Filed: Mar. 25, 1998
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: REVISED, March 25, 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 96-30664 STAFFORD J. COOLBAUGH, Plaintiff - Appellant, VERSUS STATE OF LOUISIANA, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana February 27, 1998 Before DAVIS, SMITH and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge: Stafford J. Coolbaugh, a quadriplegic, filed this action against the State of Louisiana in federal court alleging that the State violated Title II
Summary: REVISED, March 25, 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 96-30664 STAFFORD J. COOLBAUGH, Plaintiff - Appellant, VERSUS STATE OF LOUISIANA, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court For the Western District of Louisiana February 27, 1998 Before DAVIS, SMITH and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges. DAVIS, Circuit Judge: Stafford J. Coolbaugh, a quadriplegic, filed this action against the State of Louisiana in federal court alleging that the State violated Title II ..
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REVISED, March 25, 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 96-30664
STAFFORD J. COOLBAUGH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Louisiana
February 27, 1998
Before DAVIS, SMITH and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
Stafford J. Coolbaugh, a quadriplegic, filed this action
against the State of Louisiana in federal court alleging that the
State violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994), by discriminating against
him on the basis of his disability. The district court denied
Coolbaugh’s motion for summary judgment and the jury eventually
returned a verdict in favor of the State. Coolbaugh has appealed
the district court’s denial of his summary judgment motion, as well
as the take nothing judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. Before
turning to the merits, we consider whether jurisdiction was proper.
Specifically, we consider whether the ADA represents an appropriate
Congressional exercise of its Section 5 enforcement power so as to
override the State of Louisiana’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. In
light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), City of Boerne v. Flores,
117
S. Ct. 2157 (1997), and City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985), we hold that the provisions of
the ADA are enforceable against a state because the enactment of
this legislation was a valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5
enforcement power, and for that reason does not infringe upon
Louisiana’s rights under the Eleventh Amendment. On the merits, we
find no error and affirm.
I.
Coolbaugh and his family moved to Louisiana in 1993 after
living in California for many years. While he was a California
resident, Coolbaugh received a driver’s license permitting him to
operate a specially equipped, hand-controlled automobile.
Coolbaugh’s testimony revealed that he had used his California
license for identification purposes, but not to drive. Upon their
arrival in Louisiana, Coolbaugh and his wife went to the local
Office of Motor Vehicles to obtain Louisiana driver’s licenses.
Generally, a new Louisiana resident may obtain a Louisiana
driver’s license by presenting a valid out-of-state license and
passing an eye exam. Coolbaugh’s wife, who was not disabled,
followed this procedure and obtained a Louisiana driver’s license.
2
An employee of the Office of Motor Vehicles told Coolbaugh,
however, that in addition to the usual requirements, he must
complete a special medical form and pass a road test in his own
hand-controlled vehicle. Although Coolbaugh’s doctor certified
that Coolbaugh could safely drive a “handicapped controlled
vehicle,” Coolbaugh failed to supply his own hand-controlled
vehicle or otherwise to take and pass the required road test. As
a result, Louisiana declined to issue Coolbaugh a Louisiana
driver’s license.
Coolbaugh brought the current action against the State of
Louisiana in federal court alleging that the State violated Title
II of the ADA by treating him and his nondisabled wife differently
with respect to the issuance of Louisiana driver’s licenses. The
district court denied Coolbaugh’s motion for summary judgment, and
the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Louisiana, finding that the State had not discriminated against
Coolbaugh on the basis of a disability. Coolbaugh appeals both the
district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment and the
jury’s verdict.
II.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to states from suits
in federal court by private persons. The Eleventh Amendment states
that:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.
3
U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court has broadly construed the
Eleventh Amendment’s narrow language, to embrace the larger
principle that a state is granted immunity from suits initiated by
private entities or persons in federal court, if the state has not
consented to such suits. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1122 (1996) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . . which it confirms.”) (quoting Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)).
Congress has the authority to abrogate states’ immunity in
certain circumstances pursuant to Congress’ powers under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 provides that "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5. Among
the provisions is Section 1's mandate that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id., § 1.
Seminole Tribe established a two-pronged test for determining
the validity of Congress’ abrogation of state immunity through the
exercise of its Section 5 enforcement power. First, a court must
determine whether Congress “unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to
abrogate the immunity.” 116 S. Ct. at 1123 (quoting Green v.
Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). Second, a court must determine
whether Congress acted “pursuant to a valid exercise of power.”
4
Id. (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68).
The first prong--Congress’ intent to abrogate state immunity--
is patently clear in the ADA. Section 12202 of the ADA provides
that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment
[sic] to the Constitution of the United States from an action in
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of
this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202. See also Clark v. California,
123 F.3d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that in the ADA,
Congress “unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the
State’s immunity”).
The second prong--whether Congress has abrogated state
immunity in the ADA through a valid exercise of its enforcement
power--is less clear. The Constitution allows Congress to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court held in City of
Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. that disabled
persons are protected by the Equal Protection Clause.1 473 U.S.
1
We recognize that Cleburne specifically addressed the
mentally disabled, and not the physically disabled. However, we
are persuaded that its reasoning applies to the physically disabled
as well. In arguing against extension of heightened scrutiny to
mentally disabled individuals, the Court pointed out the difficulty
of “distinguish[ing] a variety of other groups who have perhaps
immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot
themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can
claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large.”
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445. The Court then listed such
indistinguishable groups, naming “the aging, the disabled, the
mentally ill, and the infirm.”
Id. at 446. Rejecting the
eligibility of these groups for heightened scrutiny, the Court
stated, “[w]e are reluctant to set out on that course, and we
decline to do so.”
Id. This assignment of rational basis review
to physically disabled persons has been recognized and applied by
numerous courts after Cleburne. See Hansen v. Rimel,
104 F.3d 189,
190 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Although protected by statutory
enactments such as the [ADA], the disabled do not constitute a
5
432, 450 (1985).
In Cleburne, the City of Cleburne denied a special use permit
to a proposed operator of a group home for the mentally retarded.
Id. at 435-37. The plaintiffs challenged the denial, arguing that
the zoning ordinance requiring a permit violated the equal
protection rights of the mentally retarded.
Id. at 437. The
Supreme Court held that “legislation that distinguishes between the
mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose.”
Id. at 446.
Thus, applying Cleburne, the disabled are protected by the
Equal Protection Clause and Congress is entitled to enforce this
protection against the states despite the Eleventh Amendment. The
Court last term, however, in City of Boerne v. Flores, declared
that Congress’ power in this respect is not unlimited. 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997).
Flores arose out of the City of Boerne’s rejection of the
Archbishop of San Antonio’s permit application to enlarge a
historically significant church. Id. at 2160. The Archbishop
“suspect class” for purposes of equal protection analysis.”);
Suffolk Parents of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate,
101 F.3d 818,
824-27 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying rational basis standard to claims
of handicapped individuals who challenged a state’s denial of
funding), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1843 (1997); Does v. Chandler,
83 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996) (“For the purposes of equal
protection analysis, the disabled do not constitute a suspect
class.”); Spragens v. Shalala,
36 F.3d 947, 950 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that “a classification applying to blind persons is not
suspect, or even quasi-suspect, and we therefore apply the
‘rational basis’ standard, rather than some more strict one”); More
v. Farrier,
984 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S.
819 (1993) (holding that the wheelchair-bound are not a suspect
class).
6
brought an action claiming, among other things, that rejection of
the permit violated The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”). 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to
2000bb-4 (1994)). The Court held that RFRA, legislation passed
pursuant to Congress’ enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, was unconstitutional because it exceeded
Congress’ enforcement power. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
The Flores Court declared that “§ 5 is ‘a positive grant of
legislative power’ to Congress.” Id. at 2163 (quoting Katzenbach
v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). The Flores Court restated
its longstanding view that
[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted
to carry out the objects the amendments have in view,
whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions
they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment
of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion,
if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of
congressional power.
Id. at 2163 (quoting Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 345-46
(1879)). The Flores Court affirmed the historical principle that
Congress has the authority to both remedy and prevent
constitutional violations.
Id. at 2164-67. In addition, the Court
restated its historical view that
[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes
into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States.’
Id. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 455
(1976)). In contrast to its affirmation of Congress’ Section 5
7
powers, the Court was clear in its mandate that Congress may not
“determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. at
2164.
The Flores Court explained Congress’ Section 5 authority to
adopt legislation that remedies or prevents constitutional
violations by reciting examples from earlier cases. Id. at 2166-
67. For example, the Supreme Court “upheld a suspension of
literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress’
parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment
. . . to combat racial discrimination in voting.”
Id. at 2163
(citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966))
(citation omitted). The Court upheld this legislation to prevent
violations despite its earlier decision upholding the
constitutionality of the literacy tests in Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45 (1959). The Supreme Court has
“also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are
within Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the
States.”
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
In Flores, the Court stated that “the line between measures
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that
make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where
it lies.” Id. at 2164. The Court held that to be a valid
exercise of power under Section 5, “[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied
8
and the means adopted to that end.” Id. (emphasis added). As
guidance to applying this test, the Court stated that “[t]he
appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of
the evil presented.”
Id. at 2169 (citation omitted).
In summary, the Supreme Court has instructed us that Congress
is authorized to adopt legislation that remedies or prevents
unconstitutional conduct, provided there is a “congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end.” Id. at 2164. This proportionality
inquiry has two primary facets: the extent of the threatened
constitutional violations, and the scope of the steps provided in
the legislation to remedy or prevent such violations.
In making our proportionality review, as Flores directs, we
must consider the ADA’s scope in light of the evil it addresses.
We first turn to findings in the ADA where Congress detailed its
understanding of the extent of the evil it was addressing--
discrimination against the disabled.2
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities, and this number is
increasing as the population as a whole is growing
older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and,
despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as
2
The findings in the ADA distinguish it from RFRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4, in which Congress made no specific findings
regarding the seriousness or the scope of discrimination against
religious persons.
9
employment, housing, public accommodations,
education, transportation, communication,
recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
national origin, religion, or age, individuals who
have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to
redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, including outright
intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects
of architectural, transportation, and communication
barriers, overprotective rules and policies,
failure to make modifications to existing
facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation,
and relegation to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have
documented that people with disabilities, as a
group, occupy an inferior status in our society,
and are severely disadvantaged socially,
vocationally, economically, and educationally.3
3
The principal findings regarding the existence of
discrimination are listed above. Congress also found:
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and
insular minority who have been faced with
restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness
in our society, based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and
resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly
indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals to participate in, and contribute to,
society;
(8) the Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals
with disabilities are to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary
discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis and to pursue those opportunities for which
our free society is justifiably famous, and costs
the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
10
42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1995).
We must give these congressional findings substantial
deference. “In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute,
‘courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive
judgments of Congress.’” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner
II), 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1189 (1997) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC (Turner I),
512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (Kennedy, J. Op.)).
The Court in Flores reaffirmed this bedrock principal when it
stated that “[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to
‘determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are
entitled to much deference.” 117 S. Ct. at 2172 (quoting
Morgan,
384 U.S. at 651).
The Turner II Court instructs that the judiciary’s “sole
obligation is ‘to assure that, in formulating its judgments,
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence.’” 117 S. Ct. at 1189 (quoting Turner
I, 512 U.S. at 666
(Kennedy, J. Op.)).
Deference to the judgment of Congress is particularly
appropriate in this case, because in Cleburne, the Court identified
Congress as the ideal governmental branch to make findings and
decisions regarding the legal treatment of the disabled. 473 U.S.
at 442-43. In Cleburne, the Court stated: “How this large and
diversified group is to be treated under the law is a difficult and
nonproductivity.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1995).
11
often a technical matter, very much a task for legislators guided
by qualified professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed
opinions of the judiciary.” Id.
Before enacting the ADA, Congress considered a wide range of
evidence and made findings. Both the House and the Senate cited
seven substantive studies or reports to support its conclusion that
discrimination against the disabled is a serious and pervasive
problem. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 28 (1990) (Both citing National Council on the
Handicapped, On the Threshold of Independence (Jan. 1988) (updating
the legislative changes recommended in Toward Independence); Report
of the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Epidemic (June 1988) (reviewing the medical, financial, ethical,
policy, and legal issues that affect those afflicted with HIV);
Louis Harris and Associates, The ICD (International Center for the
Disabled) Survey II: Employing Disabled Americans (1987)
(surveying 210 top managers, 301 equal employment managers, 210
department heads and line managers, and 200 top managers in
companies employing 10-49 people); Louis Harris and Associates, The
ICD (International Center for the Disabled) Survey of Disabled
Americans: Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream (March
1986) (surveying 1000 disabled persons); National Council on the
Handicapped, Toward Independence (Feb. 1986) (reviewing different
laws and programs that affect disabled persons and offering
recommendations for legislative changes); U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities (Sept.
12
1983) (reporting on, among other things, the history, nature, and
extent of discrimination against the disabled); From ADA to
Empowerment: The Report of the Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities (Oct. 12, 1990)
(compiling findings and recommendations following the formation of
a Task Force, which conducted 14 Washington, D.C., teleconference
meetings with participants from across the country, held 63 public
forums in the 50 states and some territories, held other meetings
involving 25,000 participants, testified in congressional hearings,
met with legislative and executive staff members, met with the
President, Vice President and various Cabinet members, and met with
opponents of the ADA)). The legislative history also includes a
wealth of testimonial and anecdotal evidence from a spectrum of
parties to support the finding of serious and pervasive
discrimination.4
4
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989)(quoting the
testimony of Timothy Cook of the National Disability Action Center,
regarding the mentally and emotionally debilitating effects of
discrimination); id. at 6-7 (quoting the testimony of Judith
Heumann of the World Institute on Disability, regarding her
personal history of discrimination due to her disability);
id. at
7 (citing a Washington Post article in March, 1988, profiling a zoo
keeper’s refusal to admit children with Downs Syndrome);
id. at 8
(citing testimony about a Kentucky woman who was fired because her
son, ill with AIDS, moved into her home so she could provide care
for him);
id. at 7 (citing the discrimination apparent in the facts
of Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287 (1985), in which a child with
cerebral palsy was excluded from the classroom because the teacher
believed the child’s appearance nauseated classmates);
id. at 9
(citing the testimony of U.S. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh (on
behalf of President Bush), profiling the isolation and dependence
faced by the disabled);
id. at 10 (citing the testimony of Harold
Russell, Chair of the President’s Committee on Employment of People
with Disabilities, that a majority of disabled persons require no
reasonable accommodation, and many others require only an
inexpensive one);
id. at 12 (citing testimony regarding the
13
We are satisfied that the extensive record compiled in the
legislative history fully supports Congress’ detailed findings of
a serious and pervasive problem of discrimination against the
disabled. As stated above, these findings are entitled to
deference. Because Congress found a significant likelihood of
unconstitutional actions and therefore a significant “evil” to be
addressed, the only remaining inquiry is whether the scope of the
ADA is so “sweeping” that the statute cannot be seen as
proportional to the evil Congress sought to address.
We are persuaded that Congress’ scheme in the ADA to provide
a remedy to the disabled who suffer discrimination and to prevent
such discrimination is not so draconian or overly sweeping to be
considered disproportionate to the serious threat of discrimination
Congress perceived. The ADA first sets forth broad provisions
generally outlawing discrimination.5 In addition to these general
inaccessibility of many polling places to disabled persons).
5
Title I and Title II each contain a broad mandate. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a):
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment.
See also 42 U.S.C. § 12132:
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation
in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.
14
provisions outlawing discrimination, Congress made specific
judgments in particular circumstances as to what it perceived to be
reasonable and appropriate to prevent unconstitutional
discrimination. For example, in Title I, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) declares it discriminatory to reject an employee
whose mental or physical limitation may be reasonably accommodated,
so long as such accommodation does not cause undue burden;
§ 12112(d) declares it discriminatory to subject a potential
employee to medical examinations or inquiries; and § 12113
provides a defense to an entity that refuses employment to a
disabled person when the refusal is “job-related and consistent
with business necessity.” Included in the provisions of Title II
is 42 U.S.C. § 12142(a), which requires entities that purchase or
renovate new buses or rail vehicles to ensure that such new or
renovated vehicles be accessible to the disabled, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 12148(b), which requires that at least one car per train is
accessible to the disabled. Congress made these particularized
judgments after hearing testimony on the reasonableness and
feasibility of these provisions. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 44-45 (1990) (citing testimony that businesses will
benefit from the ADA because the labor pool will improve); id. at
45 (citing employee expertise and performance benefits that accrue
to corporations that make accommodations);
id. (citing testimony
from a former CEO of small and large companies, arguing that the
ADA is affordable and is “good business”);
id. at 46 (citing
testimony regarding the Marriott Corporation’s success as a result
15
of policies similar to those established in the ADA).
In sum, the ADA represents Congress’ considered efforts to
remedy and prevent what it perceived as serious, widespread
discrimination against the disabled. We recognize that in some
instances, the provisions of the ADA will “prohibit[] conduct which
is not itself unconstitutional and intrude[] into ‘legislative
spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” Flores,
117 S. Ct. at 2163 (quoting
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455). We
cannot say, however, in light of the extensive findings of
unconstitutional discrimination made by Congress, that these
remedies are too sweeping to survive the Flores proportionality
test for legislation that provides a remedy for unconstitutional
discrimination or prevents threatened unconstitutional actions.
In concluding that Congress did not exceed its Section 5 power
in adopting the ADA, we join the only other circuit that has
considered the issue since the Court decided Flores. In Clark, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the ADA as a proper
exercise of Congress' Section 5 power. 123 F.3d at 1270. The
panel concluded that
[i]n both acts, Congress explicitly found that persons
with disabilities have suffered discrimination. Both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act therefore are within the
scope of appropriate legislation under the Equal
Protection Clause as defined by the Supreme Court. At
the same time, neither act provides remedies so sweeping
that they exceed the harms that they are designed to
16
redress.
Id. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were validly enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment."
Id.
Congress' inclusion of detailed findings in the ADA is an
important distinguishing feature between this case and Flores. In
contrast to the extensive findings Congress made in the ADA,
Congress made no findings in RFRA of widespread unconstitutional
treatment of religious persons. Indeed, the Flores Court concluded
that "the emphasis of the hearings [related to RFRA] was on laws of
general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion."
Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2169. The detailed factual findings in the
ADA, which require our deference, are critical to the application
of the Flores proportionality review.
Also, we are convinced that the threat posed by RFRA to our
principles of separation of powers is not similarly posed by the
ADA. In the ADA, Congress included no language attempting to upset
the balance of powers and usurp the Court's function of
establishing a standard of review by establishing a standard
different from the one previously established by the Supreme Court.
Congress performed one of its traditional legislative functions by
finding facts relating to proposed legislation. The Supreme Court
may in the future, if it chooses to do so, reconsider the Cleburne
standard of review in light of the Congressional findings.
However, this conflict is not a sufficient reason for us to
invalidate the ADA.
17
The dissent seems to conclude that Congress does not have the
power under § 5 to prohibit constitutional conduct. We disagree.
The Flores court stated
[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes
into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved
to the States.’
Id. at 2163 (quoting
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455).
We therefore hold that the ADA represents a proper exercise of
Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, Louisiana is not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suits brought pursuant to the ADA.
III.
We now turn to the merits. The record fully supports the
jury’s finding that the state did not discriminate against Mr.
Coolbaugh, who was a paraplegic, by requiring that he demonstrate
his ability to drive on the state’s roadways by taking a driving
test. A number of plausible explanations may be offered for the
verdict. Perhaps the clearest one that is fully supported by the
evidence is that the state’s refusal to issue Mr. Coolbaugh a
driver’s license based on his possession of a California license
was not motivated, even in part, by its desire to discriminate
against him because of his disability. Rather, its decision was
motivated by a desire to protect the public on the state’s
highways. Mr. Coolbaugh's argument that, absent discrimination,
the state would have accepted his California driver's license as
sufficient evidence of his ability to drive was particularly
18
unpersuasive. The evidence revealed that though Coolbaugh held a
valid California driver’s license, he had not actually driven a
vehicle since obtaining his license, and had used the license only
for identification purposes. Because the verdict is fully
supported by the record and we find no reversible error, the
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
19
