Filed: May 07, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-60154 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for Secretary of the Army, Plaintiff-Appellee versus 14.38 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATED IN LEFLORE COUNTY, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; ET AL, Defendants JOSEPH C. COKER III, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (4:92-CV-121-S-B) - - - - - - - - - - May 4, 2001 Before WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-60154 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for Secretary of the Army, Plaintiff-Appellee versus 14.38 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATED IN LEFLORE COUNTY, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; ET AL, Defendants JOSEPH C. COKER III, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi (4:92-CV-121-S-B) - - - - - - - - - - May 4, 2001 Before WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and S..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60154
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, for Secretary
of the Army,
Plaintiff-Appellee
versus
14.38 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, SITUATED
IN LEFLORE COUNTY, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; ET AL,
Defendants
JOSEPH C. COKER III,
Defendant-Appellant.
- - - - - - - - - -
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(4:92-CV-121-S-B)
- - - - - - - - - -
May 4, 2001
Before WIENER and STEWART, Circuit Judges, and SMITH,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM**:
Defendant-Appellant Joseph C. Coker III asks us to reverse the
*
District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
**
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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district court’s refusal to grant costs and fees under the Equal Access
to Justice Act (EAJA) after he prevailed in recovering severance damages
from the government in compensation for the diminution in value of the
remainder of his land following a condemnation taking of another,
contiguous portion of his property. We affirm.
I.
The parties agreed on just compensation for the property actually
taken but could not agree on severance damages to the remaining
property, so the case proceeded to trial. The government maintained
that there was no diminution in value to the remainder of Coker’s land,
and supported its litigation position with the testimony of four expert
witnesses, to wit, the Manager of the Yazoo Basin Project for the
Vicksburg District of the Corps of Engineers; a hydraulic engineer for
the Corps of Engineers; the Chief of the River Stabilization Branch of
the Vicksburg District of the Corps of Engineers and Channelization
Improvement Coordinator for the Mississippi River Channel Improvement
Projects; and a professional real estate appraiser who is also a realtor
and consultant. All four experts gave professional opinions which
together, the government contended, showed why the portion of Coker’s
property that was not taken would have the same value after the taking
and the completion of new works projects affecting the property that it
had before.
The jury disagreed and awarded Coker $237,566 in severance damages
to the land not taken. After thus prevailing, Coker filed a motion for
attorneys’ fees and expenses under the EAJA. Ultimately, the district
2
court determined that, despite Coker’s prevailing on his principal
demand, the government was “substantially justified” in the positions
it took in the litigation.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees under the
EAJA for abuse of discretion.1 The district court’s underlying
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo; its conclusions of fact are
reviewed for clear error.2
The EAJA specifies that a prevailing party other than the
government shall be awarded fees and other expenses “unless the court
finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified
or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”3 “Substantially
justified” means that the position of the United States is justified in
substance or in the main —— that is, justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.4 Thus, to be substantially justified, the
position of the government must have a reasonable basis in both fact and
law; however, it need not hold a winning hand.
III.
Our review of the entire record satisfies us that, despite Coker’s
1
See Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); Hall v.
Shalala,
50 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995).
2
See Parales v. Casillas,
950 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (5th Cir.
1992).
3
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
4
See Sims v. Apfel, 2001 W.L. at p.4, citing Pierce v.
Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
3
protestations and his criticism of the methodology and conclusions of
the government’s experts, the district court committed no error of fact
or law in its underlying findings and reasonings, and did not abuse its
discretion in its ultimate determination that the government was
substantially justified in the litigating position it took in this case.
Consequently, the district court’s denial of Coker’s motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs under the EAJA is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
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