Filed: Apr. 28, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2005 _ Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-30224 c/w No. 04-30456 _ LAWRENCE SPIKES; HENRY S. JONES, SR.; STARLA TRIPLETT JONES; JOHNNIE RAY CARPENTER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus BENJI PHELPS, ETC.; ET AL., Defendants, TERRY REEVES, Individually and in his Official Capacity as District Attorney of Winn Parish, Defendant-Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2005 _ Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-30224 c/w No. 04-30456 _ LAWRENCE SPIKES; HENRY S. JONES, SR.; STARLA TRIPLETT JONES; JOHNNIE RAY CARPENTER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus BENJI PHELPS, ETC.; ET AL., Defendants, TERRY REEVES, Individually and in his Official Capacity as District Attorney of Winn Parish, Defendant-Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court f..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 28, 2005
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30224
c/w No. 04-30456
_______________________
LAWRENCE SPIKES; HENRY S. JONES, SR.;
STARLA TRIPLETT JONES;
JOHNNIE RAY CARPENTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
BENJI PHELPS, ETC.; ET AL.,
Defendants,
TERRY REEVES, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as District Attorney
of Winn Parish,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:-CV-642
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*
Winn Parish District Attorney Reeves attempts an
interlocutory appeal to vindicate his claim of absolute
prosecutorial immunity from a suit filed against him in his
official capacity. Reeves was sued under numerous state and
federal authorities because he allegedly misused the power of his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
office to charge and imprison supporters of a local political
candidate at a critical time, preventing them from campaigning and
voting for their candidate. The district court dismissed claims
filed against Reeves individually, but it refused to dismiss claims
against Reeves in his official capacity.
The liability, if any, flowing from a federal civil
rights suit based on official capacity, runs against the local
government entity, not the individual defendant. Monell v. Dept of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691,
98 S. Ct. 2018 n.55 (1978).
While interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is granted to preserve
individual government officials’ immunity or the state’s sovereign
immunity from suit, local government entities enjoy no immunity
that would justify interlocutory appeal. Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics and Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 166,
113
S. Ct. 1160 (1993). Moreover, Reeves’s assertion of absolute
prosecutorial immunity does not confer appellate jurisdiction, as
this court has held such immunity unavailable in an official
capacity suit against a Louisiana district attorney. Burge v.
Parish of St. Tammany,
187 F.3d 452, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing
Leatherman, supra). We therefore lack jurisdiction over potential
defenses that Reeves has asserted in the official capacity suit,
e.g., whether there exists a constitutional claim for malicious
prosecution (see Castellano v. Fragozo,
352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir.
2003) (en banc)), and whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled the
existence of municipal custom or policy.
2
Insofar as Reeves asserts that he acted on behalf of the
state, rather than the parish, he raises an Eleventh Amendment
state sovereign immunity defense. Over this claim, we have
interlocutory jurisdiction. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
105
S. Ct. 2806 (1985). Reeves relies on footnote 8 in Esteves v.
Brock,
106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1997), in which this court noted that
a Texas prosecutor acting in her official capacity to prosecute
crime is a state actor protected by the Eleventh Amendment from
§ 1983 damages. Esteves should be viewed as an interpretation of
Texas law concerning the role of a district attorney within the
framework of state government.1 But this court has held, contrary
to Esteves, and based on Louisiana law, that a parish district
attorney is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See
Hudson v. City of New Orleans,
174 F.3d 677, n.1 (5th Cir. 1999);
Burge, 187 F.3d at 466-67. Reeves’s Eleventh Amendment immunity
claim thus fails.
Finally, Reeves asserts immunity against state law claims
against him on the ground that Louisiana does not distinguish
between personal and official capacity suits against district
attorneys who have acted within the scope of their prosecutorial
duties. Reeves cites Knapper v. Connick, 681 So. 2d 944 (La.
1
Esteves is reconcilable with an earlier Texas case, Crane v. Texas,
766 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1985), based on the different function that the district
attorney was performing in Crane (setting county policy for the authorization of
misdemeanor warrants) as opposed to Esteves (enforcing Texas criminal law by
prosecution). Thus, Texas district attorneys are shielded by Eleventh Amendment
immunity for acts performed as state officers in the scope of criminal prosecu-
tion, but they are not so shielded when they act with respect to local policies.
3
1996), which does not squarely address this issue. Nevertheless,
the Louisiana courts have upheld Reeves’s contention in two other
cases. Sinclair v. Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and
Corrections, 769 So. 2d 1270 (La. App. 2000); Connor v. Reeves,
649
So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1995). Accordingly, the state law claims
against Reeves must be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed in
part, and the orders of the district court are affirmed in part and
reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDERS AFFIRMED IN PART and
REVERSED IN PART, and CASE REMANDED.
4
