Cynthia Mizell appeals her convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce and robbery affecting interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

* Mizell, John Walker, and Kevin Turnage drove to the Armored Transport Company ("ATC") in Fort Worth, Texas, and Walker robbed two armored car guards at gunpoint, stealing more than $400,000. As a result of these events, Turnage pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony in exchange for his cooperation with the government's prosecution of Mizell.1 Mizell was charged by indictment with conspiracy to commit robbery affecting interstate commerce and robbery affecting interstate commerce. The government then filed a superseding information, charging Mizell with misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4.

Mizell agreed to waive indictment on the superseding information and pleaded guilty to the misprision of a felony charge in exchange for the government's agreement to dismiss the indictment containing the robbery charges. Pursuant to her guilty plea, Mizell stipulated that she conspired with Walker and others to commit robbery and that she actually participated with Walker and others in committing robbery of the armored car guards. At Mizell's plea agreement hearing, the district court rejected the plea agreement based upon its finding, as required by § 6B1.2(a) of the sentencing guidelines,2 that the misprision charge did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Mizell's actual offense behavior. Consequently, Mizell withdrew her guilty plea, and both the superseding information and the original indictment were set for trial.

Before the trial began, the district court gave Mizell an opportunity to ask that the information charging the misprision offense be dismissed. Mizell rejected this suggestion and stated that she wanted to leave the information pending, so the case would be tried to the jury on both counts of the indictment as well as the lesser count in the information. The jury returned guilty verdicts on the information and on both counts of the indictment.

Mizell appealed her convictions. This Court affirmed Mizell's conviction for misprision, but reversed and remanded her conspiracy and robbery convictions for a new trial. United States v. Mizell, No. 93-1512, 38 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 1994). A second jury convicted Mizell of conspiracy and robbery affecting interstate commerce. Mizell now appeals these convictions, arguing several points of error, each designed to demonstrate that she was denied a fair trial.

Mizell argues that the district court violated her Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses on her own behalf by not allowing her to elicit certain testimony from a prosecution witness. The government contends that the district court's actions constituted a proper limitation of Mizell's right to cross-examine the witness.

Kevin Turnage testified at trial as a witness for the prosecution. He testified about his involvement in the robbery, the roles that the other participants played, and his plea agreement with the government. As to Mizell, Turnage testified that she drove the car to the scene of the robbery, and that she participated in counting the money after the robbery. In contrast, Mizell testified that she did not drive the car to the scene of the robbery, that she had no prior knowledge that a robbery was going to take place when they drove to the ATC, and that she did not help count the money after the robbery. Mizell's attorney, Frank McCown, cross-examined Turnage concerning the events surrounding the robbery, his plea agreement with the government, dishonest statements that he had given the FBI, and his drinking problem and how it affected his memory of the robbery.

McCown then attempted to question Turnage about the FBI approaching him after receiving Mizell's account of the robbery, which contradicted what Turnage had told them earlier. The district court admonished McCown to stay within the scope of direct examination.3 McCown then informed the district court that "probably everything else" he had to ask Turnage was outside the scope of the direct examination and requested that Turnage be recalled during the defense's case-in-chief. The district court denied the request because Mizell had not listed Turnage on her witness list, as required by the local discovery rules.4

At the end of trial, McCown made a proffer of the evidence that he wanted to establish through additional examination of Turnage. McCown wanted to ask Turnage about inconsistent statements that he had made to the FBI about Mizell's and his own involvement in the robbery and whether implicating Mizell in the robbery was Turnage's only chance for leniency with the government. In addition, McCown wanted to establish that John Walker had made various threats against Turnage and his family in the event that Turnage implicated Walker in the robbery. These threats, Mizell argues, would indicate that Walker was a violent man. Mizell argues further that this testimony would add credence to Mizell's claim that she feared Walker and therefore was afraid to report the robbery after it occurred.5

* McCown told the district court that he did not list Turnage on his witness list because he assumed that he would be able to inquire into the proffered issues on cross-examination. A district court has broad discretion to reasonably restrict cross-examination; however, this discretion is limited by the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 103 (5th Cir.1995). "Cross-examination to expose a witness'[s] motive for testifying is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony, and is especially important with respect to witnesses who may have substantial reason to cooperate with the government." Id. at 103-04 (citation omitted). This right is particularly important when the witness is critical to the prosecution's case. Id. at 104. A "criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) (citation omitted); cf. Cooks, 52 F.3d at 104 ("The constitutional right is not violated, however, if the jury ha[s] sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness.").

We find that McCown's questions concerning inconsistent statements that Turnage had made to the FBI and Turnage's motive for implicating Mizell were probative of Turnage's credibility and were therefore proper subjects on cross-examination. See FED.R.EVID. 611(b) ("Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness."). Turnage was the prosecution's sole witness as to Mizell's direct involvement in the robbery; none of the other robbery participants testified at Mizell's trial. Therefore, only Turnage could directly contradict Mizell's own testimony that she did not drive the car to the scene of the robbery and that she did not know that a robbery was about to take place when she went in the car with John Walker and Turnage.6 Certainly, an earlier statement by Turnage to the FBI that he "believed," but did not know, that Mizell drove the car to the ATC would have been probative of his credibility and his ability to remember Mizell's role in the crime. In addition, if implicating Mizell in the robbery was Turnage's only opportunity for leniency, this fact could also affect his credibility. By not allowing Mizell to impeach Turnage's credibility with this evidence, the district court restricted Mizell's cross-examination of Turnage.

However, such restriction does not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation unless such restriction was unreasonable. Cooks, 52 F.3d at 103. In order to determine whether a district court's restriction of cross-examination is reasonable, we must assess whether the jury was given adequate information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness. Id. The district court allowed McCown to ask several questions concerning Turnage's inconsistent statements to the FBI and his motive to testify against Mizell. On cross-examination, Turnage admitted that in his first statement to the FBI, he lied about Mizell's involvement in the robbery. McCown was also able to ask Turnage whether he had initially told the FBI that he and Walker had discussed committing the robbery several days before they actually did commit the crime. Turnage denied making this statement to the FBI. The statement would have contradicted his testimony at trial that he did not know that they were going to commit a robbery until he was already in the car on the way to the ATC. The prosecution also elicited testimony from Turnage concerning inconsistent statements he had given the FBI. On direct examination, Turnage admitted that when he first spoke with the FBI, he stated that he did not drive the car, contrary to Turnage's testimony at trial that he drove the car away from the robbery. Turnage also admitted that he lied to the FBI when he stated that he tried to return the robbery proceeds that he received.

Concerning his plea bargain, McCown asked Turnage, who was having trouble remembering details from the night of the robbery, whether he had selectively remembered those things about the robbery that were necessary to get him the plea bargain. Turnage responded that he remembered the truth. McCown also asked Turnage whether it was his job as part of fulfilling his contract with the government to implicate Mizell in the robbery. When Turnage responded that his job was simply to be honest and cooperate, McCown pointed out the 5K motion which recommended lenient treatment for Turnage as a result of his cooperation with Mizell's prosecution.7 This motion was also introduced into evidence.

Having exhaustively reviewed the record, we conclude that the jury had adequate information with which to assess Turnage's credibility. Turnage admitted on direct and cross-examination that he had made inconsistent statements to the FBI concerning his and Mizell's involvement in the robbery. The jury was also made well aware of the fact that Turnage had a tremendous amount to gain by implicating Mizell in the robbery. Turnage testified that if he did not cooperate with the government, he potentially faced forty years in prison, as opposed to the three years which he received because of his cooperation. The excluded impeachment evidence would have merely been cumulative of the impeachment evidence already admitted at trial. Therefore, we conclude that no constitutional error was committed by the district court's limitation of Mizell's cross-examination of Turnage. See United States v. Hamilton, 48 F.3d 149 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that, because there was so much additional impeachment evidence admitted in the case, further impeachment of a witness whose credibility was vital to the prosecution's case "could not have affected the trial so as to prejudice [the defendant's] substantial rights").

Some of the evidence that McCown wished to elicit from Turnage, was not proper evidence for cross-examination because it was outside the scope of direct examination and was not probative of Turnage's credibility. Mizell argues that the district court's refusal, based on the local discovery rules, to allow her to recall Turnage violated her rights under the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment.8

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in her own defense "is an essential attribute of the adversary system." Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408, 108 S. Ct. 646, 652, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988). However, this right is limited and must be weighed against the countervailing interests in "the integrity of the adversary process, ... the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." Id. at 414-15, 108 S.Ct. at 656. The Supreme Court has held that a district court can preclude a defendant from calling a witness as punishment for the defendant's willful violation of a discovery order. See id. at 414, 108 S.Ct. at 655 (holding that preclusion of a witness's testimony was appropriate where the defendant's violation of a discovery request was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage"). However, the Supreme Court stated that in most cases "alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate." Id.

Taylor allows a district court to inquire into a party's reasons for failing to comply with a discovery rule, as the district court did in Mizell's case. Id. at 415, 108 S.Ct. at 656. McCown stated that he did not list Turnage on his witness list because he believed he could inquire into these subjects on cross-examination. However, McCown stated at oral argument that he was aware of the district court's strict policy of limiting cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and was not surprised by the district court's limits. There is no indication though that Mizell's omission of Turnage's name on her witness list was willful or done out of an attempt to gain an unfair advantage over the prosecution. Indeed, the district court did not find that Mizell willfully violated the discovery rules, nor did it consider whether Mizell's Sixth Amendment right outweighed the efficiency and fairness concerns cited in Taylor. Instead, the district court erroneously concluded that preclusion was permissible for any discovery violation. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152-53, 111 S. Ct. 1743, 1748, 114 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1991) ("We did not hold in Taylor that preclusion is permissible every time a discovery rule is violated. Rather, we acknowledged that alternative sanctions would be adequate and appropriate in most cases.") (citation omitted). As a result, Mizell's rights under the Compulsory Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the court's preclusion of Mizell's witness.

However, our inquiry does not end here, for a violation of a defendant's right to present witnesses on her own behalf does not constitute reversible error if the error was harmless. United States v. Alexander, 869 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069, 110 S. Ct. 1110, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1990). The precluded testimony concerned certain threats Walker had made to kill Turnage and his family, or to "get even," if Turnage implicated Walker in the robbery. Mizell wanted this evidence to establish Turnage's fear of Walker to add credence to her testimony that she was afraid of Walker.

Mizell's fear of Walker was central to her defense because she contended at trial that she had a "dependent personality disorder" which caused her to play a submissive role in her relationship with Walker and to be overly accommodating to him. According to Mizell, as the relationship progressed, she learned about Walker's violent tendencies and became too afraid to leave him or do anything to provoke him. This fear, Mizell argued, explained why she went in the car with Walker on the night of the robbery without inquiring as to where they were going and why she did not report the robbery after it occurred. We agree that Turnage's admission that he too feared Walker could have made Mizell's fear of Walker appear more credible to the jury.

However, Mizell presented such a substantial amount of evidence concerning Walker's violent nature, his threats, his large stature, and his proficiency in karate,9 that any additional testimony from Turnage would have been cumulative. Mizell's stepfather, Frank Johnson, testified about Walker's violent nature and stories Walker had told him about killing and harming people who had crossed him.10 Johnson stated that he was afraid of Walker, even though he was not a man who is easily intimidated. Mizell also testified that Walker told her the same stories about violent acts he had committed, that Walker kept guns, that he abused her and her son by putting them in painful karate holds, and that she was afraid of him.

Mizell also testified about the threats that Walker had allegedly made to Turnage and Brown.11 Given the overwhelming amount of evidence that Mizell presented regarding Walker's frightening propensities, and the lack of contradictory evidence on the issue, we conclude that the district court's preclusion of Turnage's testimony was harmless.

Mizell states that the district court erred in denying her pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment containing the conspiracy and robbery charges on double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel grounds. Before Mizell was re-tried on the conspiracy and robbery charges, she moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that by convicting her of misprision of a felony, the jury had conclusively determined that someone other than her had committed the crimes of conspiracy and robbery.

Mizell's only argument on this issue is that a defendant can only be convicted of misprision of a felony if the government proves that someone other than the misprision defendant committed the felony.12 Neither the elements of misprision,13 nor our opinion in United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1989), supports Mizell's argument. Warters acknowledges that "[m]isprision is normally not committed by one of the perpetrators of the underlying offense." Id. However, this observation is not based on any requirement that a person other than the defendant commit the underlying felony. Rather, the observation stems from the fact that the defendant would normally assert her "defense that the failure to make [the felony] known was an exercise of the constitutional right to refrain from self-incrimination." Id. Warters acknowledges, however, that it would be possible for a perpetrator of the crime to be convicted for misprision, because a defendant can always waive his Fifth Amendment defense by pleading guilty. Id. We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in denying Mizell's motion to dismiss the indictment.

Mizell argues that the district judge interfered in her trial to such a degree that he became an advocate for the prosecution. In other words, Mizell contends that the district judge's actions created the appearance that he was partial to the government's position, thus violating her due process right to a fair trial. "A federal district judge may comment on the evidence, question witnesses, bring out facts not yet adduced, and maintain the pace of the trial by interrupting or setting time limits on counsel." United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 921, 928 (5th Cir.1994). For judge's behavior to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, "the district judge's actions, viewed as a whole, must amount to an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of judge and prosecutor." United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1825, 131 L. Ed. 2d 746 (1995). The judge's actions must be both "quantitatively and qualitatively substantial to meet this test." Id.

* The district judge actively managed Mizell's trial, constantly interrupting both the prosecutors and the defense attorneys to remind them not to repeat questions they had already asked and to stay within the scope of the subject matter developed on direct examination when they were cross-examining a witness. The district judge also strongly admonished the defense attorneys several times; however, in most instances, the admonishments were given outside the hearing of the jury. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the district judge's actions in Mizell's case were within his broad discretion to manage the pace and objectivity of the trial. Additionally, we note that any confusion that the district judge may have created concerning his role in the proceedings was ameliorated by the jury instruction that clarified the judge's role in the trial.14 See id. at 1571-72 (stating that the Fifth Circuit has held that a curative jury instruction, like the one given in this case, "can operate against a finding of constitutional error").

Mizell contends that the district judge's interrogation of her expert witness, Dr. Schmitt, amounted to a comment on the weight of Schmitt's testimony and therefore violated her due process rights. As we have already noted, "[a] federal district court can interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." FED.R.EVID. 614(b). Because Mizell failed to object to the district court's interrogation of Schmitt either at the time of interrogation or at the next available opportunity, we review the district court's action for plain error. See FED.R.EVID. 614(c) (objections to the court's interrogation of witnesses "may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present"); United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 1266, 131 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1995). "Plain error occurs when the error is so obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and would result in manifest injustice." United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S. Ct. 180, 130 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1994).

To support her theory that she was present at the robbery but did not "participate" in it, Mizell offered the testimony of psychologist Dr. Schmitt. Schmitt testified that Mizell suffered from a "dependent personality disorder" and an "accommodation syndrome," which explained why Mizell would accompany John Walker, without question, to the robbery, and why she would continue to live with him afterwards.

Mizell's claim is based on the following exchanges that occurred at trial. In response to Schmitt's testimony concerning "John Walker's style," the district judge elicited testimony from Schmitt indicating that Schmitt had never met Walker; he was only testifying from what Mizell had told him.15 Later, in an effort to speed up the prosecution's cross-examination of Schmitt, the district judge stated, "I think he's told us that all he knows about this case is what she's told him and what he heard sitting out there in the audience a few minutes ago." Mizell also complains of the district judge's questions to Schmitt in response to which Schmitt admitted that a person with a personality disorder can do things and have relationships that are not caused by the disorder.16 Finally, the district judge asked Schmitt about his practice in forensic psychology. Schmitt informed the court that forensic psychology refers to testifying for lawyers and working with people in legal situations. In response to a question from the district judge, Schmitt testified that one-third of his income is derived from doing legal work.

We conclude that the district judge's interrogation of Schmitt did not amount to plain error. The district judge's questions were aimed at eliciting clarifying testimony, and any effect on Mizell's case was insignificant. Moreover, any error was again corrected by the court's instructions to the jury.

Finally, Mizell argues that the district judge erred in refusing to recuse himself from her retrial, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.17 Even if the discretionary rules regarding recusal did not mandate that the district judge recuse himself, Mizell urges us to create a mandatory recusal rule in cases where the district judge has made determinations in earlier proceedings concerning the ultimate issues in the case.

Mizell asserts as grounds for recusal events that occurred before and after her first trial for misprision, conspiracy to commit robbery, and robbery. First, prior to Mizell's first trial, the district judge rejected Mizell's plea agreement that provided for dismissal of the indictment charging her with conspiracy and robbery. The district judge refused to accept the plea agreement because he could not find that the misprision offense, to which Mizell wished to plead guilty, would adequately reflect the gravity of her actual offense behavior, as required by U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a)18 and FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(e).19 Further, at sentencing following Mizell's first trial, the district judge accepted the recommendation of the Presentence Report and increased Mizell's sentence for obstruction of justice because he found that Mizell lied when she testified that she had not driven the car to the robbery scene.20 These two instances demonstrate, according to Mizell, that the district judge had formulated an opinion as to the strength of the prosecution's case and her guilt which prevented him from being impartial.

Section 455(a) provides that any judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Section 455(b)(1) provides that the judge "shall also disqualify himself ... [w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." We review a district judge's decision not to recuse himself for abuse of discretion. Matter of Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir.1993).

In Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994), the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances which could necessitate the recusal of a judge for "impartiality," pursuant to § 455(a), or for "bias or prejudice," pursuant to § 455(b)(1). The specific issue before the Liteky Court was whether the "extrajudicial source" doctrine applied to § 455(a).21 The Court held that the extrajudicial nature of a judge's opinion is a factor to consider in analyzing whether recusal is necessary; however, it is not determinative. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1156. The "extrajudicial source" doctrine, the court explained, was merely one application of the pejorativeness requirement of the terms "impartiality," and "bias or prejudice" as they are used in §§ 455(a) and 455(b)(1). Id. at ----, ----, 114 S. Ct. at 1155, 1156. This pejorativeness requirement mandates that a judge be recused under § 455(b)(1) when his "judicial predispositions go beyond what is normal and acceptable," id. at ----, 114 S. Ct. at 1155,22 and under § 455(a) when his predisposition is "wrongful or inappropriate." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1156.23

In explaining acceptable predispositions that a judge might possess, the Court noted that "judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality motion." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. The Court continued, "In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or accompanying opinion), [the rulings] cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source; and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required ... when no extrajudicial source is involved." Id. These opinions, which are "formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgement impossible." Id. Opinions that a judge forms based on information that he acquires in earlier proceedings are also "not subject to deprecatory characterizations as 'bias' or 'prejudice,' " for "[i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1155.

In Liteky, the defendants had moved to disqualify the trial judge from their criminal trial, pursuant to § 455(a), based on his behavior at an earlier trial of one of the defendants.24 Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1151. After explaining the role that the "extrajudicial source" should play in recusal jurisprudence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' denials of the disqualification motion. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1158. The Court concluded that the judge's actions of which the petitioners complained consisted of "judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts, and ordinary admonishments (whether or not legally supportable) to counsel and to witnesses." Id. Moreover, "All occurred in the course of judicial proceedings, and neither (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside such proceedings nor (2) displayed deepseated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible." Id.

Following Liteky, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Mizell's motion to transfer the case. The grounds for recusal that Mizell asserts consist of judicial rulings which the district judge was required to make. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; United States v. Crowell, 60 F.3d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1995) (stating that the district court has a duty to take an active role in evaluating a plea agreement once it has been disclosed to the court). We hold that to the extent that the district judge formed any opinion about Mizell's case based on his findings made pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 3C1.1, 6B1.2(a), and FED.R.CRIM.P. 11(e), it was a proper and appropriate opinion acquired in the course of judicial proceedings, in reliance on information learned during the proceedings. See Crowell, 60 F.3d at 204 (stating that the court's "evaluation [of a plea agreement] may include a consideration of the punishment allowable under the agreement, as compared to the punishment appropriate for the defendant's conduct as a whole"). Moreover, the district judge's rulings did not display such deepseated animosity towards Mizell, so as to render his fair judgment impossible upon her retrial. For these reasons, we also decline Mizell's invitation to establish a mandatory rule of disqualification when a judge has made findings of the kind attacked in this case. We feel the current rules for discretionary recusal provide adequate security for a defendant's right to an impartial judge.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mizell's conviction.