Brought by plaintiff, a wholesale distributor of Shell Oil products, against defendant, the Texas Company, another marketer of petroleum products, the suit was for allegedly inducing a breach of contract between plaintiff and Horne's of Bayard, Inc., the operator of a gasoline service station and candy store in Bayard, Florida, which plaintiff had previously supplied.

In addition to compensatory damages, plaintiff, alleging that the interference with the contract rights of the plaintiff was without justification and malicious, and in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 13, 13a, 13b, 21a, claimed $1,000,000.00.

Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, to strike from it the reference to the Robinson-Patman Act, and for summary judgment, arguing in support (1) that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief whatever because no valid contract or lease existed between plaintiff and the Hornes; and (2) that there had been no violation of the Robinson-Patman Act on which to ground a claim for punitive damages.

Granting the motions to the extent of striking the reference to the Robinson-Patman Act and the claim for punitive damages, the district judge denied defendant's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment except as to the claim of punitive damages.

Thereafter plaintiff moving for leave to file an amended complaint which it tendered with the motion and the district judge denying the motion on the ground that the amended complaint presented no essential difference in fact or in law from the original complaint, the cause went to trial before the court without a jury on the question of compensatory damages.

The trial concluded, the district judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law1 and entered judgment accordingly, and plaintiff has appealed, assigning four specifications of error.2

Recognizing the controlling effect of the findings of fact of the district court, on the tendered issue, whether defendant induced the breach of plaintiff's contract with Hornes, plaintiff devotes the larger portion of his brief to the task of overcoming the effect of these findings. Setting out some of the oral testimony and stating, 'So we come into a direct conflict in the testimony', appellant goes on to say:

'If we had only this oral testimony, the Court would be faced with the impossible task of determining who's lying. However, you don't have to rely on oral testimony to so decide, to resolve this case. There is in this record documentary evidence in the form of correspondence between officials of Texas on this subject which sets it all out in full and gives us the true picture.'

Thus premising, appellant, setting out the correspondence he relies on, argues vigorously that these writings completely refute and thus make clearly erroneous the court's finding of fact No. 9:

'I find that nothing was done by Texas to solicit the Hornes' business at Bayard, at any time material hereto. All the negotiations between the Hornes and Texas were at the Hornes' instigation and Texas did nothing more than accept the business when it was offered. Hence, regardless of the nature of the legal relation between the Hornes and Stanton, no breach of that relation is shown to have been induced by Texas Company.'

Insisting that the court should have found to the contrary on this issue, appellant then proceeds to a discussion of the other issue which the court declined to decide, whether he had an enforceable contract with the Hornes. Urging upon us that even though a contract is unenforceable, because of the statute of frauds or of some other defect which could be raised by the other party to the contract, such defect cannot be availed of by a person in the position of Texas as a defense to a suit for causing the breach of it, he cites and discusses cases which he claims support his view.

Leaving to the last page of his brief, and without citing any authority or putting forward any argument in support, appellant contents himself with the dictum that there can be no doubt that Texas willfully and knowingly violated the Robinson-Patman Act.

Finally, in a single paragraph dealing with the question of damages and completely disregarding the finding that defendant had not committed the acts charged against it, appellant concludes his brief with the didactic assertion that he should be here awarded the compensatory damages which the parties agreed should be awarded as due, if there was a breach, and the cause should be remanded for a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages.

The appellee squarely meeting the contentions and arguments of appellant on the issue which was decided by the district judge, presents as its counter point one, 'The trial court's finding of fact, that Texas did nothing to induce or support any breach of contract, is amply supported by the evidence and is dispositive of the entire appeal', and supports it by full reference to excerpts from and discussions of the record facts.

Proceeding then, as the appellant has done, though the district judge did not decide the question, to argue that there was no valid contract to breach, appellee puts forward and vigorously argues its counter point, 'Plaintiff's action for inducing breach of contract will not lie because there was no valid contract to breach'. Citing in support Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934; Pokress v. Southern Hotel Corp., Fla., 42 So. 2d 166; Behrman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1094, 137 So. 120; Camichos v. Diana Stores Corp., 157 Fla. 349, 25 So. 2d 864; Baker v. Coleman, 160 Fla. 297, 34 So. 2d 538; Minsky's Follies of Florida, Inc., v. Sennes, 5 Cir., 206 F.2d 1, appellee stoutly disputes appellant's contentions both as to the validity of the contract and as to his right to recover for interference with his business relations, even though there was no valid contract. Pointing out that the evidence completely agreement show: (1) that there was an agreement on the essential terms of the option; (2) that the option was exercised; and (3) that the statute of frauds was satisfied; appellee insists that the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the alleged breach sued for did not occur and could not have occurred because plaintiff had not contract to breach.

Finally, meeting appellant's claim, that he pleaded and proved a case entitling him to punitive damages, by pointing out that on the facts of record and under the findings of the court, plaintiff failed to establish that he was entitled to any recovery whatever and his claim for punitive damages inevitably fails,3 appellee insists that appellant's claim, that this is a case for punitive damages, is hardly to be taken seriously.

We find ourselves in complete agreement with appellee's position that the findings of fact and the rulings and judgment of the district court are well supported by the record.

It is impossible to read the pleadings and the evidence without reaching the fixed conviction that what was really in controversy below was not whether there had been a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act or whether Texas had interfered with the general business relations between plaintiff and the Hornes, but whether, as charged by plaintiff, 'The Texas Company unlawfully interfered with the contract rights of the plaintiff without justification, as hereinabove shown, and operated to the detriment of the plaintiff, C. C. Stanton and to its own profit and advantage.'

When, therefore, the district judge found, as he did in Par. 9:

'I find nothing was done by Texas to solicit the Hornes' business at Bayard at any time material hereto. All the negotiations between the Hornes and Texas were at the Hornes' instigation and Texas did nothing more than accept the business when it was offered.',

If this finding is supported by the record, he completely and effectively disposed of the case before him. Recognizing that this is so, appellant undertakes by a strong and earnest attack on the finding to set it aside as erroneous, while the appellee, with the same recognition, as vigorously defends it as amply supported by the record.

We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments that the correspondence on which he relies refutes the oral testimony which the court accepted as correct and establishes that the finding was erroneous. On the contrary, after considering the whole record in the light of the finding and the arguments, we agree with appellee that we ought not, indeed may not, interfere with it. Because we do and because this finding is dispositive of the appeal, we find it unnecessary to discuss or consider the other matters so vigorously and interestingly discussed in both briefs.

The judgment was right. It is affirmed.