Filed: Dec. 26, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 99-40230 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SEAN DEQUINCE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. G-97-CR-5-1 - December 21, 2000 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Sean DeQuince Brown (“Brown”) appeals his convictions involving bank robbery and the use of a firearm during the commi
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 99-40230 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SEAN DEQUINCE BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. G-97-CR-5-1 - December 21, 2000 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Sean DeQuince Brown (“Brown”) appeals his convictions involving bank robbery and the use of a firearm during the commis..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40230
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SEAN DEQUINCE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. G-97-CR-5-1
--------------------
December 21, 2000
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Sean DeQuince Brown (“Brown”) appeals his convictions
involving bank robbery and the use of a firearm during the
commission of a crime of violence. He argues that (1) his waiver
of the right to counsel was (a) involuntarily made because he was
forced to choose between proceeding with ineffective counsel and
proceeding pro se and (b) unknowingly made because the magistrate
judge’s inquiry into the waiver was inadequate; (2) the district
court erred in admitting his confession; (3) the district court
violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-40230
-2-
Amendment by admitting hearsay testimony; and (4) the evidence
was insufficient to support his convictions.
This court has reviewed the record and the briefs of the
parties. This court rejects Brown’s argument that his waiver of
the right to counsel was involuntarily made because the record
does not show that he was forced to choose between proceeding
with ineffective counsel and proceeding pro se. See Richardson
v. Lucas,
741 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1984). This court rejects
Brown’s argument that his waiver of the right to counsel was
unknowingly made because the magistrate judge’s inquiry into the
waiver was adequate. See Neal v. Texas,
870 F.2d 312, 314 (5th
Cir. 1989). This court rejects Brown’s argument that the
district court erred in admitting his confession because he did
not raise an issue as to the voluntariness of his confession in
the district court and does not explain how the evidence in the
record would “clearly raise” a question as to the voluntariness
of his confession. See United States v. Iwegbu,
6 F.3d 272, 274
(5th Cir. 1993). This court rejects Brown’s argument that the
district court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause
by admitting hearsay testimony because the testimony of Agents
Angel Martinez and Blake McConnell did not contain hearsay as
Brown asserts. See United States v. Cheramie,
51 F.3d 538, 541
(5th Cir. 1995). This court rejects Brown’s argument that
insufficient evidence existed to support his convictions because
Brown did not adequately brief his aiding-and-abetting claim, see
United States v. Posada-Rios,
158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied,
526 U.S. 1031, 1080, 1137 (1999), and Brown’s argument
No. 99-40230
3
about hearsay is foreclosed by the earlier conclusion that the
testimony of Agents Martinez and McConnell did not contain
hearsay. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.