Filed: Aug. 12, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20-4082 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TIMOTHY ALAN HIMELRIGHT, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00028-GMG-RWT-1) Submitted: May 12, 2020 Decided: August 12, 2020 Before DIAZ, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Nichola
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20-4082 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TIMOTHY ALAN HIMELRIGHT, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00028-GMG-RWT-1) Submitted: May 12, 2020 Decided: August 12, 2020 Before DIAZ, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Nicholas..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4082
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
TIMOTHY ALAN HIMELRIGHT,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00028-GMG-RWT-1)
Submitted: May 12, 2020 Decided: August 12, 2020
Before DIAZ, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Powell,
United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Kimberly Crockett, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy Alan Himelright was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment and 40
years’ supervised release for distributing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(b)(1). On appeal, Himelright argues that the district court erred at
his sentencing in three ways: (1) by failing to address his nonfrivolous argument for a
downward variance, (2) by failing to explain the length or special conditions of his
supervised release, and (3) by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.
We conclude that the district court erred by failing to address Himelright’s
nonfrivolous argument for a downward variance. We therefore vacate Himelright’s
sentence as procedurally unreasonable and remand for resentencing.
I.
In October 2018, Himelright sent from West Virginia (via a social media app) a
two-minute video containing child pornography to undercover police in the United
Kingdom. Himelright also used the app’s chat feature to describe supposed sexual
interactions between him and his daughter. The police in the United Kingdom shared this
information with their counterparts in West Virginia. An investigation by West Virginian
authorities led them to Himelright, who admitted to using the app to view and share child
pornography.
Himelright pleaded guilty to one count of distributing child pornography in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(b)(1). Himelright’s presentence report calculated an
advisory Guidelines sentence range of 97–121 months’ imprisonment, and five years to a
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lifetime of supervised release. Among other enhancements and reductions, Himelright’s
Guidelines range incorporated a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) for
using a computer to commit his offense. Neither Himelright nor the government objected
to the presentence report.
Himelright did, however, request a downward variance on the ground that the
§ 2G2.2(b)(6) enhancement no longer serves its original purpose because most child
pornography offenses now involve a computer. Based on this argument and two others not
at issue here, Himelright requested a sentence of 78 months’ imprisonment and five years’
supervised release.
At sentencing, the district court sentenced Himelright to 121 months’ imprisonment,
at the high end of his Guidelines range, and 40 years’ supervised release. The court noted
the severity of Himelright’s crime, his impact on his victims, the need to punish him, and
the need to protect society. The court also noted that, although Himelright’s charged
conduct was limited to one video, this was because Himelright deleted the relevant app,
preventing law enforcement from recovering suspected additional images. In addition, the
district court included over 20 special conditions for Himelright’s supervised release. The
court stated that the special conditions would protect the community, prevent recidivism,
and provide rehabilitation.
This appeal followed.
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II.
A.
Himelright raises three issues on appeal: (1) the district court procedurally erred by
failing to address his nonfrivolous § 2G2.2(b)(6) argument for a downward variance, (2)
the district court procedurally erred by not giving an individualized explanation for either
the length or special conditions of his supervised release, and (3) the sentence is
substantively unreasonable.
We review sentences for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). We first consider whether the district court committed any “significant procedural
error.”
Id. at 51. Specifically, to affirm, we must be satisfied that “the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s advisory guidelines range, gave the parties an
opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.” United States v. Ross,
912 F.3d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). As part of that mandate, “the district court
must provide some individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and rejection
of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on § 3553.”
Id. A district court can
justify its rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence in two ways: (1) by directly
addressing a defendant’s non-frivolous argument in its sentencing explanation or (2) by
“engag[ing] with a defendant’s arguments in a way that makes patently obvious that it has
given specific attention to a non-frivolous argument for a shorter sentence.” See United
States v. Webb, -- F.3d --,
2020 WL 3955953, at *5–6 (4th Cir. July 13, 2020).
B.
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We agree with Himelright that the district court failed to consider and explain its
rejection of his § 2G2.2(b)(6) argument.
For starters, the argument isn’t frivolous. The government argues otherwise, relying
on a Sixth Circuit decision rejecting claims that § 2G2.2(b)(6) shouldn’t apply merely
because the use of computers is common in child pornography cases. See United States v.
Walters,
775 F.3d 778, 786–87 (6th Cir. 2015). But whether Himelright’s Guidelines range
properly incorporates § 2G2.2(b)(6) and whether it is reasonable to apply § 2G2.2(b)(6) to
Himelright are two separate questions. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 46.
And it’s clear that the district court failed to either directly or in a “patently obvious”
way address Himelright’s § 2G2.2(b)(6) argument at any point during his sentencing
hearing. See Webb,
2020 WL 3955953, at *5–6. The court’s sole mention of § 2G2.2(b)(6)
was when it recited the enhancements that led to Himelright’s Guidelines range. Though
the court noted that Himelright used a computer to commit his offense, it never confronted
his argument that § 2G2.2(b)(6)’s application to the record facts warranted a downward
variance. We have held that sentences with similar deficiencies are procedurally
unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Blue,
877 F.3d 513, 519 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding
that the district court procedurally erred by addressing only two of Blue’s eight
nonfrivolous arguments for mitigation).
This error alone warrants a remand. But we also note Himelright’s argument that
the court failed to adequately explain the 40-year term (and special conditions) of
supervised release. Because we remand for resentencing, we leave it to the district court
to consider this argument.
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For the reasons given, we vacate Himelright’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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