Louis Darnell Gordon (Gordon) appeals his conviction by jury of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.1 We affirm.

The United States Coast Guard seized a marijuana-laden vessel off the coast of Florida and brought it, on the morning of July 6, 1978, to the Coast Guard base at Miami. The Customs Service supplied temporary workers, Gordon among them, to unload the marijuana. After the unloading, Gordon and several Customs Officers went to an incinerator site to dispose of the marijuana.

A Customs Officer saw Gordon place a bale of marijuana on the roof of the incinerator. An inspection revealed two bales of marijuana on the roof, two bales in a nearby trash can, and one bale, covered by an old bedspread, under a ladder leading to the incinerator roof.

Gordon was arrested and taken to a local jail, where a search revealed marijuana in his socks and umbrella. He was indicted, tried by a jury, and convicted on one count of theft of Government property having a value in excess of one hundred dollars. Gordon was placed on probation for eighteen months.ISSUES

The issues on this appeal are whether: (1) the marijuana was government property at the time of the theft; (2) the indictment charged an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 641; and (3) the marijuana represented "value" under the statute.2

(1) Government Property

Raising an issue of first impression, Gordon says the Government did not establish its ownership of the marijuana, and that the trial judge erred in not allowing him to argue the property issue to the jury. We find those assertions unpersuasive.

Contrary to Gordon's argument, the Government's failure to comply with a notice provision of a regulation, 19 C.F.R. § 162.63,3 did not deprive it of title to the marijuana. Whatever effect the agency regulation may have under other circumstances, it cannot supersede a statute applicable to those present here. That statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(f), provides: "All controlled substances ... possessed ... in violation of the provisions of this subchapter (Subchapter I of the Controlled Substances Act) shall be deemed contraband ... and summarily forfeited to the United States."4 Gordon's argument that § 881(f) does not apply because the marijuana was seized under subchapter II of the Act ignores 21 U.S.C. § 965 (1976)5 (in effect when Gordon was arrested): "Part E of subchapter I (29 U.S.C. § 871-886) ... shall apply ... to violations of this subchapter, (Subchapter II) to the same extent that such part applies ... to violations of subchapter I of this chapter." Because importation of marijuana is a violation of subchapter II, the summary forfeiture provision of subchapter I applies.

The marijuana having become the property of the Government the moment it was seized, Gordon's arguments regarding proof of ownership lack merit. Title having by law vested in the Government, its ownership was not a proper fact question for the jury, and the trial judge committed no error in refusing to allow Gordon to argue the issue to the jury.6

(2) Sufficiency of the Indictment

The indictment charged Gordon with theft of "property of the United States having a value in excess of one hundred dollars ..." under a statute which provides: "Whoever ... steals ... any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof ... (shall be guilty of an offense.)" Gordon points to the absence from the statute of the word "property" and the presence of that word in his indictment. He also cites the presence of that word in a predecessor statute, positing therefrom an implication that theft of Government "property" is not an offense under the current statute. That argument must fail.

The current statute makes it an offense to steal a "thing of value of " (emphasis added) the United States. The word "of" necessarily implies ownership. Things "of" the Government, in the sense of the statute, are property of the Government. Hence an indictment charging theft of property of the Government constitutes full notice of a charge of theft of a thing of value of the Government. Moreover, the title of the statute under which Gordon was indicted reads "Public money, property or records" (emphasis added).

Indictments must be read for their clear meaning, and convictions should not be reversed because of minor deficiencies which do not prejudice the accused. United States v. Contris, 592 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S. Ct. 739, 50 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977). There was no prejudice to Gordon here, where the indictment charged theft of "property of the United States having a value in excess of one hundred dollars." That language of the indictment is the full equivalent of a "thing of value of the United States," and Gordon was thus fully informed of the nature of the offense charged.

(3) "Value"

The marijuana was an illegal substance, and the Government paid for its destruction. On those facts, Gordon says the marijuana was not a "thing of value," insisting that the required "value" must be value to the Government, not to smugglers or outlaws. We disagree.

The term value must be liberally construed. The statute under which Gordon was indicted, 18 U.S.C. § 641, defines "value" as "face, par, or market value...." "Value" may also be "thieves value." United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 890 (5th Cir. 1971); Jalbert v. United States, 375 F.2d 125, 126 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S. Ct. 225, 19 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1967). Hence the district court properly foreclosed Gordon from arguing his "value" contentions to the jury.

AFFIRMED.