Filed: Jan. 08, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-50443 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE ALFREDO PADRON-STEELE, also known as Pete, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-00-CR-2084-7-DB - January 7, 2003 Before DAVIS, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jose Alfredo Padron-Steele (“Padron”) appeals his conviction following a jury trial. Padro
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 02-50443 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSE ALFREDO PADRON-STEELE, also known as Pete, Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. EP-00-CR-2084-7-DB - January 7, 2003 Before DAVIS, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Jose Alfredo Padron-Steele (“Padron”) appeals his conviction following a jury trial. Padron..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50443
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE ALFREDO PADRON-STEELE, also known as Pete,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. EP-00-CR-2084-7-DB
--------------------
January 7, 2003
Before DAVIS, WIENER and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jose Alfredo Padron-Steele (“Padron”) appeals his conviction
following a jury trial. Padron was convicted on four counts of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it and one
count of conspiracy to possess 1000 kilograms of marijuana with
intent to distribute it. Padron argues that the district court
erred when it denied his motion to dismiss his indictment for a
violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-50443
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The Speedy Trial Act requires that a federal defendant be
tried within 70 non-excludable days of the filing of his
indictment or his appearance before a judicial officer, whichever
comes later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Numerous time-period
exclusions are available under the Speedy Trial Act. See
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).
Padron’s trial began over a year after he was indicted. The
district court concluded that many of the delays Padron
experienced were excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. Padron’s
case was continued under the ends-of-justice provision of the
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8), from February 2, 2001, through
June 4, 2001, and from July 6, 2001, through October 15, 2001.
The periods from October 15, 2001, through October 23, 2001, and
again from October 30, 2001, through December 5, 2001, were
excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(I), which allows for
exclusion of time periods in which the court considers a proposed
plea agreement. The period from October 23, 2001, to October 30,
2001, was excluded under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), which allows
delays from pretrial motions to be excluded.
On December 5, 2001, Padron advised the court that he no
longer wished to plead guilty. As a result, the district court
entered an order setting trial for February 11, 2002. Padron
argues that the 67-day period from December 6, 2001, through
February 11, 2002, was non-excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.
The district court determined that this period was excludable
No. 02-50443
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under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) as a period of delay resulting from
other proceedings concerning the defendant. “The Speedy Trial
Act entitles criminal defendants to adequate time for preparing a
defense, but that right may not be used as a two-edged sword.”
United States v. Westbrook,
119 F.3d 1176, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997);
see also United States v. Willis,
958 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Maynie,
257 F.3d 908, 914 (8th Cir.
2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1151 (2002), and cert. denied,
122
S. Ct. 1333 (2002); United States v. Mentz,
840 F.2d 315, 330 &
n.30 (6th Cir. 1988). The district court did not err in
concluding that the delay caused by Padron’s plea vacillations
was excludable under the Speedy Trial Act. A review of the
record convinces us that only 41 days in that period were non-
excludable. Thus, Padron’s trial comported with the Speedy Trial
Act.
Padron also argues that the evidence admitted at his trial
was insufficient to support his conspiracy and possession
convictions. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
court “consider[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
verdict.” United States v. Cathey,
259 F.3d 365, 368 (5th Cir.
2001) (footnote omitted).
In order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to possess
with the intent to distribute marijuana, the government must
prove 1) the existence of an agreement to possess marijuana with
No. 02-50443
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the intent to distribute it, 2) the defendant knew of the
conspiracy, 3) the defendant intended to join the conspiracy, and
4) the defendant participated in the conspiracy. United States
v. Gutierrez-Farias,
294 F.3d 657, 661 (5th cir. 2002). To
sustain a conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent
to distribute it, the Government must prove that the defendant
had (1) knowing (2) possession of marijuana (3) with intent to
distribute it. United States v. Reyes,
300 F.3d 555, 559 (5th
Cir. 2002). Padron’s convictions should be affirmed “if a
rational trier of fact could have found that the government
proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Mackay,
33 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Castro,
15 F.3d 417, 419 (5th
Cir. 1994)).
The jury heard from one of Padron’s co-conspirators, Robert
Nunez, who testified that Padron supplied him with large
quantities of marijuana for resale. Evidence was introduced
through the testimony of a DEA agent, an El Paso police officer,
and a DEA intelligence analyst regarding their surveillance of
Padron and Nunez. Numerous wiretap recordings were played for
the jury to support the testimony of Nunez and the peace
officers.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for
reasonable jurors to convict Padron for the conspiracy count and
No. 02-50443
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the four counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute it. Because Padron’s convictions were supported by
the evidence and there was no Speedy Trial Act violation,
Padron’s conviction is AFFIRMED.