is not a generalized showing of
prejudice; rather, the defendant must link the actual prejudice [s]he claims to have suffered
to the specific due process violation at issue.”
Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d at 462. Terrazas-
Silas asserts that there is a reasonable probability that she would have been given
permission to withdraw her application for admission and allowed to return to Bolivia
without an order of removal. Upon our review of the record and the district court’s
findings, we conclude that Terrazas-Silas failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability
that a formal request to withdraw her application for admission would have been granted
by the immigration officer.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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