Filed: Aug. 18, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the United States Court of Appeals August 17, 2005 For the Fifth Circuit Charles R. Fulbruge III _ Clerk No. 04-10031 _ ANN TENISON HEREFORD WEBB; LIZANN TENISON WEBB; BYRON JAMES WEBB; CAMILLE ELIZABETH WEBB SEWELL, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION BOARD; PAUL DYER, DIRECTOR, CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, Defendants
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the United States Court of Appeals August 17, 2005 For the Fifth Circuit Charles R. Fulbruge III _ Clerk No. 04-10031 _ ANN TENISON HEREFORD WEBB; LIZANN TENISON WEBB; BYRON JAMES WEBB; CAMILLE ELIZABETH WEBB SEWELL, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION BOARD; PAUL DYER, DIRECTOR, CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT, Defendants ..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the United States Court of Appeals
August 17, 2005
For the Fifth Circuit
Charles R. Fulbruge III
_________________________ Clerk
No. 04-10031
_________________________
ANN TENISON HEREFORD WEBB; LIZANN TENISON WEBB; BYRON JAMES WEBB;
CAMILLE ELIZABETH WEBB SEWELL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION
DEPARTMENT; CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION BOARD; PAUL DYER,
DIRECTOR, CITY OF DALLAS PARKS AND RECREATION DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
_________________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs Ann Tenison Hereford Webb, Lizann Tenison Webb,
Byron James Webb, and Camille Elizabeth Webb Sewell (collectively
the “Webbs”) appeal the district court’s take-nothing judgment with
respect to their claims against the City of Dallas. The Webbs
asserted that the City violated a condition contained in deeds
conveying property to the City which provided that the property
would revert to the grantors “or their heirs” if the property ceased
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
to be used as a public park. The Webbs alleged that they were heirs
under the deeds. A jury found to the contrary, and the district
court entered judgment based on this finding. We now affirm.
I
We set forth the factual background of this case at length in
our prior opinion, and will not retrace it here.1 Following remand
to the district court, the case was tried to a jury. The court
submitted a series of special interrogatories to the jury. Question
One inquired whether the Webbs “prove[d] that in the Tenison Deeds,
the grantors, Edward O. and Annie M. Tenison, clearly intended to
refer to the [Webbs] by the use of the word ‘heirs’?” The court
instructed the jury to answer “Plaintiffs did prove,” or “Plaintiffs
did not prove.” In the event that the jury chose the latter answer,
they were instructed to stop and answer no further questions.
Following several days of deliberations, the jury answered Question
One by marking “Plaintiffs did not prove.” Upon consideration of
the verdict, the court entered a take-nothing judgment against the
Webbs. The Webbs filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
Of the eight points of error raised by the Webbs on appeal,
only one merits discussion: whether the district court erred when it
submitted Question One to the jury. Specifically, the Webbs argue
that the question of whether they were heirs under the deeds was not
1
See Webb v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 787, 788-90 (5th Cir. 2002).
2
properly before the district court and, in the alternative, that
this question was one of law to be resolved by the court. We
address these arguments in turn.
A
The Webbs argue that the meaning of the word “heirs” as used in
the deeds was not properly before the district court because (1) it
was conclusively answered in our prior opinion, and (2) it is a
question of state law that must be answered in a separate heirship
proceeding before a state court. These arguments are without merit.
First, our prior decision did not conclusively adjudicate the
question of whether the Webbs are “heirs” under the Tenison deeds.
Rather, we were called upon to determine whether the Webbs claimed
an interest in the property transferred by the deeds sufficient to
satisfy the jurisdictional injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III. Looking to the pleadings, we determined that the Webbs had
averred facts adequate to meet constitutional standing requirements.2
Importantly, we noted that the “Webbs may ultimately fail to prove
ownership or any property interest entitlement to the Tenison
2
See Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 529 (5th
Cir. 1996) (“‘At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury
resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss
we presum[e] that general allegations embace those specific facts that are
necessary to support the claim.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); Cramer v. Skinner,
931 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir. 1991)
(“When a court considers standing on a motion for a 12(b) dismissal, it must
accept the allegations in the pleadings as true.”); see also Barrett Computer
Servs., Inc. v. PDA, Inc.,
884 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[I]n cases in
which the merits of the claims asserted are intertwined with the jurisdictional
issue of standing, challenges to standing are frequently resolved in summary
judgment proceedings . . . or at a trial on the merits.” (emphasis added)).
3
property.”3 It is clear from this statement and our analysis that
we did not render a final ruling on the meaning of the word “heirs”
as used in the deeds.
Second, the Webbs argue that it was unnecessary for the
district court to determine whether they would take as heirs under
the deeds; that this question should have been answered in a
separate state heirship proceeding following a determination of
whether the property had reverted under the deeds. Under Texas law,
persons claiming to be entitled to property in a decedent’s estate
may initiate an heirship proceeding to determine “who are the
heirs . . . and their respective shares and interests.”4 Such
proceedings are appropriate when a decedent dies “intestate.”5
Whether the Webbs are entitled to bring an heirship proceeding is
irrelevant to the present suit, in which the Webbs seek to establish
an interest in the property via the deeds. In order to ascertain
whether the Webbs were entitled to take under these inter vivos
conveyances, the district court was required to interpret the
language of the deeds.
In short, we conclude that the question of whether the Webbs
were “heirs” under the deeds was properly before the district court.
B
3
Webb, 314 F.3d at 791.
4
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 48(a) (Vernon 2003); see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 49(a)
(Vernon 2003); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 54 (Vernon 2003).
5
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 48(a).
4
The Webbs also contend that the district court erred by
submitting a purely legal question of deed construction to the jury.
They claim that the unambiguous language of the deeds created an
executory interest in the property which would vest in the lineal
descendants of the Tenisons alive when the deed conditions were
violated. The Webbs did not object to the submission of Question
One to the jury; accordingly, our review is for plain error only.6
“For an appellant to prevail under the plain error standard, it must
show 1) that an error occurred; 2) that the error was plain, which
means clear or obvious; 3) the plain error must affect substantial
rights; and 4) not correcting the error would seriously impact the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”7
Under Texas law, both the interpretation of an unambiguous deed
and the determination of whether a deed is ambiguous are questions
of law for the court.8 If the court determines that a deed is
ambiguous, it may submit the deed to a jury for resolution of the
ambiguity.9 The court need not make an express finding of ambiguity
6
See Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2005).
7
Id. at 607.
8
See Dell Computer Corp. v. Rodriguez, 390 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 2004);
Propulsion Techs., Inc. v. Attwood Corp.,
369 F.3d 896, 900 (5th Cir. 2004);
Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. United States,
988 F.2d 1418, 1421 (5th Cir.
1993).
9
See Exxon Corp. v. W. Tex. Gathering Co., 868 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.
1993).
5
in order to do so; if the court submits the issue to the jury, we
may presume that the court found the deed ambiguous.10
When seeking to determine whether a deed is ambiguous, Texas
courts look to the intent of the contracting parties as expressed
within the “four corners” of the document.11 “The four corners rule
requires the court to ascertain the intent of the parties solely
from all of the language in the deed.”12 If the court cannot
determine the intent of the parties from the plain language of the
deed, the court may apply “applicable rules of construction.”13 If,
after the application of the rules of construction, the language of
the deed is still ambiguous, the court may admit and consider
extrinsic evidence to assist it in its interpretive task.14 “An
instrument is ambiguous only when the application of these rules
leaves it unclear which of two reasonable meanings is the correct
one.”15
The deeds at issue here provide that if the property is not
used by the City as a public park, the City ceases to use the
10
Id. (“While the trial court here never made an express finding that the
contract was ambiguous, such a determination was necessary to its submission of
a jury question inquiring into the [interpretation of the contract].”).
11
Cherokee Water Co. v. Freeman, 33 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2000, no pet.) (citing Luckel v. White,
819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991)).
12
Id. (citing Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co.,
966
S.W.2d 451, 465 (Tex. 1998)).
13
Id.
14
Id. (citing Stauffer v. Henderson,
801 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Tex. 1990)).
15
Id.
6
property for park purposes, or the name of the park is changed, the
City’s title to the property shall cease, “and said property . . .
shall at once revert to and vest in us [the Tenisons] or our heirs,
and it shall be lawful for us or our heirs to re-enter upon, take,
repossess and enjoy all and singular the property hereby granted as
in our former estate.” Looking to the deed as a whole, it is
apparent that the Tenisons sought by this language to grant to the
City a fee simple interest in the land subject to a condition
subsequent that the City maintain the property as a public park.16
This property interest was passed from the Tenisons to their
surviving children by operation of the residuary clauses of their
wills. Importantly, these wills did not transfer the right of re-
entry to the Webbs’ ancestor who predeceased the Tenisons.
In addition to the creation of a right of re-entry, the Webbs
urge that the deeds conveyed to the “heirs” an executory interest in
the property. Under this theory, the word “heirs” in the deeds
refers to all lineal descendants of the Tenisons living at the time
the deed conditions were violated. This conveyance is impermissible
as it contravenes the rule against perpetuities, which provides that
“no interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, within twenty-
one years after the death of some life or lives in being at the time
16
See Lawyers Trust Co. v. City of Houston, 359 S.W.2d 887, 890 (Tex.
1962) (holding that nearly identical language in a conveyance created a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent).
7
of the creation of the interest.”17 When the deeds were executed,
the City could have maintained the land as a public park for an
indefinite period of time. Thus, it was possible at the time the
deeds were made that the lineal descendants of the Tenisons alive
when the City ceased using the property as a public park would not
be determined until well after the perpetuities period ended. Under
Texas law, if a deed is equally open to two constructions, “effect
will be given to the construction which renders the agreement valid
rather than void.”18 Thus, the Webbs’ proffered interpretation of
the deed must be rejected. Further, no alternative interpretation
of the deeds that would vest rights in the Webbs is available.
Because the word “heirs” in the deeds cannot, as a matter of
law, refer to the Webbs, the district court committed plain error by
submitting Question One to the jury. However, the district court’s
take-nothing judgment is correct as a matter of law for this very
reason. Further, to the extent that the court omitted any necessary
factual issue in the jury instructions, we deem the court to have
made such a finding in accord with the judgment.19 Accordingly, we
conclude that the district court’s submission of Question One to the
17
Hamman v. Bright & Co., 924 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996),
vacated pursuant to settlement,
938 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. 1997) (citing Peveto v.
Starkey,
645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982); Foshee v. Republic Nat’l Bank of
Dallas,
617 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1981)).
18
Conquistador Petroleum, Inc. v. Chatham, 899 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. App.-
-Eastland 1995, writ denied) (citing Kelly v. Womack,
268 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex.
1954)).
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)
8
jury, while erroneous, did not affect the Webbs’ substantial
rights.20
III
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
20
See Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 905
(5th Cir. 1973) (applying harmless error analysis to errors in a jury charge in
a civil case).
9
