Filed: Jan. 06, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-21007 _ UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER NETWORK, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER FORMS, LTD; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER CONSULTING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (H-96-CV-2389) _ January 6, 2000 Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-21007 _ UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER NETWORK, INC.; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER FORMS, LTD; UNIVERSAL COMPUTER CONSULTING, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (H-96-CV-2389) _ January 6, 2000 Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-21007
_____________________
UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INC.;
UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SERVICES, INC.;
UNIVERSAL COMPUTER NETWORK, INC.;
UNIVERSAL COMPUTER FORMS, LTD;
UNIVERSAL COMPUTER CONSULTING,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
(H-96-CV-2389)
_________________________________________________________________
January 6, 2000
Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The plaintiffs sued the defendant for violations of sections
I and II of the Sherman Act and for tortious interference with
existing contracts and with prospective business relations under
Texas law. The defendant filed a summary judgment motion on all
claims, which the district court granted. The defendants have
appealed the dismissal of their claims. We have reviewed the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
record, studied the briefs, and considered the arguments made by
counsel. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
I
In the United States, most automobile dealerships are separate
and independent from automobile manufacturers. Dealerships usually
rely on a computerized Dealer Management System (“DMS”) to help
track inventory, manage warranty and parts records, and perform
accounting functions. A DMS consists of both hardware, software,
and often technical support. The three largest sellers of DMSs are
Universal Computer Systems (“Universal”), Automatic Data Processing
(“ADP”), and The Reynolds & Reynolds Company (“R&R”). These
companies sell the DMSs directly to the individual auto
dealerships. The systems sold to the dealerships are similar to
one another regardless of what make of cars that dealership
carries. There are, however, minor alterations made to ensure
compatibility with different manufacturers’ computer systems and to
account for idiosyncracies of individual dealerships.
Volvo Cars of North America has 365 dealerships in the United
States. In 1994, Universal had contracts with twelve of those
dealers to provide them with DMSs. In the spring of 1994, Volvo
began looking for ways to improve its information systems, leading
it to form the Dealer Systems Steering Committee in September 1994.
Volvo selected ten representative dealers to participate along with
five of its own employees. Two main concerns were raised during
the committee’s meetings. The first, which was primarily that of
2
the dealers, was a general concern about the level of, and
differences in, prices dealers were having to pay for DMSs. The
second concern, which was exclusively Volvo’s, was that there were
too many suppliers of DMSs, which made it more costly for Volvo to
maintain compatibility with its dealers’ different systems. As a
result of these meetings, the committee asked Universal, ADP, and
R&R to prepare presentations on their services, including pricing
information. Universal’s presentation failed to provide
information on prices, while its competitors complied with the
committee’s request.
In February 1995, the committee met to discuss the DMS
providers. It later recommended that Volvo approve ADP and R&R,
but not Universal, as approved DMS providers. Volvo followed this
recommendation and approved Universal’s two competitors. Although
Volvo did not require its dealers to use DMSs from approved
vendors, the dealers would have to do so to participate in Volvo’s
“Partnering For Excellence” program, which provided monetary
benefits to participating dealers.
Universal filed suit in 1996, charging Volvo with violations
of Sections I and II of the Sherman Act and tortious interference
with existing contracts and with prospective business relations
under Texas law. The district court first dismissed the Section II
claim on summary judgment at the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
The magistrate judge concluded that Universal had failed to
establish a relevant market that Volvo had monopolized or attempted
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to monopolize, and that Universal had not alleged harm with
sufficient particularity. However, the court offered Universal an
opportunity to amend its pleading to specify the harm. Universal
did amend its pleading. The magistrate judge later recommended,
and the district court agreed, that the Section I and tortious
interference claims be dismissed as well. The magistrate judge’s
opinion rejected the contention that Volvo’s actions constituted a
per se violation; the magistrate judge concluded that Volvo’s
decision to recommend two vendors was not an agreement to fix
prices. With respect to the rule of reason, the magistrate judge
concluded that Universal had again failed to establish a relevant
market, and in addition, that Universal had not demonstrated an
injury to competition. Because Volvo’s actions did not constitute
Sherman Act violations, according to the magistrate judge, they
were not unlawful, so Volvo’s actions were privileged with respect
to the tortious interference claims. The district court adopted
the magistrate judge’s recommendations and entered judgment
dismissing the complaint.
II
We first turn to the question of jurisdiction. Volvo argues
that Universal does not have standing, because establishing
antitrust standing requires allegation and proof of more than just
an injury-in-fact to the individual defendant. Volvo cites to a
Second Circuit case for the proposition that Universal must allege
an “antitrust injury”--an actual adverse effect on competition in
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the relevant market. See George Haug v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars,
148 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1998)(requiring an allegation that
elimination from the marketplace harmed competition).
We are, however, governed by the precedent of our own circuit.
Since 1983, we have distinguished between “antitrust injuries” and
“injuries to competition,” the latter of which is often a component
of substantive liability. Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co.,
709 F.2d 980, 986 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983). And in 1984, we explained
that the antitrust laws do not require a plaintiff to establish an
injury to competition as an element of standing:
In this circuit, an antitrust injury for standing
purposes should be viewed from the perspective of the
plaintiff's position in the marketplace, not from the
merits-related perspective of the impact of a defendant’s
conduct on overall competition. So viewed, any alleged
losses and competitive disadvantage fall easily within
the conceptual bounds of antitrust injury, whatever the
ultimate merits of its case.
Walker v. U-Haul Co.,
747 F.2d 1011, 1016 (5th Cir.), modifying,
734 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1984). Universal has alleged an injury to
its position in the marketplace and therefore has standing to
pursue this suit.
III
One of the first hurdles any plaintiff must overcome in
bringing claims under either section I or II of the Sherman Act is
to define the relevant market. See Doctor’s Hospital of Jefferson,
Inc. v. Southeast Medical Alliance, Inc.,
123 F.3d 301, 311 (5th
Cir. 1997)(must establish relevant market in Section II conspiracy
5
to monopolize case); R.D. Imports Ryno Industries, Inc. v. Mazda
Distributors (Gulf), Inc.,
807 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1987)(must
establish relevant market in Section I claims); Seidenstein v.
National Medical Enterprises, Inc.,
769 F.2d 1100, 1106 (5th Cir.
1985)(must establish the relevant market for Section II claims
generally). Because the district court granted Volvo’s motion for
summary judgment, we review this issue de novo. Cabrol v. Town of
Youngsville,
106 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1997).1
Universal has attempted to define the relevant market as
American Volvo dealerships, as opposed to all automobile
dealerships nationwide. In support, Universal cites to Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,
553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977). But
that case suggests otherwise.
In
Heatransfer, 553 F.2d at 980, the plaintiff manufactured
air conditioning equipment for Volkswagen automobiles. The market
in that case consisted of manufacturers making specialized
equipment that could only be sold to Volkswagen.
Id. Moreover,
most of the individual manufacturers did not make air conditioning
equipment for any other automaker.
Id. The court held that
Volkswagen’s purchases of air conditioning equipment did constitute
1
Universal makes the unconvincing argument that defining the
relevant market is fact-based and therefore inappropriate for
summary judgment. Universal is correct that defining the relevant
market is a fact-based question. The question is whether Universal
has presented a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this
issue. We think not.
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a market. In doing so, however, the court used a test that favors
Volvo in the present case:
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he outer boundaries
of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of
demand between the product itself and the substitutes for
it.
Id. In this case, the following characteristics all cut against
Universal:
(1) The DMSs for Volvo are reasonably interchangeable--they
can be sold to other automobile dealerships with little
or no modification.
(2) The marketwide elasticity of demand for Universal’s
products is not altered dramatically by Volvo’s decision
not to approve Universal’s DMSs.
(3) Universal manufactures DMSs for a wide variety of
automobile dealerships.
(4) Companies in the DMS industry generally sell to a wide
variety of dealerships.
Thus, Universal has not defined a relevant market under
Heatransfer.2
In
Seidenstein, 769 F.2d at 1106, we considered whether a
single hospital’s cardiac facility could constitute a distinct
market when there were similar facilities in the city’s other
hospitals. We held that barring “unique services or facilities,”
that was not a legitimate Sherman Act market.
Id. There is
2
Universal’s contention, that a market is defined by the
ability of a company to affect prices, can lead to an irrational
result. Most companies have the ability to negotiate the price of
non-commodity goods and services up or down with customers and
suppliers. But that does not mean that these are all relevant
markets for antitrust purposes.
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nothing cognizably unique in the antitrust sense about the Volvo
dealer market here.
In Domed Stadium, 732, F.2d at 487-88, however, we conceded
that sub-markets may exist in a larger market of interchangeable
goods. But for there to be such a sub-market, we required:
practical indicia [such] as industry or public
recognition of the sub-market as a separate economic
entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses,
unique production facilities, distinct customers,
distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and
specialized vendors.
Id. Only one of these many criteria of a relevant sub-market
exists in this case--distinct customers. Thus, Universal has also
failed to establish a relevant sub-market under Domed Stadium.
Because Universal has failed to define a relevant market, we
need not address the company’s other arguments related to the
Sherman Act.
IV
As Universal conceded during oral argument, its tortious
interference claims are based on the alleged antitrust contentions.
Because we have held that Universal’s Section I and II claims fail,
so do its tort claims.
V
For these reasons, the district court’s dismissal of
Universal’s various claims is
A F F I R M E D.
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