Filed: Jun. 11, 1999
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 98-60546 Summary Calendar EARL BARNES, Plaintiff - Appellant, VERSUS INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.; RAY MOORE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (1:97-CV-133-GR) June 11, 1999 Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:1 Earl Barnes (“Barnes”) worked for Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (“Ingalls”) as Gantry Crane Operator. In May 1996, Ingalls fired Barnes
Summary: UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit No. 98-60546 Summary Calendar EARL BARNES, Plaintiff - Appellant, VERSUS INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.; RAY MOORE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (1:97-CV-133-GR) June 11, 1999 Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:1 Earl Barnes (“Barnes”) worked for Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. (“Ingalls”) as Gantry Crane Operator. In May 1996, Ingalls fired Barnes f..
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 98-60546
Summary Calendar
EARL BARNES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
INGALLS SHIPBUILDING, INC.; RAY MOORE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(1:97-CV-133-GR)
June 11, 1999
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:1
Earl Barnes (“Barnes”) worked for Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc.
(“Ingalls”) as Gantry Crane Operator. In May 1996, Ingalls fired
Barnes for violating company rules and insubordination. Barnes
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) and received a right to sue letter. He sued Ingalls,
asserting (1) race discrimination and retaliatory discharge under
Title VII and (2) violation of his due process rights. The
district court granted Ingalls’ motion for summary judgment.
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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Barnes appeals.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
See Hall v. Gillman Inc., 81 F.3d 35,36-37 (5th Cir. 1996). After
a careful review of the briefs and the record, we conclude that the
district court properly granted summary judgment for Ingalls.
Although the entire appeal lacks merit, the due process claim was
particularly frivolous. It is a basic tenet of constitutional law
the Due Process Clause is applicable only to state actors. Ingalls
is a private company and was, therefore, incapable of violating
Barnes’ due process rights. See Shelley v. Kraemer,
68 S. Ct. 836,
842 (1948) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful.”). We affirm for the reasons given by the district
court.
AFFIRMED.
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