Filed: May 17, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the May 17, 2005 United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III for the Fifth Circuit Clerk _ m 04-20107 _ KATHERINE E. HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas m H-02-CV-4171 _ On Petition for Rehearing In her petition for rehearing, Hammond argues that Istre v.
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the May 17, 2005 United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III for the Fifth Circuit Clerk _ m 04-20107 _ KATHERINE E. HAMMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas m H-02-CV-4171 _ On Petition for Rehearing In her petition for rehearing, Hammond argues that Istre v. ..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
In the May 17, 2005
United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III
for the Fifth Circuit Clerk
_______________
m 04-20107
_______________
KATHERINE E. HAMMOND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
m H-02-CV-4171
______________________________
On Petition for Rehearing In her petition for rehearing, Hammond
argues that Istre v. Apfel,
208 F.3d 517 (5th
Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DEMOSS, Cir. 2000), stands for the proposition that the
Circuit Judges. good cause requirement applies only to cases
brought under sentence (6) of § 405(g), in
PER CURIAM: which new evidence is presented for the first
time in the district court. Although that
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for re- happens to be the procedural posture of this
hearing is DENIED. We do, however, elect to case, we do not read the important holding of
comment on two points raised in the petition. the opinion in that way. Instead, Istre holds
that there are no permissible bases for remand
other than under sentences (4) and (6) of §
405(g). The district court did not remand
here, so Istre is inapplicable. In other words,
Istre concerned the circumstances under which
a case may be remanded, not the circum-
stances under which it must be remanded.
Also in her petition for rehearing,
Hammond argues that “new evidence
submitted to the Appeals Council justifies
reversal.” Hammond indeed introduces
evidence that would have been material, had
the date of the hearing been later. We,
however, cannot deem evidence material
insofar as it details the alleged worsening of a
claimant’s condition after the date of the hear-
ing. This is not to say that we cannot consider
any evidence post-dating a hearing, but that
medical evidence must shed light on the
severity of a claimant’s medical condition
before the hearing.
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