Gary Frank Condren's sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm was enhanced under Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) because illegal drugs, in addition to the firearm, were found in his home. The only issue on appeal is the construction to be given the "specific offense characteristic" (sentence enhancement) found in that section: "used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense". We AFFIRM.

On January 13, 1992, Dallas undercover police officers traded two televisions and a VCR to Condren, in exchange for five pieces ("rocks") of crack cocaine. Based on this, a search warrant for his home was obtained; it was executed the next day. Drug paraphernalia, including crack pipes, mirrors, and a scale were found. And, on top of a desk in the bedroom, two rocks of crack, which weighed .1 gram, as well as 33.3 grams of marijuana seed, were found. Moreover, a loaded .22-caliber revolver was found in a drawer in the desk.1

Condren was indicted on, and pleaded guilty to, one count of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), possession of a firearm by a felon. The presentence investigation report (PSR) set his base offense level at 24;2 and added four points pursuant to the Guidelines section in issue, Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), which requires that adjustment if the firearm was possessed "in connection with another felony offense".3

Condren filed objections to the PSR, including to the sentence enhancement. The enhancement objection, however, was to the wrong subsection of Sec. 2K2.1.4 In any event, at the sentencing hearing in mid-November 1992, Condren's counsel objected (unsuccessfully) to the enhancement in relation to the subsection in issue.5

The district court, however, sustained Condren's objection to not being granted a Sec. 3E1.1 acceptance of responsibility adjustment. As a result, and pursuant to a recent amendment that allowed a maximum of three, rather than two, points for the adjustment, the court reduced the offense level by three points to 25.6 The ensuing guideline range was 110 to 137 months.7 Condren was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release.

As noted, only the sentence enhancement is in issue. It goes without saying that, in reviewing "sentences, we examine factual findings subject to the 'clearly erroneous' standard ... and ... accord great deference to the trial judge's application of the sentencing guidelines." United States v. Humphrey, 7 F.3d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.1990) and United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.), clarified, 868 F.2d 807, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 3257, 106 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989)). The sentence will be upheld unless, inter alia, " 'it was imposed ... as a result of an incorrect application of the ... guidelines....' " United States v. Haymer, 995 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Howard, 991 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 395, 126 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1993)); accord, Humphrey, 7 F.3d at 1189 (quoting Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218, and citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(1)).

Consistent with this court's order detailing the issues to be presented, Condren challenges the Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement.8 It is mandated if, among other things, the "defendant used or possessed [the] firearm ... in connection with another felony offense".9 Condren contends that the government failed to show that his firearm possession was "in connection with," i.e., in any way related to, his commission of "another felony".10 Therefore, we must first identify the other felony employed in the district court's enhancement calculus.

The PSR states that Condren possessed the firearm in connection with distribution of cocaine:

U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) requires that if the defendant possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense, four-levels should be added. The defendant was in possession of a firearm while involved in the distribution of crack/cocaine. Therefore, four-levels are added.

In response to Condren's written (apparent) objection to this, the Probation Officer stated only that "section [2K2.1(b)(5) ] ha[d] been appropriately applied."

As stated, at sentencing, except for its finding acceptance of responsibility, the district court adopted the findings in the PSR. Thus, it adopted the finding that Condren possessed the firearm "while involved in" drug distribution.11 See United States v. Sherbak, 950 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1992) (court need not explicitly adopt individual findings, but may adopt PSR as a whole).

But also, at sentencing, see note 5, supra, the district court found that Condren possessed the firearm "at the same time that ... he was possessing controlled substances. It would appear to the Court that that [firearm] possession was then during the commission of another felony". Accordingly, it found that Condren possessed the firearm while in possession of small quantities of crack and marijuana seed,12 and determined that this possession was a felony, because he had been convicted previously of a narcotics offense.13 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(a); 28 C.F.R. Secs. 76.1, 1316.91(c). As Condren conceded at oral argument in our court, the district court did not err in ruling that, for enhancement purposes, Condren's drug possession was a felony.14

Therefore, the district court found that Condren was engaged in both drug felonies--possession and distribution; the enhancement is triggered if Condren possessed the firearm "in connection with" either. Hence, we turn to the issue before us: the relationship that must exist between firearm possession and the other felony; specifically, the construction to be given "in connection with".

We first examine Condren's firearm and drug possession.15 Neither the district court nor the PSR defines the phrase "in connection with", or otherwise discusses the construction to be given it. But, the PSR, which the district court adopted, does use the phrase in explaining the enhancement. In ruling against the enhancement objection, the district court found that Condren possessed the firearm "at the same time that" he was possessing drugs; that the firearm possession "was then during the commission of another felony." Similarly, the adopted PSR finding was that Condren possessed the firearm "while involved in" the distribution of cocaine. (The district court's findings of fact--i.e., that Condren possessed the firearm while engaged in both drug possession and distribution--are, as stated, reviewed only for clear error.) Therefore, in imposing the enhancement, the district court implicitly concluded that the firearm possession was in connection with the drug possession.

"Connection" is defined as a "causal or logical relation or sequence". Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 278 (1990). Condren contends that "in connection with" requires the government to establish a "nexus" between his firearm and drug possessions, and that it is lacking because the drug quantity--.1 gram of cocaine and 33.3 grams of marijuana seed--is consistent with personal use and too small to support a conclusion that he possessed the firearm in order "to protect" the drugs. In addition, giving Condren's contention a very liberal reading, he seems to assert that the absence of the nexus is demonstrated further by the facts that the firearm was in a drawer (allegedly locked) and was kept only as collateral for a loan, rather than for any purpose related to drug possession.16

The phrase "in connection with" for Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) purposes is not defined in the Guidelines; and, as noted, our circuit has not squarely addressed the issue. The nexus requirement that Condren urges is borrowed from 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) (proscribing the use or carrying of a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" (emphasis added)). See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1117-18 (5th Cir.1993) (applying Sec. 924(c)); United States v. Capote-Capote, 946 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 2278, 119 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1992) (same). Although, as the Tenth Circuit has noted, the standard of proof required under Sec. 924(c) "provides some guidance" in construing Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466 (10th Cir.1993), we decline to adopt it as the controlling standard.

First, Sec. 924(c) expressly proscribes the use or carrying of a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime or crime of violence; in contrast, Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) mandates an enhancement even if the defendant only possesses a firearm in connection with any other felony. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5); see United States v. Sanders, 990 F.2d 582, 585 (10th Cir.) (rejecting defendant's contention that Sec. 924(c) standard should control Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) determination), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 216, 126 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1993).17

Second, Sec. 924(c) is a criminal statute, requiring that the government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the relationship of the firearm to the drug trafficking crime or the crime of violence. Pace, 10 F.3d at 1117. In contrast, because the subsection in issue is under the Sentencing Guidelines, the relationship need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Angulo, 927 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S. Ct. 2290, 119 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1992), cited in United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.1993), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 21, 1993) (No. 93-7246).

The government urges that we construe the enhancement phrase according to its literal and straightforward meaning.18 See Sanders, 990 F.2d at 585 ("We think it appropriate to apply the phrase 'in connection with' in a straightforward and literal fashion."). It maintains that, if we do, the enhancement will apply, because both the gun and the drugs were in Condren's possession at the same time and in close proximity to one another.

"In the absence of any statutory definition, we construe th[e] phrase [i.e., "in connection with",] according to its ordinary and natural meaning." United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 1111, 127 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1994) (construing " 'in connection with' a crime of violence" language of U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), and citing Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2054, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43, 100 S. Ct. 311, 314-15, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979)). As noted in Guerrero, the Supreme Court

reads terms such as "used or possessed" quite expansively in the context of firearms. For instance, in order to prove a criminal defendant "use[d] a firearm ... during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1), the government need not show the firearm was even "use[d] as a weapon."

Id. at 872 (quoting Smith, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S. Ct. at 2053-54 (internal quotations omitted)). In Guerrero, for purposes of Sec. 4B1.4(b)(3)(A), we held that the defendant possessed firearms "in connection with" a burglary even where they were not used to commit the burglary, but were instead the fruits of it. Id.

In addition, as noted, other circuits have looked to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b) (enhancement for possession of firearm during drug-trafficking crime) for guidance in interpreting Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5). See, e.g., Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d at 466 (10th Cir.1993); Sanders, 990 F.2d at 585 & nn. 2-3 (10th Cir.), followed by Brewster, 1 F.3d at 54 & n. 4 (1st Cir.). They acknowledge, however, that Sec. 2D1.1, like 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924, is an imperfect analogy to Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) for at least two reasons.

First, Sec. 2D1.1 mandates an enhancement whenever, in a crime involving the manufacture, import, export, trafficking, or possession of drugs, "a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed". Arguably, this language requires less of a relationship, or specific connection, between the possession of the weapon, and the drug offense. That is, Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) contains no language requiring that the possession of the weapon be "in connection with" (Secs. 2K2.1(b)(5), 4B1.4(b)(3)(A)), or "in relation to" (18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)) the other offense. Second, unlike Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), the commentary to Sec. 2D1.1 sets a standard by which to judge the relationship between the firearm and the drug offense: the enhancement applies unless it is "clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense." U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1, comment. (n. 3); Sanders, 990 F.2d at 585 (noting "explanatory vacuum" accompanying Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), and declining to extend Sec. 2D1.1's "clearly improbable" standard to it).

Nonetheless, similar policy reasons militate in favor of the enhancement provided by both Sec. 2D1.1(b) and Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5). Sanders, 990 F.2d at 585; Guerrero, 5 F.3d at 872 & n. 9 (discussing Sanders in context of analogy between Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) and "in connection with" language of Sec. 4B1.4(b)(3)(A)). As does the original commentary to Sec. 2K2, the commentary to Sec. 2D1.1 "explains the enhancement for weapons possession ... as reflecting 'the increased danger of violence' " that exists when guns and drugs are present together. Sanders, 990 F.2d at 585 (discussing and comparing U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 374 comment. (backg'd) (original commentary to Sec. 2K2) with U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(1) comment. (n. 3)).

Simply stated, the enhancement in issue reflects the undeniable fact that "[p]ossession of firearms obviously increases the danger of violence whether or not such weapons are actually used.... [I]t makes little difference how the [defendant] obtained [the] firearms." Guerrero, 5 F.3d at 873 (emphasis in original). As much as in a drug trafficking crime, e.g., Capote-Capote, 946 F.2d at 1104, or a crime of violence such as burglary, Guerrero, 5 F.3d at 873, this rationale applies in cases involving possession of a firearm while in possession of drugs.19

Section 2K2.1(c)(1) presents another useful, if imperfect, standard for comparison. As noted, it provides, as does Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), for an enhancement "[i]f the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with" another offense. It specifies, however, that the firearm must be used or possessed in connection with "the commission or attempted commission of another offense". U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(c)(1) (emphasis added). The requirement that the firearm possession be in connection with the commission of another offense appears to mandate a closer relationship between the firearm and the other offense than that required for Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) purposes.

In other words, for Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) purposes, the connection could be even more remote and require less proof. Yet, in the only case from this circuit to address the issue (Hernandez, discussed supra at note 17) we did not require a specific showing of a close relationship between the firearm and the drug possession. There, as noted, we affirmed a Sec. 2K2.1(c)(1) enhancement based primarily on "undisputed evidence that the firearm was found in the room with the marijuana". Hernandez, No. 91-8249, slip op. at 2 (unpublished) (emphasis added). At bottom, in Hernandez, the simple physical proximity of the firearm to the drugs allowed the district court properly to "conclude that the firearm was used in connection with the possession of the marijuana." Id. (emphasis added).

In addition, it is well to remember that a sentencing enhancement is being construed; a "specific offense characteristic". Therefore, obviously, the purpose to be served by such an enhancement must guide our giving effect to the ordinary and natural meaning of the subsection. Specific offense characteristics, such as those described in Sec. 2K2.1(b), represent the Sentencing Commission's attempt to consider "real offense" aspects of the underlying offense. United States v. Manthei, 913 F.2d 1130, 1134 (5th Cir.1990), citing and quoting U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro., 4(a); see also U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro., p.s. (3) (Guidelines attempt to establish "proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity"). The Guidelines state that, although they are "closer to a charge offense [rather than a real offense] system", they

take account of a number of important, commonly occurring real offense elements such as role in the offense, the presence of a gun, or the amount of money actually taken, through alternative base offense levels, specific offense characteristics, cross references, and adjustments.

U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. p.s. 4(a); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, comment. (discussing consideration of relevant conduct in determining sentence). Specific offense characteristics represent an integral part of the Guidelines' "return[ ] ... to an earlier philosophy that the punishment should fit the crime...." Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218.

Chapter Two of the Guidelines relates to offense conduct; its Part K--including Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5)--pertains to offenses "involving public safety", such as arson, use of explosives or firearms, and transportation of hazardous materials. Section 2K2.1 provides offense levels for unlawful receipt, possession, or transportation of firearms or ammunition. In 1991, the specific offense characteristic represented by the subsection in issue was added to the Guidelines (enacted in 1987). It was one of several changes to Sec. 2K2 that reflect increased concern about firearms, crimes of violence, and drug offenses. Needless to say, the unlawful use or possession of firearms represents an ever increasing assault on public safety; it is a clear and present danger. For example, 15,377 of the 22,540 murders in the United States in 1992 were committed with firearms, of which 1,144 concerned drugs. 1992 FBI Uniform Crime Rep. for the United States 20.

Finally, Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) mandates that if the resulting offense level--after the enhancement is applied--is less than 18, it must be increased to that level. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5); see note 9, supra. This is yet another indication that the enhancement represents an intention to impose a significantly heavier sentence, regardless of the other offense (felony).

Under the ordinary and natural meaning of "in connection with" as found in Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5), especially as informed by the above discussion, we cannot credit either Condren's contention that the quantity of drugs involved was too small, or the possible contention that the source of the firearm was too unrelated, to support the enhancement.

a.

As to the quantity, it must be kept in mind that Condren was actively involved in distributing cocaine; it would be more than reasonable to infer that he would know, or assume, that other persons would know, or assume, that he kept drugs in his home, and that he would be concerned that those persons might seek to steal them. (No authority need be cited for the fact that theft is a close and ever present partner of illegal drugs, either to steal the drugs, or to steal money or other items to purchase them.)

Therefore, as discussed infra, it would likewise be more than reasonable to infer that Condren possessed the firearm in order to protect even the small amount of drugs kept, or intended, for his personal use. See United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1057 (5th Cir.) ("Firearms are 'tools of the trade' of those engaged in illegal drug activities."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S. Ct. 1962, 95 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1987). In any event, Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) does not specify that a certain amount of drugs are required to support the enhancement. Indeed, it is mandated whenever a firearm is possessed in connection with any other felony, regardless of whether it involves drugs. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5).20

Moreover, Condren's assertion that Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) is not applicable, in this case, because only a small amount of drugs was involved, and was kept only for his personal use, is unsupported by the case law he relies on.21 The Sec. 2D1.1 cases Condren cites are inapposite; that they happen to involve larger quantities of drugs than does this case is perhaps due to the fact that Sec. 2D1.1 pertains specifically to offenses involving drugs, including drug manufacture, import, and trafficking.

In contrast, as noted, Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancements may be based on any felony, including, as here, felony possession of a small amount of drugs. See Sanders, 990 F.2d at 583, 585 (enhancement applied where defendant possessed firearm in connection with drug trafficking; defendant was carrying 7 grams of cocaine, 33.7 grams of heroin, and assorted drug paraphernalia); see also United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 445-46 (5th Cir.1990) (leaving open possibility that, on remand, defendant could receive enhanced sentence under Sec. 2D1.1(b) for possession of firearm during possession of as little as .37 grams of heroin).

b.

As to the possible contention that the firearm was simply collateral for a loan, instead of being possessed for Condren's drug-related activities, we reiterate that the enhancement provision speaks to the real and obvious increase in the risk of violence (threat to public safety) through the mere possession of firearms in connection with drugs. See Guerrero, 5 F.3d at 873. This increased risk obviously exists regardless of whether the weapons are used, and regardless of how, or why, they were obtained, or for what other reasons they are possessed. Id.

We turn now to the findings of fact and conclusion of law concerning the connection. As stated, a finding is upheld unless it is clearly erroneous--it is implausible in light of the record as a whole. E.g. United States v. Martinez-Moncivais, 14 F.3d 1030, 1038-39 (5th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Sanders, 942 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir.1991)).

Condren's firearm "was found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia [we]re stored or where part of the transaction occurred." United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir.1991) (construing Sec. 2D1.1, and citing cases). It was in close "physical proximity to narcotics", Gomez-Arrellano, 5 F.3d at 466-67 (10th Cir.1993)--in a drawer of the very desk where the drugs were found. Furthermore, it was fully loaded. Regardless of how it came into Condren's possession, it was readily available to him to protect his drug-related activities; and, based on our review of the record, the district court implicitly finding this was not clearly erroneous.22

Therefore, the district court did not err, as a matter of law, in concluding that the firearm possession was "in connection with" the drug possession. See Hernandez, No. 91-8249, slip op. at 2 (concerning Sec. 2K2.1(c); "From the undisputed evidence that the firearm was found in the room with the marijuana, the court could conclude that the firearm was used in connection with the possession of the marijuana."); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1361 (5th Cir.1994) (under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), government need only show that gun was available to provide protection to defendant's drug activity); and Pace, 10 F.3d at 1117-19 (construing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) and quoting Capote-Capote, 946 F.2d at 1104 ("Weapons in the home may facilitate a drug crime because the defendants could use the guns to protect the drugs".) (emphasis in Pace; citations omitted)).

Accordingly, the court correctly applied Sec. 2K2.1(b)(5). The sentence is

AFFIRMED.