Filed: Jul. 31, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-10063 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMIE ROY KEYS, also known as Jamie Benitez, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:01-CR-67-1-C - July 30, 2002 Before Jolly, Higginbotham, and Parker, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jamie Roy Keys appeals from his conviction and sentence, following a jury trial, for possession of a
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-10063 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JAMIE ROY KEYS, also known as Jamie Benitez, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 5:01-CR-67-1-C - July 30, 2002 Before Jolly, Higginbotham, and Parker, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jamie Roy Keys appeals from his conviction and sentence, following a jury trial, for possession of a ..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10063
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMIE ROY KEYS, also known as Jamie Benitez,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:01-CR-67-1-C
--------------------
July 30, 2002
Before Jolly, Higginbotham, and Parker, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jamie Roy Keys appeals from his conviction and sentence,
following a jury trial, for possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Keys contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter
of law to support the interstate-commerce element of an 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) offense and that this court should reconsider its
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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jurisprudence regarding the constitutionality of that statute in
light of Jones v. United States,
529 U.S. 848 (2000). To establish
the “in or affecting commerce” element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
the Government need prove only that a firearm has traveled
interstate at some point in the past. See United States v.
Cavazos,
288 F.3d 706, 712-13 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Daugherty,
264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.
Ct. 1113 (2002). Keys does not deny that testimony at his trial
established that the gun was manufactured in California and
traveled at some point to Texas. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Jones did not affect or undermine the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Daugherty, 264 F.3d at 518.
Keys also argues that the district court erred in applying to
him the first-degree murder guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)’s cross-reference provision, resulting in a
guideline range that was restricted to the maximum statutory prison
term of 120 months. He maintains that the evidence at trial and
sentencing did not support a finding that the shooting of his
brother was premeditated and that it supported a finding, at worst,
of voluntary manslaughter, which would have called for a guideline
imprisonment range of 100 to 120 months. Because Keys has not
established that the district court clearly erred in rejecting his
voluntary-manslaughter argument and because the evidence supported
a finding of at least second-degree murder (in that malice
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aforethought was evident), any error with respect to the
application of the first-degree murder guideline was harmless.
See United States v. Mitchell,
166 F.3d 748, 754 n.24 (5th Cir.
1999); United States v. Tello,
9 F.3d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1993);
18 U.S.C. § 1111.
The conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
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