Filed: Dec. 11, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 11, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III _ Clerk No. 02-10954 _ RONALD A. HAMILTON, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus J.D. COLLETT; ET AL, Defendants, J.D. COLLETT; JEFFREY RAMIREZ, Defendants - Appellants. Appeals from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas - Dallas Division Civil Action No. 00-1469 Before GARWOOD, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONE
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 11, 2003 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III _ Clerk No. 02-10954 _ RONALD A. HAMILTON, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus J.D. COLLETT; ET AL, Defendants, J.D. COLLETT; JEFFREY RAMIREZ, Defendants - Appellants. Appeals from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas - Dallas Division Civil Action No. 00-1469 Before GARWOOD, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. EDITH H. JONES..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 11, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_______________________ Clerk
No. 02-10954
_______________________
RONALD A. HAMILTON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
J.D. COLLETT; ET AL,
Defendants,
J.D. COLLETT; JEFFREY RAMIREZ,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas - Dallas Division
Civil Action No. 00-1469
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*
Plaintiff-appellee Ronald Hamilton sued Dallas police
officer J.D. Collett and FBI agent Jeffrey Ramirez under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and its constitutional counterpart, Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for false arrest and malicious
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that Hamilton could not prove
the elements of his civil rights claim or overcome the defendants’
qualified immunity defense. The district court denied the motion,
and the defendants now appeal. Because we find that the malicious
prosecution claim must be dismissed and that both defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity for the false arrest claim, we
reverse the district court and enter summary judgment on the
defendants’ behalf.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this case have been extensively
reported by this court in United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443
(5th Cir. 1998), and will not be repeated here. Briefly, Hamilton
was arrested and prosecuted on various conspiracy, money
laundering, travel in aid of racketeering, and gambling counts
related to his involvement with World Sportsbook (“WSB”), an
international sports wagering operation. After a jury convicted
Hamilton on multiple counts, a panel of this court reversed his
conviction on a finding of insufficient evidence.
Hamilton then initiated the instant suit, asserting that
the defendants made a number of false statements that led to his
arrest and prosecution. Specifically, Hamilton complains that
Agent Ramirez falsely testified before the federal grand jury that
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an illegal bet was placed with another FBI agent during a search of
Hamilton’s residence. Likewise, Hamilton contends that Collett
falsely swore in an affidavit before a Dallas County grand jury
that bets were taken at Hamilton’s home during the search.
Hamilton argues that because no bets were actually taken during the
search of his residence, probable cause is destroyed and the
defendants violated his clearly established constitutional rights.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Hamilton asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction over
this interlocutory appeal because the district court concluded that
genuine issues of material fact exist. However, this court has
jurisdiction to consider the purely legal question of whether,
taking the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, the plaintiff
has alleged a violation of clearly established law. Roe v. Tex.
Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Serv., 299 F.3d 395, 400 (5th Cir.
2002).
This court reviews the district court’s denial of a
summary judgment motion based on a claim of qualified immunity
de novo. Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2002).
Determining probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact:
“[a]lthough factual findings are reviewed for clear error, we
review the legal conclusions reached by the district court de
novo.” Gordy v. Burns,
294 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2002).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Malicious Prosecution
Hamilton argues that the defendants’ false statements
caused him to be maliciously prosecuted in violation of the United
States Constitution. However, this court has recently held that a
claim of malicious prosecution standing alone does not violate the
United States Constitution. Castellano v. Fragozo, No. 00-50591,
2003 WL 22881590, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2003)(en banc). Thus,
Hamilton cannot establish that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights in this regard and the claim must be
dismissed.
B. False Arrest
The key inquiry in the false arrest context is whether
the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Courts engage in
a two-step analysis when determining if public officials are
entitled to qualified immunity. First, we must determine whether
the facts, as the plaintiff alleges, establish that the officer
violated a constitutional right. Price v. Roark, 256 F.3d 364, 369
(5th Cir. 2001). If no constitutional right has been violated, the
inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Id. However, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional viola-
tion, the court must next determine whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.
Id.
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A claim of unconstitutional false arrest requires a
showing of no probable cause. Brown v. Lyford,
243 F.3d 185, 189
(5th Cir. 2001). The question presented here is whether, setting
aside the allegedly false testimony by the defendants, probable
cause existed to believe that Hamilton committed an offense. See
Freeman v. County of Bexar,
210 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 2000).
Stated another way, the question is whether the allegedly false
testimony was necessary to the Magistrate Judge’s determination of
probable case. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171-72
(1978). “[T]he probable cause analysis only requires that we find
a basis for an officer to believe to a ‘fair probability’ that a
violation occurred.” Piazza v. Mayne,
217 F.3d 239, 246 (5th Cir.
2000).
The evidence known to both Collett and Ramirez, excluding
that evidence which Hamilton alleges to be false, established
probable cause as a matter of law. The defendants were aware of,
inter alia, the following pertinent facts: (1) Hamilton was
identified as an advertising agent for WSB in a letter to potential
bettors; (2) Hamilton established a bonding system for the bettors
he referred to WSB; (3) Hamilton possessed a tally sheet of bets
placed with WSB; (4) Hamilton would pick up bettors’ Western Union
transfers and deposit them in various Dallas bank accounts; and
(5) payoffs to winners were made from Dallas-area bank accounts
belonging to Hamilton. A reasonable basis existed for Collett and
5
Ramirez to find a fair probability that a violation of Texas
gambling laws occurred.1
It is also important to note that in ruling on Hamilton’s
motion to suppress, a district court judge found that probable
cause existed to believe Hamilton was involved in illegal gambling.
Specifically, the district court judge concluded that, based on the
letter identifying Hamilton as WSB’s advertising agent, his “link
to WSB’s illegal gambling operation is clear.” Because probable
cause existed, even absent the allegedly false statements, the
defendants did not violate Hamilton’s constitutional rights and are
therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for entry of judgment
in favor of the defendants.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
1
The Texas gambling law to which both officers referred in their
testimony is Section 47.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code, which provides that
“[a] person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly. . .engages in
bookmaking.” Bookmaking is further defined as “a scheme by three or more persons
to receive, record, or forward bets or offers to bet.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
47.01(2)(C) (Vernon 2003). Collett prepared an affidavit in support of the
original state arrest warrant for Hamilton for engaging in organized crime in
violation of Section 71.02 of the Texas Penal Code. A person violates that
section by committing or conspiring to commit a gambling offense. TEX. PEN. CODE
ANN. § 71.02(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Ramirez testified before the federal
grand jury that Hamilton was involved in an illegal bookmaking operation in
violation of Texas law, which in turn violated 18 U.S.C. § 1955. The undisputed
facts known to both defendants, including that Hamilton handled bettors’
transfers and payoffs, was WSB’s advertising agent, and possessed a sheet listing
various bets, establishes probable cause to believe that a violation of Texas law
had occurred.
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