Filed: Feb. 19, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-10474 Conference Calendar YVONNE EVETTE BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE TEXAS BOARD OF NURSE EXAMINERS, Defendant-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:01-CV-2315-M - February 19, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Yvonne Evette Brown (“Brown”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-10474 Conference Calendar YVONNE EVETTE BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE TEXAS BOARD OF NURSE EXAMINERS, Defendant-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:01-CV-2315-M - February 19, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Yvonne Evette Brown (“Brown”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint ..
More
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-10474
Conference Calendar
YVONNE EVETTE BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE TEXAS BOARD OF NURSE EXAMINERS,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:01-CV-2315-M
--------------------
February 19, 2003
Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Yvonne Evette Brown (“Brown”) appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Brown argues that the district court erred
in denying her motion for a default judgment against the Texas
Board of Nurse Examiners. This court reviews the denial of a
default judgment for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lynn,
236
F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Brown’s motion for a default judgment
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-10474
-2-
because Brown has not demonstrated that the 11-day delay between
the Board serving her with a copy of its motion to dismiss and
filing the motion in the clerk’s office was sufficiently
“extreme” to warrant the “drastic remedy” of a default judgment.
See
id.
Brown also contends that her case should be reinstated
because she was not given an opportunity to respond to the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The record
indicates that the district court held that it would consider
Brown’s objections if they impacted the issue of whether the
court had subject matter jurisdiction, but Brown did not file
objections. Consequently, Brown’s argument lacks merit.
Brown does not address the district court’s dismissal of her
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This court
“will not raise and discuss legal issues that [an appellant has]
failed to assert.” See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff
Abner,
813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987). Brown’s failure to
identify any error in the district court’s legal analysis or the
application of law is the same as if she had not appealed that
judgment.
Id.
Because Brown’s appeal is without merit, and it is DISMISSED
as frivolous. See Howard v. King,
707 F.2d 215, 219-20
(5th Cir. 1983); 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.