On the evening of September 20, 1973, a Beech Model 18 Aircraft carrying singer Jim Croce and his entourage (the "Jim Croce Group" or the "group") crashed shortly after takeoff from the Natchitoches, Louisiana, airport. Among those killed was Croce's road manager, Kenneth Dominick Cortese, whose wife and son are the plaintiffs in this wrongful death action.1

Initially, we recite only the most pertinent facts; other relevant ones are detailed in our discussion below of the numerous legal issues. On September 18, 1973, Bill Breedlove, the Director of Operations of Mustang Aviation, Inc. ("Mustang"), entered into an agreement with Lloyd St. Martin of Variety Artists International, Inc. ("Variety Artists"), a booking agency for popular singers, to provide an aircraft to fly the Jim Croce Group from Shawnee, Oklahoma, to Columbus, Mississippi, to Natchitoches, Louisiana, and then on to Dallas. Mr. St. Martin wired Mustang the agreed upon fee ($952.63). Later that day, Mr. Breedlove learned that the aircraft he had planned to use to transport the group was disabled. He thereupon contacted John Roberts, President of Bromley Corporation, d/b/a Roberts Airways ("Roberts Airways"), who agreed to provide a Roberts Airways plane and pilot to fly the charter for Mustang.2 Whether the group or its booking agent was ever notified that Roberts Airways had been substituted for Mustang is disputed by the parties. In any event, the Roberts Airways plane, flown by Robert N. Elliott, followed the itinerary until its fatal crash on leaving Natchitoches airport on September 20.3

The circumstances surrounding the airplane crash and the cause of the crash were hotly contested at trial. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the pilot's negligence for example, his failure to perform a full preflight check of the aircraft or his taking off downwind into a "black hole" or his having had a heart attack was the cause of the crash. Taking off at night, the plane was airborne only a short while before crashing. Everyone aboard the plane died instantly. Some marijuana and other controlled substances were found in the plane's debris, and a small amount of marijuana was found on the body of the plaintiffs' decedent.

Linda and Eric Cortese, decedent's wife and minor son, brought this wrongful death action against both Mustang and Roberts Airways. See n.1, supra. Three separate trials were held, each addressing a different question, and this appeal involves aspects of all three trials. At the first, bench trial, held in July 1976, the sole material issue was Mustang's liability for the actions of Roberts Airways. The trial judge rejected plaintiffs' theories of vicarious liability, respondeat superior, and joint venture but held Mustang liable on two alternative grounds: (1) Mustang was liable for the acts of its agent, Roberts Airways, and was estopped from denying that agency; and (2) Mustang was liable as the agent of an undisclosed principal (Roberts Airways). The court denied an interlocutory appeal. At the second trial, held in August 1977, a jury found that the pilot's failure to exercise the highest degree of care was a proximate cause of the airplane crash. In a separate order, the trial court held that "as a matter of law," the defendants were "common carriers who owed plaintiffs' decedent( ) the highest standard of care." Therefore, in accordance with the jury's verdict, the court held defendants Mustang and Roberts Airways jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs' damages. The third trial, on the issue of damages, resulted in a jury verdict for plaintiffs in the following amounts: $250,000 for care, maintenance, and support; $10,000 for household services; $20,000 for love, affection, counsel, and guidance; and $20,000 for sorrow, mental anguish, or grief suffered as a result of the decedent's death.4

Both Roberts Airways and Mustang bring this appeal, alleging numerous errors in the second and third trials. With respect to the second trial, they challenge the district court's denial of their motions for a directed verdict, a judgment n. o. v., and a new trial; its holding as a matter of law that the defendants were carriers who owed the highest degree of care to plaintiffs' decedent; its admitting certain evidence with respect to the pilot's prior conduct; and its failure to appoint a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of decedent's minor son. From the third trial, defendants appeal the court's admitting certain testimony concerning the decedent's future earnings, its refusing to give an instruction that any damages awarded by the jury would not be subject to federal income tax, and its permitting the jury to award separate damages for mental anguish and loss of love and affection. In addition, Mustang appeals the district court's holding in the first trial that it is liable for the actions of Roberts Airways. We will initially discuss the issue of Mustang's liability, as determined in the first trial, and then proceed to consider the other issues seriatim.

The district court concluded as a matter of law that "Mustang is estopped to deny agency because Mustang led the Croce group to believe that Robert Elliott, the pilot, was Mustang's agent, flying Mustang's airplane," and that "(t)he Croce Group reasonably relied, to its detriment, on Mustang's implied promise that Mustang would fly the charter flight." Thus, it held Mustang liable for the actions of Roberts Airways and its pilot, Robert Elliott. Alternatively, the court found Mustang liable as "the agent of an undisclosed principal."5 Mustang contends that it is not liable under either theory. We disagree. We hold that Mustang is liable for the actions of Roberts Airways and its pilot on estoppel grounds.6

Mustang asserts that the district court erred in allocating the burden of proof on the estoppel theory. The following statement from the court's explanatory Memorandum and Order, issued after Mustang challenged its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, provides the basis for Mustang's assertion: "Mustang was under a duty to speak. Mustang did not. The burden of avoidance of this breach of duty by proof that the Croce group learned from sources other than Mustang of the substitution (of Roberts Airways) can hardly be placed upon the Croce group." (emphasis added).

The remainder of the Memorandum and Order, however, makes clear that the district court properly placed the burden of proving estoppel on the plaintiffs and that he was persuaded by the evidence adduced at trial that plaintiffs had carried that burden. In the margin, we quote in full the relevant portion of the Memorandum and Order.7 This language reveals that the allegedly erroneous statement to which Mustang points concerns merely an alternative estoppel theory, the breach of a duty to speak,8 that was, in the court's words, "(w)holly apart from the direct evidence of nondisclosure, which in this court's view would directly meet the burden of proof argument . . . ." (emphasis added). The direct evidence was provided in large part by Richard Linden, a Mustang employee. Linden testified that he had contacted a member of the group on the road and left word that a substitute aircraft would be provided;9 however, he also indicated that he was not likely to have informed the person that the substitute would be provided by Roberts Airways or that Mustang would no longer be responsible for the flight. The district court found, as a matter of fact, that

there is no credible evidence that Richard C. Linden informed the Croce agent that Roberts (Airways) was the owner and operator of the substitute or that Roberts (Airways) was solely responsible for the flight, nor did anyone secure the Croce Group's agreement to the change from the original contract. While the evidence on this point is sparse, the reasonable inferences from the evidence left the court with the firm belief that no such communication occurred.

In light of Linden's testimony, this finding is not clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). Nor is the finding that no one "in the Croce Group knew or should have known that Mustang was not responsible for the flight or that Roberts (Airways) was flying it in Mustang's place." Besides the direct evidence of nondisclosure provided by Linden, the district court relied on testimony given by the president of Roberts Airways that it was customary for Roberts Airways not to disclose to customers that they were substituting for Mustang. The inferences drawn by the trial court from this evidence are reasonable.10 Because the factual findings detailed above fully support the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs carried their burden of proof on the estoppel issue, we hold that Mustang is estopped from denying that Roberts Airways was its agent and is liable for the acts of that agent.

Denial of Defendants' Motions for a Directed Verdict,

Defendants claim that there was insufficient evidence of the pilot's negligence to support a jury verdict for plaintiffs in the second trial and that the district court therefore erred in denying their motions for a directed verdict, a judgment n. o. v., and a new trial. Having thoroughly reviewed the trial transcript, we are firmly convinced that the defendants' position is without merit. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), sets out the standard by which to measure the denial of a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment n. o. v. Shipman mandates that we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion in this instance, plaintiffs. "(I)f there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury." Id. at 374.

The evidence presented at the second trial was substantial enough to withstand the motion for a directed verdict or a judgment n. o. v. The central issue at the trial was whether the pilot's negligence was a proximate cause of the crash. Although defendants presented expert testimony to the effect that the pilot had suffered a heart attack shortly after takeoff,11 the plaintiffs presented evidence that was certainly sufficient to raise doubt in the mind of a reasonable juror that the pilot had suffered a heart attack.12 Plaintiffs contended at trial that various acts of negligence on the part of the pilot, rather than a heart attack, caused the crash.13 Any one of the several negligent acts alleged,14 if proved, would be sufficient to support a jury verdict for plaintiffs. Of these, we discuss in detail only one the pilot's alleged spatial disorientation.

The plaintiffs' expert medical witness testified at length that spatial disorientation resulting from the pilot's taking off into a "black hole" was the cause of the crash. See n.12, supra. This theory was buttressed by the testimony of Asher Vandenberg, a commercial, multiengine pilot with instrument ratings.15 Vandenberg testified that "Natchitoches is the worst (black-out area) I have ever seen" and that a pilot taking off at night to the south "would fly into a black void." Such a takeoff, according to Vandenberg, would severely hinder a pilot's ability to tell by visual reference whether, and how far, the airplane was climbing or turning. Although other pilots testified for defendants that the deceased pilot's takeoff on the night of the crash was proper, all of the evidence on this issue, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Shipman, 411 F.2d at 374, could have led a "reasonable and fair-minded" person to conclude that the pilot was in fact negligent in taking off in the manner that he did. Given all of the evidence on plaintiffs' various theories of negligence and the conflicting evidence concerning the pilot's alleged heart attack, we conclude that the trial judge rightly denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict and let the issue of the pilot's negligence go to the jury.16 It follows that his denial of defendant's motion for a judgment n. o. v. was proper as well.

With respect to the judge's denial of defendants' motion for a new trial, we are bound by an "abuse of discretion" standard. See Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1980); Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976). In light of the evidence outlined above, we find no such abuse here.

The district court at the August 1977 trial ruled that defendants were "common carriers who owed the plaintiffs' decedent( ) the highest standard of care" with regard to the flight in question. The jury found that the pilot's failure to exercise the highest degree of care was a proximate cause of the airplane crash. Defendants submit that they owed the decedent only a duty of ordinary care and that they are therefore entitled to a judgment in their favor in light of the additional jury finding that the pilot's failure to exercise ordinary care was not a proximate cause of the crash.

Defendants concede that a common carrier ordinarily owes one who is a "passenger" the highest duty of care. However, they argue that the decedent lost his status as a "passenger" by carrying marijuana aboard the airplane and thereby became a mere licensee, invitee, or trespasser to whom they owed only a duty of ordinary care.17 Evidence adduced at trial showed that the decedent was carrying a small amount of marijuana18 on his person. The thrust of defendants' argument is that their contract of carriage with the decedent is void because it had an illegal purpose: to transport the marijuana.

We find defendants' contention on this point to be specious. The purpose of the contract between the defendants and the decedent was to transport the decedent and the other members of the Jim Croce Group, not to transport marijuana. The policy underlying the requirement that a common carrier exercise the highest degree of care is to ensure that it provide safe transportation to those who contract for the use of its services. We agree with the plaintiffs that a common carrier should not be entitled to avoid the high standard of care it owed its passengers "because of some unknown or undisclosed conduct of the passenger, merely incidental to the trip, that happen(s) to be in violation of a statute or regulation."19 (emphasis added). It makes no sense to say that a common carrier owes a lesser duty of care to a traveler who is carrying a marijuana cigarette or two in his pocket20 than to a "passenger" seated nearby who is not. Defendants' counsel admitted as much at oral argument,21 and agreed that a passenger traveling with one marijuana cigarette on his person could not be said to be traveling with the intent to transport it. An airline passenger may be subject to other penalties for transporting a small amount of marijuana in violation of state or federal laws, but he is still entitled to the assurance that a carrier will exercise the utmost degree of care in order to insure his safety. In essence, decedent's carrying a small amount of marijuana aboard the airplane is immaterial for the purpose of determining the degree of care that a common carrier owes its "passengers."

Defendants argue that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the pilot's past conduct to prove that he acted in conformity with that conduct on the evening of the accident in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404.22 The trial transcript makes clear, however, that the judge permitted this evidence to be introduced not for the purpose proscribed by Rule 404 but for the limited purpose of rebutting certain opinions given by defendants' experts concerning the pilot's previous deportment as a pilot.23 We agree with the district court, whose ruling is set out in the margin,24 that the admission of the evidence for this circumscribed purpose was entirely proper.25 Moreover, since the defendants themselves, despite repeated warnings by the trial court, "place(d) the general reputation of the pilot in issue, see n.24, supra, they cannot now be heard to complain of the district court's error, if any, in admitting this evidence. See United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961, 966 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 100 S. Ct. 2151, 64 L.Ed.2d ---- (1980).

Defendants submit that the court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) constituted reversible error. We disagree. Rule 17(c) authorizes the district court to appoint a guardian ad litem "for an infant . . . not otherwise represented in an action . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). In the instant case the infant was "otherwise represented"; the child's legal guardian, his mother, brought this action on his behalf. Thus, there was no need for the court to appoint a guardian ad litem.

Defendants nevertheless contend that the trial court erred in failing even to "consider the question of whether a guardian ad litem should have been appointed to represent the minor Plaintiff."26 For this proposition, they cite Roberts v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1958). Roberts, however, is clearly distinguishable: in Roberts the children's mother was not a party to the cause of action, and neither she nor any other legal representative pressed the children's interests until after a judgment was entered against them; in the instant case, to the contrary, the child's mother and legal guardian was a party to the lawsuit below and vigorously pressed her child's claims before the trial court. The defendants here have demonstrated absolutely no conflict between Mrs. Cortese's interests and those of her son, nor have they shown any prejudice to the child's interests.27 We discern no error on the part of the trial court on this issue.

Defendants further contend that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Allen Neuman, a former employee of the organization by which the decedent was employed, and the testimony of decedent's wife concerning the decedent's future earnings because such testimony was speculative and conjectural in nature.28 In their view, Louisiana law prohibits the consideration of such evidence in awarding damages for the loss of future earnings. However, Louisiana law does not control the issue of whether this evidence should have been admitted in a federal district court;29 Fed.R.Evid. 40330 provides the proper standard. Evaluated by that standard, the testimony concerning decedent's future earnings, albeit speculative and conjectural, was properly admitted. Because Louisiana law permits plaintiffs in a wrongful death action to recover for loss of support, which is equivalent to the loss of future earnings, see Viator v. Gilbert, 253 La. 81, 216 So. 2d 821, 822 (1968), the testimony was certainly relevant to the issue of damages. Moreover, we are not convinced that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The speculative nature of the evidence affects only the weight of the evidence and was therefore properly before the jury.

Damages for Mental Anguish and Loss of Affection

Defendants complain that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award $20,000 for loss of "love, affection, counsel, and guidance" and an additional $20,000 for "sorrow, mental anguish, or grief suffered as a result of his (Kenneth Dominick Cortese's) death".31 We agree with defendants that Louisiana law32 does not sanction such "double recovery."Louisiana's wrongful death statute provides in pertinent part that "(t)he survivors in whose favor this right of action survives may also recover the damages which they sustained through the wrongful death of the deceased." La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West 1979). The statute, by its terms, does not restrict the elements to be considered in assessing damages, and we have previously noted that "Louisiana courts recognize as proper elements of damages (for wrongful death) not only loss of support, loss of contributions, from the decedent, but also loss of society and the grief and anguish of the beneficiaries." Silverman v. Travelers Insurance Co., 277 F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1960) (footnote omitted).33 However, no case to which we have been referred stands for the proposition that plaintiffs in a wrongful death action can recover separate monetary awards for loss of love and affection on the one hand and for sorrow and mental anguish on the other.

Blancher v. Samuels, 354 So. 2d 213 (La.App.) (on reargument), writs denied, 355 So. 2d 257, 263 (La. 1978), cited by plaintiffs, acknowledges that damages for wrongful death "include not only loss of support, but also loss of the love and affection of the decedent and the grief and anguish of the survivor," id. at 223, but it does not support their contention that separate awards were proper in the instant case. In fact, Blancher cuts against, rather than in favor of, plaintiffs' contention. The special interrogatory on damages34 that the judge in Blancher submitted to the jury required the jury to fix a single dollar figure to compensate the plaintiff for both loss of love and affection and grief and mental anguish.35 Blancher thus cannot be read to support the duplicative recovery permitted in the instant case.

Absent a clear expression from the Louisiana courts favoring separate monetary awards for distinct elements of nonpecuniary damages,36 we decline to authorize separate awards here. Our caution is dictated at least in part by a fear that a contrary decision could result in further "fragmentizing" of awards for nonpecuniary losses in future cases. Moreover, our refusal to award separate damages gains support from 3 Stone, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 26 at 32 (1977) (emphasis added):

The question whether a survivor could in addition recover damages under the action for wrongful death for distress and mental suffering occasioned by the death is more difficult. In Dobyns v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co.,⁸³ the Supreme Court referred to "distress and mental suffering" of the plaintiff but such was due to the "deprivation of her husband's companionship" and so it can be argued that these were merely ways of describing loss of companionship. In Bourg v. Brownell-Drews Lumber Co.⁸⁴ the court took into consideration "the mental suffering and deprivation caused to a parent by the death" but again the use of the word "deprivation" could indicate that what was here referred to was loss of affection, companionship etc. The better opinion would seem to be that Judge Monroe in these cases was not creating a separate category of recoverable damage but was merely describing that damage which was included under the heading of loss of society and companionship.

83. 119 La. 72, 82, 43 So. 934 (1907).

84. 120 La. 1009, 45 So. 972 (1908).

Insofar as the district court allowed plaintiffs to recover separately for loss of affection and mental anguish, its judgment is reversed. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover a total of $20,000 for their nonpecuniary losses.

Defendants next contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as they had requested,37 that any damages the jury awarded to the plaintiffs would not be subject to federal income taxation. In their brief, defendants observed that "the propriety of an instruction as to the effect of federal income tax law upon the issues (related to damages) is a matter of the proper application of Louisiana law" and proceeded to argue on the basis of Louisiana case law that the trial court's refusal to give their requested instruction constitutes reversible error. At oral argument, however, defendants relied not on Louisiana law but on Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt, --- U.S. ----, 100 S. Ct. 755, 62 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1980), decided by the Supreme Court after the submission of briefs in this case, for the proposition that the district court was required to give their requested instruction.

We cannot agree with the defendants that Liepelt controls our disposition of this issue; for reasons explained below, we look to state law to determine whether the instruction was required, as defendants contended in their brief. Our reading of the Louisiana cases, unlike defendants', indicates that a trial judge's refusal to give the requested instruction would not constitute reversible error in Louisiana. Accordingly, the district judge's refusal to give the instruction was proper.

In Liepelt the administratrix of a fireman's estate brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for damages that his survivors suffered as a result of his death. At trial an expert witness testified for plaintiffs that they had suffered damages in the amount of $302,000.38 An expert witness for defendant sought to testify that the decedent's federal income taxes for the years 1973 through 2000 would have amounted to $57,000. Taking this figure into account and using different assumptions about decedent's future salary and the calculation of the present value of future earnings, defendant's expert estimated plaintiffs' net pecuniary loss to be $138,327. The trial court, however, refused to allow evidence of the decedent's future taxes into evidence and also refused to instruct the jury on the nontaxability of a damage award as requested by defendant. The jury returned a verdict of $775,000. After Illinois appellate courts affirmed, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower court erred both in refusing to admit the evidence and in refusing to give the requested instruction.

We are convinced that Liepelt does not control our decision here. The wrongful death action in Liepelt arose under the FELA and not under a state statute, as the instant case did. In our view, this distinction is crucial. In discussing the issue of whether federal or state law governed the propriety of the court's refusal to give the instruction in Liepelt, the Supreme Court specifically acknowledged the federal nature of suits brought pursuant to the FELA:

Whether it was error to refuse that instruction, as well as the question whether evidence concerning the federal taxes on the decedent's earnings was properly excluded, is a matter governed by federal law. It has long been settled that questions concerning the measure of damages in an FELA action are federal in character. See, e. g., Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 S. Ct. 192, 57 L. Ed. 417. This is true even if the action is brought in state court. See, e. g., Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491, 36 S. Ct. 630, 632, 60 L. Ed. 1117.⁵

5. One of the purposes of the Federal Employer's Liability Act was to "create uniformity throughout the Union" with respect to railroads' financial responsibility for injuries to their employees. H.R.Rep.No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3 (1908). See also Dice v. Akron, Canton and Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 362, 72 S. Ct. 312, 314, 96 L. Ed. 398; Brady v. Southern Railway, 320 U.S. 476, 479, 64 S. Ct. 232, 234, 88 L. Ed. 239; Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 Ohio St.L.J. 384 (1956).

Id. 100 S.Ct. at 757 and n.5 (emphasis added). In the instant case federal concerns are lacking; this wrongful death action is a statutory creation of the state, and the measure of damages to be recovered, as we noted above, see n.32, supra, is governed by state law. Nor is the need for uniformity throughout the United States, which was "(o)ne of the purposes of the Federal Employer's Liability Act," id., 100 S.Ct. at 757 n.5, implicated in a cause of action brought to vindicate a state-created right. Despite some broad language approving an instruction that informs the jury that an award of damages will not be subject to income tax, see id. 100 S.Ct. at 759, there is no suggestion that the Supreme Court in Liepelt intended to require a trial judge to give such an instruction in wrongful death actions predicated upon state statutes.39

Moreover, the jury in Liepelt awarded the plaintiffs $775,000, far in excess of the estimation of the plaintiffs' pecuniary loss ($302,000) made by their own expert witness. The Court, noting this discrepancy, opined: "It is surely not fanciful to suppose that the jury erroneously believed that a large portion of the award would be payable to the Federal Government in taxes and that therefore it improperly inflated the recovery." Id. 100 S.Ct. at 759 (emphasis added). At the trial below on the issue of damages, there was no inflation of the recovery beyond the amounts testified to by the expert witnesses. We thus have no reason to suppose, as the Court in Liepelt did, that the jury labored under the misconception that federal taxes would be imposed.

Having determined that Liepelt does not control the outcome of this issue, we turn to Louisiana case law to ascertain whether the refusal to give the requested instruction constitutes error in Louisiana.40 We conclude that it does not. In Guerra v. Young Construction Co., 165 So. 2d 882 (La.App.), writ ref'd, 246 La. 864, 167 So. 2d 676 (1964), the court held that a refusal to give a similar instruction was not error.41 The defendants mistakenly contend that DeBose v. Trapani, 295 So. 2d 72 (La.App.), writ ref'd, 299 So. 2d 359 (La. 1974), repudiated the holding of Guerra. See also Francis v. Government Employers Insurance Co., 376 So. 2d 609 (La.App. 1979), writ ref'd, 378 So. 2d 1391 (La. 1980). In DeBose the trial court had in fact given the requested instruction; the appellate court merely held that the trial judge had not erred in doing so. 295 So. 2d at 74-75. Cf. Francis, 376 So. 2d at 612 (following DeBose). The court in DeBose was simply not confronted with the issue presented in Guerra and in the instant case. In the absence of contrary authority,42 we follow the mandate of Guerra in upholding the district court's refusal to give the instruction.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court's imposition of joint and several liability on Mustang and Roberts Airways for plaintiffs' damages, as modified herein.

AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part.