Filed: Oct. 20, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-40614 Summary Calendar _ JEFFREY CAMACHO, Petitioner-Appellant, versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (C-97-CV-352) _ October 18, 1999 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:* Jeffrey Camacho appeals, based on the district court’s
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-40614 Summary Calendar _ JEFFREY CAMACHO, Petitioner-Appellant, versus GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Respondent-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (C-97-CV-352) _ October 18, 1999 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:* Jeffrey Camacho appeals, based on the district court’s ..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 98-40614
Summary Calendar
_______________________
JEFFREY CAMACHO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(C-97-CV-352)
_________________________________________________________________
October 18, 1999
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*
Jeffrey Camacho appeals, based on the district court’s
certificate of appealability, the denial of his federal habeas
corpus petition. Following the enactment of AEDPA, this court may
reverse only if the state court’s denial of relief resulted in a
decision that was contrary to, or involved in an unreasonable
application of federal law; or depended upon an unreasonable
determination of the facts by the state courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Camacho asserts that his procedural due process rights
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
were violated in the course of the Texas Parole revocation process.
Finding no clear misapplication of federal law under the exacting
standards now applicable, we affirm.
The Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles released Camacho
on parole on April 19, 1995. Only three months later, the Board
issued a warrant for his arrest on six charges of parole
violations. Camacho pled true to five of those violations, and the
Board revoked his parole on December 5, 1995.
Camacho contends that he was denied due process because
“the state parole authorities, after issuing a ‘final disposition’
to continue his earlier parole, later issued a purported second
‘final disposition’ revoking that parole, based solely on a new
charge which came to light after the initial ‘final disposition.’
We conclude, however, that the state courts did not plainly
misconstrue federal law in rejecting Camacho’s habeas petition.
The procedural rights offered Camacho were essentially in accord
with Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471,
92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
Camacho chose to waive the specific Morrissey protections and to
admit his guilt to five of the six charges. The only remaining
question was the extent of penalty he would receive. There is no
dispute that the least penalty he expected was custody in an
Intermediate Secure Facility, which represented a continued loss of
liberty. Whether Camacho suffered ISF incarceration or prison
confinement pursuant to actual parole revocation is immaterial for
procedural due process purposes, as a prisoner has no due process
rights to a specific custody classification. Sondin v. Connor, 515
2
U.S. 472,
115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). Moreover, the impact of the then-
pending child custody charges on his parole revocation is either
speculative or a matter of harmless error. By admitting parole
violations, Camacho subjected himself to whatever punishment the
Board of Pardons and Paroles chose to impose; their flip-flop on
the level of continued custody, in and of itself, raises only an
issue of Texas and not federal constitutional law.
The Board’s procedures accorded to Camacho did not
unreasonably conflict with Morrissey. The judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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