Filed: Sep. 11, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 94-60678 Summary Calendar SANABEL EL-ATTAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Mississippi (1:91 CV 326 S D) (September 1, 1995) Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* I. FACTS Sanabel El-Attar ("El-Attar") is a naturalized citizen of the United States who was born in Egypt. She received a
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 94-60678 Summary Calendar SANABEL EL-ATTAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Mississippi (1:91 CV 326 S D) (September 1, 1995) Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* I. FACTS Sanabel El-Attar ("El-Attar") is a naturalized citizen of the United States who was born in Egypt. She received a ..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 94-60678
Summary Calendar
SANABEL EL-ATTAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
MISSISSIPPI STATE UNIVERSITY, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Mississippi
(1:91 CV 326 S D)
(September 1, 1995)
Before GARWOOD, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
I. FACTS
Sanabel El-Attar ("El-Attar") is a naturalized citizen of
the United States who was born in Egypt. She received a Bachelor
of Commerce Degree from Ain Shams University in Cairo, Egypt, in
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
1959. In 1973, she received a Master of Arts Degree in Sociology
from the University of Georgia. In 1980, El-Attar was accepted
to the Master of Business Administration program at Mississippi
State University ("MSU"). She received her degree in 1985.
From 1985 through 1991 El-Attar repeatedly applied for
admission to the Doctor of Business Administration ("DBA")
program at MSU. She was not accepted into the program. As a
result of this continued rejection, El-Attar filed a civil rights
action against MSU and others alleging she had been discriminated
against because of her sex and national origin. El-Attar made
claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e), and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, asserting that MSU's exclusive use of
the Graduate Management Admission Test ("GMAT") in admissions had
a disparate impact on women and individuals who spoke English as
a second language.
Following a bench trial, the district court entered its
memorandum order that El-Attar's suit be dismissed because she
failed to establish that the defendants violated Title VI and
Title IX. The district court found that MSU did not use the GMAT
as the sole determinative factor for admissions into the DBA
program. The district court also found that El-Attar had not
presented any "persuasive statistical data" or "credible expert
testimony" to show that MSU's admissions policy for the DBA
program had a disparate impact on females or individuals who
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spoke English as a second language. El-Attar timely filed a
notice of appeal. We affirm.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Finding that GMAT Score Was Not Sole Criterion for Admission:
El-Attar argues that the district court was clearly erroneous
in its finding that MSU did not use the GMAT score alone to
determine who would be admitted into the DBA program.1 This Court
reviews factual findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52; Johnston v. Lucas,
786 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th
Cir. 1986). A district court's findings of fact are not clearly
erroneous if they are "plausible in light of the record in its
entirety." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564, 573-74
(1985).
The testimony of several MSU faculty members who sat on the
DBA admissions committee supports the finding that the GMAT score
was not the sole admission criterion. Dr. R.H. Gilmer, Director of
Graduate Studies, testified that the GMAT was only one part of the
application to the doctoral program. The other parts included the
applicant's statement of reasons for seeking admission, academic
transcripts, and letters of reference. Dr. Louis M. Capella,
currently a professor of marketing and one-time Director of
Graduate Studies, testified that the GMAT score was not the only
criterion for admission. Dr. Richard D. Koshel, dean of the
graduate school, testified that in his experience at MSU the GMAT
1
El-Attar devotes a great deal of her appellate brief to the
argument that it is improper to use the GMAT as the sole
admission criterion. As will be discussed below, the district
court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the GMAT was
not the sole admission criterion. As such, whether such a policy
is proper is not relevant to the this case.
4
score was not a "go-no-go-decision." Dr. Jung P. Shim, a full
professor of Management Information Systems, testified that
admission to the MSU DBA program included consideration of GMAT
scores, grade point averages, experience, and letters of
recommendation. Dr. Mary Jones, an assistant professor of
Management and Information Systems, testified that in reviewing
applications for the DBA program she considers GMAT scores, grade
point averages, letters of recommendation, work experience, and the
applicant's written reasons for applying to the program. Dr.
Rodney Andrews Pearson, an associate professor of Management and
Information Systems at MSU, testified that reviewing an application
consists of examining the entire application, including letters of
recommendation, the applicant's narrative answers on the
application form, the applicant's philosophies, the applicant's
reasons for getting the degree, grade point averages, and GMAT
score. Dr. Pearson testified that none of those items was
absolutely determinative of whether an applicant was accepted. El-
Attar testified that she knew of several other applicants who were
admitted even though their GMAT score was below the recommended
level.
Dr. Elias Richard Callahan, Jr., a former faculty member at
MSU, testified in his deposition that the admission procedure for
the DBA program was automatically halted if the applicant did not
have an appropriate GMAT score. Dr. Callahan testified that he
"had nothing to do with the admission process," and that Dr.
Capella was in charge of the admissions process. El-Attar contends
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that Dr. Callahan alone testified as to the admissions practices
prior to 1989. This is incorrect. Dr. Capella was the Director of
Graduate Studies from 1982-89. His testimony was specifically
directed to the time when he was the director. He personally
recalled El-Attar's 1985 application.
Given the consistent testimony of the faculty involved in the
admissions process, it cannot be said that the district court was
clearly erroneous in finding that the GMAT would not by itself stop
an application, notwithstanding the testimony of Dr. Callahan. The
district court was not clearly erroneous in its factual finding.
B. Disparate Impact Claim:
El-Attar asserts that "MSU's sole reliance upon GMAT scores to
cut-off acceptance to the DBA program disparately impacts female
students" and "international students whose native language is not
English." Thus, her disparate impact claim is dependent on a
finding of sole reliance upon GMAT scores. As we have already held
that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding
that MSU did not solely rely on GMAT scores, the disparate impact
claim fails as well.
6