Filed: Jun. 13, 2001
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-60211 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TONY LEWIS HODGES, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:99-CR-23-ALL-LS - June 12, 2001 Before JOLLY, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Tony Lewis Hodges appeals his conviction and sentence for making a false statement to a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 00-60211 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus TONY LEWIS HODGES, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi USDC No. 4:99-CR-23-ALL-LS - June 12, 2001 Before JOLLY, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Tony Lewis Hodges appeals his conviction and sentence for making a false statement to a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C...
More
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60211
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TONY LEWIS HODGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:99-CR-23-ALL-LS
--------------------
June 12, 2001
Before JOLLY, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Tony Lewis Hodges appeals his conviction and sentence for
making a false statement to a federal agent in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). He argues that the district court erred in
holding that his statement to a federal agent was voluntary and
denying his motion to suppress his statement. Although Hodges
refused to sign a form containing a waiver of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), he stated that he was
willing to talk to the federal agent and, therefore, his
statement was voluntary. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-60211
-2-
369, 373 (1979). Hodges has not shown that his statement was
involuntary because his probation officer told him to meet with
the federal agent. Hodges was advised of his constitutional
rights, chose to answer the agent’s questions rather than invoke
his privilege against self-incrimination, and would not have
suffered a penalty for invoking his privilege. See Minnesota v.
Murphy,
465 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1984).
Hodges also argues that the district court erred in
calculating his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.3 governing
offenses involving the unlawful receipt, possession, or
transportation of explosive materials, rather than U.S.S.G.
§ 2F1.1, governing fraud and deceit. In cases involving
fraudulent statements prosecuted under a general statute such as
18 U.S.C. § 1001, the court should apply a more specific
guideline if it is more apt. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2F1.1, comment. n.14 (1998); United States v. Clements,
73 F.3d 1330, 1339 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Castaneda-Gallardo,
951 F.2d 1451, 1452 (5th Cir. 1992). Hodges
was convicted of making a statement falsely denying any knowledge
concerning explosive devices found hidden in the ceiling of a
business which had previously been run by his former girlfriend.
Because Hodges’ offense was more aptly covered by the more
specific guideline in § 2K1.3 governing possession of explosive
materials, the district court did not err in calculating his
sentence under § 2K1.3. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2F1.1, comment n.14 (1998);
Clements, 73 F.3d at 1339 n.15;
Castaneda-Gallardo, 951 F.2d at 1452.
No. 00-60211
-3-
AFFIRMED.