Filed: Mar. 10, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT March 10, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-20414 Summary Calendar AARON GREENLEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DEAN DARREN ALLREAD, Etc.; ET AL., Defendants, DEAN DARREN ALLRED, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff for Harris County, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:01-CV-1335) Before JONES, BARKSD
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT March 10, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-20414 Summary Calendar AARON GREENLEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus DEAN DARREN ALLREAD, Etc.; ET AL., Defendants, DEAN DARREN ALLRED, individually and in his official capacity as Deputy Sheriff for Harris County, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:01-CV-1335) Before JONES, BARKSDA..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT March 10, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20414
Summary Calendar
AARON GREENLEE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEAN DARREN ALLREAD, Etc.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
DEAN DARREN ALLRED, individually and in his official
capacity as Deputy Sheriff for Harris County,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:01-CV-1335)
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dean Darren Allred, a former deputy sheriff for Harris County,
Texas, pursues this interlocutory appeal from the denial of his
qualified immunity claim for a false arrest claim brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Aaron Greenlee. We have jurisdiction to
determine, as a matter of law, whether a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity, after accepting all of the plaintiff’s factual
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
allegations as true, by determining whether those facts show, inter
alia, that the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable under
clearly established law at the time of the conduct. E.g., Kinney
v. Weaver,
367 F.3d 337, 346-50 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). (We
need not reach whether Allred reasonably relied on the field test
he conducted to determine probable cause.)
The district court ruled that, based upon our court’s
precedent, the arrest could not be supported by the probable cause
that existed for the traffic violations discovered by Allred before
and during his stop of Greenlee’s vehicle. The Supreme Court’s
decision in Devenpeck v. Alford,
125 S. Ct. 588, 593-95 (2004),
abrogates our court’s rule that the uncharged offense establishing
probable cause be related to, and based upon the same conduct as,
the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of the
arrest, see Trejo v. Perez,
693 F.2d 482, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1982),
or given by the officer at booking, see Gassner v. City of Garland,
864 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s determinations in
regard to Allred’s summary judgment motion based upon qualified
immunity and REMAND the case to the district court for
consideration in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in
Devenpeck. (On remand, should the district court continue to deny
qualified immunity and should Allred pursue another interlocutory
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appeal, the field-test issue not reached in this opinion will be
subject to our review, should Allred again present it.)
VACATED AND REMANDED
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