Filed: Oct. 01, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-20549 Summary Calendar _ HELEN G. MURRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division USDC No. H-01-CV-599 _ September 30, 2002 Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff Helen Murray appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, ExxonM
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 02-20549 Summary Calendar _ HELEN G. MURRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division USDC No. H-01-CV-599 _ September 30, 2002 Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiff Helen Murray appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, ExxonMo..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 02-20549
Summary Calendar
_____________________
HELEN G. MURRAY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
USDC No. H-01-CV-599
_________________________________________________________________
September 30, 2002
Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Helen Murray appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendant, ExxonMobil. Murray asserted a
federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as well as state
law promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims against the defendant. She argues
that she, the only African American in her division, was
discriminated against when ExxonMobil offered her employment that
required relocation from Houston, TX to Fairfax, VA. She maintains
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
the offer was not made in good faith but was intended to deprive
her of severance benefits by “forcing” her to retire. An at-will
employee with Exxon since 1975, Murray voluntarily retired after
turning down the position. At retirement, Murray was 56 years old
and was earning $92,700 per year. Murray has not sought employment
since she retired.
In February 2001 she filed this lawsuit alleging three causes
of action. First, a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in
which she alleged that ExxonMobil “compelled her” to retire early
in violation of her right to enter into and enforce contracts on
the same terms as white people. She contends the company offered
her employment in Virginia knowing she would not accept it, with
the intent of forcing her to resign without severance plan
benefits. Her promissory estoppel and quantum meruit claims
asserted she relied on an alleged promise that Exxon would not
transfer her out of Houston. Her emotional distress claim alleged
ExxonMobil’s actions have caused her to experience “wounded pride,
shame, despair, and utter devastation.”**
I
This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo. Pratt
v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 605-606 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary
judgment is properly granted when the evidence, viewed in the light
**
Complaint, at 3. Murray does not renew or address any claims other than her § 1981 claim
on appeal.
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most favorable to the non-movant, reflects no genuine issue of
material fact. Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane
Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000). After a
review of the record before us, we conclude that we must agree with
the lower court and affirm the grant of summary judgment.
II
We are aided by the district court’s carefully considered and
thorough summary judgment order, entered on April 30, 2002. After
reviewing the applicable legal standards for summary judgment in a
case of racial discrimination under § 1981, and the record
evidence, the district court granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Under the burden-shifting standard for race
discrimination claims, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing
that her employer intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of race. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802-804 (1973); Pratt v. City of Houston,
247 F.3d 601, 606 n.1.
(5th Cir. 2001).
The district court assumed, arguendo, that Murray had
established a prima facie case. Accordingly, the burden shifted to
ExxonMobil to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale
for its decision. The district court concluded that the defendant
had borne its burden: after the merger, a position comparable to
Murray’s was to be created for the merged entity at the new
corporate headquarters, and she was qualified to fill it.
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Murray attempted to demonstrate why the proffered rationale
was pretextual. We find the district court was clearly correct in
concluding that the reasons offered were insufficient to meet her
summary judgment burden. See Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., Inc., 238
F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001). ExxonMobil presented uncontradicted
evidence that her assignment to Fairfax was consistent with the
merged company’s business plan. Furthermore, numerous co-workers
in her department were offered jobs which required relocation.
Murray offered no evidence of racial animus or of disparate
treatment based on race. In view of the circumstances surrounding
the post-merger reorganization of ExxonMobil, her unsubstantiated
assertions that ExxonMobil’s proffered rationale is a pretext for
racial discrimination must fail. Because the plaintiff is unable
to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact about whether the
defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for racial
discrimination, summary judgment was warranted.
III
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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