Defendant shipowner Patton-Tully Corporation appeals the district court's interlocutory order determining that decedent Tommy Lee Ratliff was a Jones Act seaman, and expanding the shipowner's limitation fund to include the value of the entire flotilla of vessels engaged in the operation in the course of which Ratliff lost his life. We conclude that Patton-Tully's appeal of the district court's determination that Ratliff was a Jones Act seaman is premature. We further conclude that since the order expanding the fund at the same time establishes that Patton-Tully is simply not entitled to limit its liability, the order must be vacated.

Patton-Tully, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Anderson-Tully Company, is a Mississippi corporation with headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi. As Anderson-Tully's marine subsidiary, Patton-Tully is primarily engaged in loading harvested timber on barges at various points along the Mississippi River and its tributaries, then transporting the timber to mills in Vicksburg with the aid of tugboats.

Tommy Lee Ratliff, a 16-year-old resident of Warren County, Mississippi, applied for work at Anderson-Tully in October 1979, and was assigned to Patton-Tully's Yazoo Canal repair facility as a laborer on the maintenance crew. This crew also did salvage, decking and fleeting work.

In March of 1981, Patton-Tully sent a number of boats and land-based equipment to a place on the river called Diamond Point, to load and transport about 1,200,000 board feet of hardwood timber to the lumber mills before the water level in the Mississippi fell too far to permit transporting the logs through a nearby chute. Vessels assigned to this project included the M/V McAuley, the M/V Frank Phipps (both tugboats), Derrick Boat 17, Crane Barge 54-B, 8 long barges, and a 16 foot aluminum skiff powered by a 20 hp outboard motor. The skiff, with a rated capacity of 1,080 pounds, was valued at $1,200.00. Ratliff was assigned as an oiler, helper or roustabout on the 54-B.

Work proceeded on the project for several days without incident, with the skiff and the M/V McAuley being used to ferry the workers to and from the jobsite on the far side of the river. The last of the logs were loaded aboard the log barges at 11:00 AM on March 15, 1981. All of the vessels save the small aluminum skiff made for the center of the river. James Jernigan, a deck hand on the M/V McAuley, told the six remaining workers that he was to take them back across the river in the skiff. The six men climbed into the skiff, which was piloted by Jernigan, and made for the Marathon LeTourneau landing on the far shore of the Mississippi. The weather had deteriorated since the early morning hours. A strong, gusty, southwesterly wind had sprung up and the river was rough. As soon as the boat turned out into the main body of the Mississippi, it was struck by the full force of the wind and by a "chop," short, steep waves which became rougher the closer the skiff got to the far shore. Jernigan steered a diagonal course toward the opposite bank, despite instructions from a more experienced operator aboard the skiff to steer directly across the river. At a point about 150 yards from the far shore, the skiff suddenly encounted particularly rough water. Jernigan turned the bow of the skiff into the waves and reduced the throttle, lowering the bow and causing the skiff to swamp and turn turtle. The men, who were wearing their lifejackets, were thrown into the water. Ratliff and another man, Kelly, struck out for shore, and were ultimately followed by two more men. The remaining two workers remained with the overturned skiff, and were eventually rescued by the M/V McAuley. At one point during his swim, Kelly heard Ratliff call for help, but was unable to save him because of the high wind and waves. Ratliff never made it to shore. The other two men who left the skiff reached the shore safely, as did Kelly.

On March 25, 1982, Patton-Tully filed a complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C.A. § 185 and Rule F of the Supplemental Admiralty Rules.1 An ad interim stipulation for the value of the skiff in the amount of $1,200.00 was allowed by the court. On April 24, 1981, Patricia June Ratliff, Tommy Lee's mother and administratrix of his estate, filed a claim under the Jones Act seeking damages of $912,275.00 for the loss of her son's life, accompanied by third-party unseaworthiness and Jones Act claims against Anderson-Tully Company. Mrs. Ratliff then moved pursuant to Rule F(7) (see note 1 supra) to increase the limitation fund to $641,200.00, the value of all the vessels making up the flotilla which was assigned to the log-loading operation in the course of which Tommy Lee Ratliff died. The district court entered an interlocutory order granting Mrs. Ratliff's motion. Patton-Tully appeals from that order.

Patton-Tully first appeals the district court's determination that Ratliff was a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West 1975). The court's determination was included in its order granting Mrs. Ratliff's motion to expand the limitation fund. The order is clearly interlocutory, and the decision that Ratliff was a Jones Act seaman is not appealable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(a)(3)2 because it does not finally determine the rights or liabilities of either party to this dispute. While a determination that a plaintiff is not a Jones Act seaman is appealable under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 because it effectively terminates the suit,3 that portion of an interlocutory order determining that plaintiff is a Jones Act seaman merely allows him to pursue his claim in the hope of obtaining a final judgment against defendant.4 Accordingly, we DISMISS Patton-Tully's appeal of this determination as premature.

In this Circuit, an interlocutory order increasing the amount of a limitation fund is, on the other hand, appealable under section 1292(a)(3). In re Drill Barge No. 2, 454 F.2d 408, 409 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906, 92 S. Ct. 1610, 31 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1972).

Under the "flotilla doctrine," the limitation fund liability of a defendant shipowner may be increased to include his interest in the value of all vessels engaged in a common enterprise or venture with the vessel aboard which the loss or injury was sustained.5 The district court's interlocutory order by its words increases the amount of the limitation fund to include the value of all of Patton-Tully's vessels engaged in the log-loading operation in the course of which Ratliff met his death.6 Patton-Tully appeals the increase in the fund to this Court.

Careful examination of the district court's order reveals a serious contradiction therein, requiring that it be vacated. In its order, the court unquestionably found that Patton-Tully had failed to carry its burden of proof on the question of its lack of privity or knowledge of the negligent acts and conditions leading to Ratliff's death.7 46 U.S.C.A. § 183(a), establishing the shipowner's right to limit his liability to his interest in the vessel, provides as follows:

The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not, except in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.

46 U.S.C.A. § 183 (West 1958) (emphasis added). Since section 183(b) by its terms denies the shipowner the right to limit his liability where he has privity or knowledge of the negligent act,8 the court's finding that Patton-Tully had failed utterly to establish its lack of privity or knowledge is wholly inconsistent with its order limiting Patton-Tully's liability to $641,200.00. The district court's order is accordingly VACATED, and this cause is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.