This suit arises out of events beginning with the attempted purchase in 1961 by M. D. Bryant of possible vacancies in the vicinity of land claimed by plaintiff, L. L. McGuire, in the Big Bend country of West Texas. Pursuant to provisions of Texas law1 a hearing was held and the vacancies were found to exist.

Following this hearing McGuire filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division in which he alleged that the vacancy proceeding was conducted and the vacancy declared pursuant to a fraudulent conspiracy participated in by the officials of the General Land Office of the State of Texas, Bryant, Gulf Oil Corporation and its employees. The suit was dismissed on June 19, 1963 and appeal was taken by McGuire.

This Court reversed the dismissal, McGuire v. Sadler, 5 Cir., 1964, 337 F.2d 902, and remanded the case for trial. The land had, however, been sold on June 24, 1963 to Bryant and leases for the production of oil and gas had been granted to Gulf Oil Corporation, who drilled two dry holes.

After the remand, the District Court in Austin on March 29, 1966 appointed a Special Master. Then, after a hearing that lasted six weeks, the Special Master reported that the survey upon which the declaration of a vacancy had been based was incorrect. His report was adopted and the vacancy proceeding was set aside by a judgment of the District Court dated June 13, 1967. Thus that suit came to an end with McGuire having cleared his title to the land.

McGuire, however, had on April 24, 1967 filed the present action. In this action he seeks damages for the destruction of the speculative value of his property as a result of the dry holes drilled by Gulf, he seeks to recover the money paid by Gulf to Bryant2 for the leases, and he seeks legal and surveying fees.3 This relief is sought under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1985,4 which give a remedy for state action that deprives persons of federal Constitutional and statutory rights. In addition, McGuire claims to have a direct remedy under the Constitution, specifically Article I, Section 105 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The defendants responded to this damage action by motions to dismiss on the pleadings and motions for summary judgment. After a hearing the District Court granted their motions for summary judgment. The Court concluded that McGuire's action for damages had been barred by limitations. Specifically, the District Court held that the claim arose on June 24, 1963 when the vacancies were sold to Bryant and that the Texas two year statute of limitations6 was applicable.

It is well established that when, as here, Congress has provided no period of limitation for a federal claim, the federal courts must borrow the applicable statute of limitations from the state in which it sits. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 1914, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S. Ct. 596, 58 L. Ed. 980; Beard v. Stephens, 5 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 685.8 This borrowing is a two-step process. First, the essential nature of the federal claim must be determined. Secondly, the state law must be looked to in order to determine which state statute is applicable to claims like the one the Court has determined it is presented with. Beard v. Stephens, supra; Moviecolor Limited v. Eastman Kodak Co., 2 Cir., 1961, 288 F.2d 80, 90 A.L.R. 2d 252, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 821, 82 S. Ct. 39, 7 L. Ed. 2d 26; Bertha Building Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 2 Cir., 1959, 269 F.2d 785, cert. denied, 1960, 361 U.S. 960, 80 S. Ct. 585, 4 L. Ed. 2d 542.

Although McGuire argues that his action is essentially of an equitable nature to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the lease from Bryant to Gulf, it seems clear that it is really to recover damages under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 or for trespass under the Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Kishi, Tex.Com.App., 1927, 276 S.W. 190 theory.9 In either case the Texas two-year statute of limitation applies. If it is considered to arise under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 or § 1985, it would come under § 4 of V.A.T.S. Art. 5526, (see note 6, supra), Jackson v. Duke, 5 Cir., 1958, 259 F.2d 3, since it is well established by Texas law that liability created by statute is an action for debt for limitation purposes. See e. g., Cowart v. Russell, 1940, 135 Tex. 562, 144 S.W.2d 249; Hamilton v. Board of Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund Trustees, Tex.Civ.App., 1966, 408 S.W.2d 781, writ ref. n. r. e. And, if it is action for trespass, the statute is explicit (V.A.T.S. Art. 5526 § 1, see note 6, supra.) Moreover the plea for recovery of the money paid by Gulf to Bryant is just part of the total claim for damages under 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983 and 1985. And, if it is considered to have some quasi-common-law basis, it would still be one for debt or on an account and barred by the two-year statute of limitation. Ferguson v. Ferguson, Tex.Civ.App. — Austin, 1944, writ ref. w. m., 181 S.W.2d 601; Zaruba v. Boethel, Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi, 1965, 393 S.W.2d 716; Clanton v. Community Finance & Thrift Corp., Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland, 1953, 262 S.W.2d 252.

The District Court was also correct in its determination of when the statute of limitation began to run. The rule in Texas is that limitations run from the date of the commission of the wrong. Houston Waterworks Co. v. Kennedy, 1888, 70 Tex. 233, 8 S.W. 36. And here, under whatever characterization of the essential nature of the claim that may be used, the wrong occurred where McGuire lost possession through the sale of the supposed vacancies to Bryant and the leasing of the property to Gulf. This all occurred on June 24, 1963.

Although placing heavy reliance upon the fraudulent concealment exception to the general limitations rule, McGuire cannot shield himself with that doctrine since he knew of the activities of all the defendants at the time the claim arose. He was actually engaged in litigation over the title to the property during the entire time limitations were running.10 McGuire also claims that he could not have known the extent of his damages in the summer of 1963 since the wells Gulf was drilling had not yet proved to be dry holes. He did, however, know of Gulf's activity and he knew injuries were being done. Under such circumstances it is clear that the running of the statute of limitation is not postponed. Burnham v. Todd, 5 Cir., 1944, 139 F.2d 338, 342.

Thus the District Court was correct in all aspects of its determination as to the applicability of the bar of limitations. McGuire has had many opportunities to right the wrong he claims was done him. But, he chose only to get his land back. The law regards it as a case in which he has slept on his claims for other relief.

Affirmed.