Filed: Jul. 24, 1996
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-20623 (Summary Calendar) _ In The Matter Of: JAMIE BYRNE CREECH, Debtor, JAMIE BYRNE CREECH, Appellant, versus SHEFFIELD CAPITAL CORP., assignee of the FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas July 17, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jamie Byrne Creech appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankru
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 95-20623 (Summary Calendar) _ In The Matter Of: JAMIE BYRNE CREECH, Debtor, JAMIE BYRNE CREECH, Appellant, versus SHEFFIELD CAPITAL CORP., assignee of the FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Southern District of Texas July 17, 1996 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jamie Byrne Creech appeals the district court’s order affirming the bankrup..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 95-20623
(Summary Calendar)
_________________
In The Matter Of: JAMIE BYRNE CREECH,
Debtor,
JAMIE BYRNE CREECH,
Appellant,
versus
SHEFFIELD CAPITAL CORP., assignee of the
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
July 17, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jamie Byrne Creech appeals the district court’s order
affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision to deny Creech’s
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
objections and allow the FDIC’s claim against her Chapter 13
bankruptcy estate. After carefully reviewing the record, we hold
that the bankruptcy court’s finding that the FDIC’s claim was
governed by the “Modification Agreement” was not clearly erroneous.
See United States Abatement Corp. v. Mobil Exploration and
Producing U.S., Inc.,
79 F.3d 393, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that, in the context of bankruptcy appeals, “we perform the
identical task as the district court, reviewing the bankruptcy
court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard”);
Border v. McDaniel,
70 F.3d 841, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that in reviewing bankruptcy court’s findings of fact, “we must
defer to that court’s findings unless, after review of all the
evidence, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that the
bankruptcy court erred”). We further hold that the bankruptcy
court did not err in finding that Creech had failed to present any
evidence to support her claim of usury. See Thrift v. Hubbard,
44
F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1995) (setting forth elements of usury
claims and noting the Texas presumption against finding usury
absent clear evidence to the contrary). Finally, we hold that the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit
the “Assignment of Note” document which had been rendered
irrelevant to the case by the superseding Modification Agreement.
See Stephenson v. Salisbury,
967 F.2d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 1992)
(applying abuse of discretion analysis to bankruptcy court’s
evidentiary rulings, and noting the “great latitude allowed in the
conduct of a bench trial”).
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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