Filed: Dec. 27, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 95-30022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Appellee, VERSUS PAUL HENRY KIDD Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana December 19, 1995 Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and DUHE, Circuit Judges. REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge: Background Paul Henry Kidd ("Kidd"), an attorney representing Dewey Brown in a criminal case, was suspended from the practice of law for one year and fined $5,000 by the d
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 95-30022 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Appellee, VERSUS PAUL HENRY KIDD Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana December 19, 1995 Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and DUHE, Circuit Judges. REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge: Background Paul Henry Kidd ("Kidd"), an attorney representing Dewey Brown in a criminal case, was suspended from the practice of law for one year and fined $5,000 by the di..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-30022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellee,
VERSUS
PAUL HENRY KIDD
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
December 19, 1995
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and DUHE, Circuit
Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Background
Paul Henry Kidd ("Kidd"), an attorney representing Dewey Brown
in a criminal case, was suspended from the practice of law for one
year and fined $5,000 by the district court for challenging,
without an appropriate factual basis, the district court's handling
of his client's trial.1 Kidd had alleged in alternative motions
Dewey Brown was convicted after a jury trial on three counts
of violating the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. ยงยง 3371 et seq.
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for a new trial or for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the
verdict and the accompanying brief that
[T]he trial court denied the defendant a fair and
impartial trial by creating the perception in the mind of
the jury that it believed in the evidence presented by
the prosecution and that it favored the prosecution's
case[.]
United States District Judge Tucker L. Melancon (the "trial court")
issued an order denying the motion on all grounds except the ground
noted above. The trial court referred the issue of impartiality to
District Judge Donald E. Walter.
The district court scheduled a hearing on the question of
impartiality and ordered Kidd to file a brief in support of the
motion. This brief was to include "detailed facts supporting the
conclusion asserted." Kidd filed a memorandum in which he alleged
the following acts on the part of the trial judge:
1. he appeared not to be interested in anything that the
defendant testified to;
2) he appeared to give special attention to the witness of
the Government;
3) he seemed to have a mission of belittling, castigating,
and otherwise discrediting defense counsel;
4) he seemed to have anything but an even hand in addressing
objections of the Government and of the defendant;
5) he was partial to the government;
6) he gave -- by gesture -- by facial expression -- and by
oral comments -- the impression that he favored the government
and disfavored the defendant; and,
7) he gave the jury the impression that he believed the
testimony of the Government's witnesses and simply tolerated
the testimony of the defendant's witnesses as something that
was expected of them to say.
Kidd further stated that "[o]utside of the numerous side bar
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conferences called for the purpose of admonishing defense counsel
and the comments made from the bench addressing arguments of
counsel which are contained in the record, there is no objective
independent evidence to corroborate the defendant's contentions."
His memorandum concluded that "acrimony between the trial court and
defense counsel deprived defendant of a fair trial."
Dissatisfied with Kidd's lack of specificity, the district
court ordered Kidd to provide record citations, or at least state
under oath how the "appearance" or "impression" of judicial bias
manifested itself and whether objections had been made at trial.
Kidd filed a supplemental brief in which he provided fourteen
excerpts from the trial transcript in support of his allegations.
The excerpts largely involve instances in which the trial court
sustained objections by the government during defense counsel's
cross-examination.
In a memorandum ruling, the district court denied Kidd's
motion for a new trial "because the record is devoid of the
proverbial scintilla of evidence indicating that the trial judge
deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial." The
district court also concluded that Kidd had violated Rule 8.2(a) of
the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, pertaining to remarks about a judge that are false or
made with a reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity.2 The
In the memorandum ruling, the district court also referenced
its inherent power to sanction in addition to its power to sanction
for violation of professional rules. However, the court primarily
relied on its finding of the violation of 8.2 to support its
sanction order. See discussion infra. The district held Kidd
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court set a hearing for Kidd to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned for his conduct.
At the hearing on the order to show cause, the district court
instructed Kidd to explain or give examples in the record to
support his allegations of judicial bias. Kidd responded that his
claims were based on subjective "perception," and "impression" and
did not provide specific examples. Noting at the hearing that Kidd
had violated Rule 8.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
district court suspended Kidd from the practice of law in the
Western District of Louisiana for one year and fined him $5,000 to
be paid within ninety days.
Because we hold that Rule 8.2's restriction on reckless
statements regarding members of the judiciary does not apply to a
lawyer's in court comments concerning the judge's actual
performance during the conduct of the trial, we reverse the
sanctions order of the district court.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Sanctions imposed against an attorney by a district court are
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S.
32 (1991). That discretion is abused if the ruling is based on an
"erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of
accountable for this rule pursuant to Rule 20.4 of the Uniform
Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Eastern,
Middle, and Western District of Louisiana, which adopts Louisiana's
Rules of Professional Conduct.
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the evidence." Chaves v. M/V Medina Star, 47 F.3d 153, 156 (5th
Cir. 1995). Of course, the question of whether Mr. Kidd's conduct
was subject to sanction under professional responsibility Rule 8.2
is a legal issue which must be reviewed de novo.
B. Sanctions Under Rule 8.2 (a) of the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct
The court below relied on its finding of the Rule 8.2
violation to sanction Mr. Kidd. We believe this reliance was
erroneous. Rule 8.2 (a) provides that:
[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its
truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public
legal officer, or of a candidate for election or
appointment to judicial or legal office.
From the face of the rule, it is unclear whether Rule 8.2 is
meant to apply to comments on a judge's performance by a lawyer at
trial. No case of this circuit has interpreted this provision and
the decisions of other courts applying this provision have all
involved allegations of dishonesty or corruption.
In Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406 (La.
1983), one of the cases cited in support of sanctions, an attorney
was suspended from practice for one year for repeated public
allegations that a judge was dishonest and had engaged in fraud and
misconduct. The lawyer made statements to that effect in letters
to newspapers and in briefs filed in various courts. The Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld sanctions against the attorney under an
earlier but similar version of the rule.
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In In re Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313
(Minn. 1990), the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a 60-day
suspension of an attorney under Rule 8.2 of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct for stating in letters to a U.S. Attorney and
to the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit that a state judge, a
United States Magistrate Judge and various attorneys had conspired
to fix the outcome of a federal case. See also In the Matter of
Emil J. Becker, Jr.,
620 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 1993) (30-day suspension
upheld for lawyer's baseless allegations that the court had
interfered with audio recording of trial and had granted
continuances to favor one side of the litigation); Matter of
Westfall,
808 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. 1991) (attorney reprimand ordered for
televised statement accusing judge of purposefully dishonest
conduct).
None of these cases interpreting the language of Rule 8.2
involved mere lawyer's complaints about how judicial conduct may
have affected the decision of the jury in the context of a an
adversary proceeding. Rather, the statements made were accusations
of dishonesty and corruption. Kidd's comments about gestures,
comments and inattentiveness made in the confines of the judicial
process hardly equal the statements noted supra of graft and
conspiracy. Kidd himself repeatedly stated on the record that he
was not attacking the trial court's character but was simply noting
how the court's conduct may have appeared to the jury.
The official comment to Rule 8.2 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct suggests as well that the Rule is meant to
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reach comments on a judge's integrity.3 Comment 1 to the ABA Rule
states:
Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating
the professional or personal fitness of persons being
considered for election or appointment to judicial office
and to public legal offices, such as attorney general,
prosecuting attorney and public defender. Expressing
honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to
improving the administration of justice. Conversely,
false statements by a lawyer can unfairly undermine
public confidence in the administration of justice.
Nothing in this or the other comments to the rule intimates that
the rule is to be applied, as it was by the district court, to a
lawyer's criticism of a judge's handling of a trial in which the
lawyer was involved made in papers filed with that same court in
the same proceeding. Rather, the comment suggests that the rule is
primarily a prohibition on comments made to the public that would
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.
Because attorney suspension is a quasi-criminal punishment in
character, any disciplinary rules used to impose this sanction on
attorneys must be strictly construed resolving ambiguities in favor
of the person charged. Matter of Thalheim, 853 F.2d 383, 388 (5th
Cir. 1988). We are also wary, as a matter of policy, of equating
an attorney's questioning of the court's conduct of a trial with
the sort of character attack proscribed by Rule 8.2. Attorneys
should be free to challenge, in appropriate legal proceedings, a
court's perceived partiality without the court misconstruing such
a challenge as an assault on the integrity of the court. Such
challenges should, however, be made only when substantiated by the
The Louisiana rule is identical to the ABA rule.
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trial record.
Should an attorney question how the court's behavior at trial
may have affected the jury without a basis for the allegation, the
court may possibly sanction that attorney under some version of ABA
Rule 3.1. Rule 3.1 provides that a "lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous."4 Rule
8.2 does not address such frivolous adversary statements.
Based then on our examination of other courts' application of
Rule 8.2, the ABA Comment and the strict construction in favor of
the charged, we conclude that Rule 8.2 does not reach Kidd's
statements made in his motion for new trial. Rule 8.2 solely
proscribes false or reckless statements questioning judicial
qualifications or integrity (usually allegations of dishonesty or
corruption). While such comments could arise in the trial context,
a trial court should be careful to distinguish frivolous motions on
the appearance of partiality from attacks on the character of the
court.
C. Sanctions Under the District Court's Inherent Power
The district court relied principally on its finding that Kidd
violated Rule 8.2, rather than on its inherent power, as the basis
for sanctions. This is demonstrated by the court's statement at
Louisiana has codified this provision as Rule 3.1 of the
Professional Rules of Conduct.
8
the show cause hearing.5 Nonetheless, we hold that had the court
relied on its inherent power to sanction Kidd, it would have abused
its discretion.
Conclusion
Since we hold that Rule 8.2 provided no basis for sanctioning
Kidd for his comments on the court's handling of the trial and that
use of the inherent power would have been an abuse of discretion,
we REVERSE the sanction order of the district court and render
judgment dismissing the rule of sanctions.
At the hearing, the district court stated:
Mr. Kidd, I find that you violated the terms of Rule 8.2
of the rules of professional conduct. . .And consequently
I'm going to sanction you by suspending you from practice
in the Western District of Louisiana for a period of one
year[.]
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