Filed: May 26, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 26, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-40783 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SERAFIN ARECHE, also known as Moreno Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:03-CR-83-LED-3 - Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Serafin Areche, “aka ‘Moreno
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 26, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 04-40783 Summary Calendar UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus SERAFIN ARECHE, also known as Moreno Defendant-Appellant. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 6:03-CR-83-LED-3 - Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Serafin Areche, “aka ‘Moreno’..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 26, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40783
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SERAFIN ARECHE, also known as Moreno
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:03-CR-83-LED-3
--------------------
Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Serafin Areche, “aka ‘Moreno’” was charged in a two-count
superseding indictment with conspiracy to possess with the intent
to distribute more than 50 kilograms of cocaine, and with
possession with the intent to distribute approximately 21
kilograms of cocaine. After a trial, the jury returned a guilty
verdict.
The presentence report (PSR) did not recommend an adjustment
for Areche’s role in the offense. The probation officer noted
that although there were “three other participants in this
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-40783
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offense, the defendant’s role is not considered either
aggravating nor mitigating.” The Government objected, arguing
that Areche should receive a four-level increase pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The district court sustained the
Government’s objection. The court found that “there were at
least five or more participants involved in the criminal activity
and that the Defendant directed at least one of them, Hugo
Quevedo.” The court further found that Areche’s “involvement as
a leader of a criminal activity was otherwise extensive.” In
addition to assessing the four-level increase under U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1, the court imposed a two-million dollar fine. This
appeal followed.
Areche first argues that DEA Agent Robert Zafra should not
have been allowed to testify that it was Areche’s voice that
could be heard on the recorded conversations recounted by Zafra.
Areche argues that the identification testimony violated the
attorney-client privilege because it was admittedly based on
Zafra’s listening to conversations between Areche and his counsel
at trial. Areche acknowledges that because he did not object to
Zafra’s testimony on the basis of the attorney-client privilege,
review of his argument is for plain error. To show reversible
plain error, Areche must show (1) an error, (2) that is clear and
obvious, and (3) that affects his substantial rights. See United
States v. Reyes,
300 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 2002).
No. 04-40783
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Zafra’s testimony was not based on the content of any
confidential communication between Areche and his attorney, but
merely on the sound of Areche’s voice during normal conversation
in the courtroom. Accordingly, the district court’s failure to
disallow Zafra’s testimony based on the attorney-client privilege
was not plain error. See United States v. Robinson,
121 F.3d
971, 975 (5th Cir. 1997).
Areche also argues that Zafra’s identification testimony was
insufficient under FED. R. EVID. 901. Because Areche made a
timely objection to the district court’s evidentiary ruling in
this respect, review of the district court’s ruling is for an
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lampton,
158 F.3d 251,
259 (5th Cir. 1998). Zafra’s testimony satisfied the
requirements of FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).
Id. Areche’s contention
that Zafra’s identification of his voice was equivocal goes only
to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.
Id.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the identification testimony.
Areche next argues that the district court erred by
increasing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
He argues that the his role in the conspiracy was limited to
being “the source of the cocaine only” and that a buyer-seller
relationship is insufficient to qualify for the enhancement. We
review a district court’s legal interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo. United States v. Lowder,
148 F.3d 548, 552
No. 04-40783
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(5th Cir. 1998).** The district court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error.
Id.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for the increase in a
defendant’s offense level by four levels “if the defendant was an
organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.1(a). “To qualify for an adjustment under this section,
the defendant must have been the [organizer or leader] of one or
more other participants.”
Id., comment.(n.2); United States v.
Cooper,
274 F.3d 230, 247 (5th Cir. 2001). In distinguishing a
leadership or organizational role from one of mere management or
supervision, factors the court should consider include: (1) the
exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of
participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the
recruitment of accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger
share of the fruits of the crime; (5) the degree of participation
in planning or organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope
of the illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and
authority exercised over others.
Id., comment.(n.4); see United
States v. Glinsey,
209 F.3d 386, 396 (5th Cir. 2000).
At the sentencing hearing, the Government asserted that “the
telephone conversations that Your Honor heard which were admitted
**
United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), did not
affect the application of this standard in cases, such as
Areche’s, where the district court has imposed a guidelines
sentence. United States v. Villegas, __ F.3d __, No. 03-21220,
2005 WL 627963 at *2-*5 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2005).
No. 04-40783
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in evidence at [Areche’s] trial made it clear that Quevedo took
directions from this Defendant.” The Government’s reliance on
the introduction of the taped conversations is flawed, however,
because the tapes were never introduced into evidence. Moreover,
although Areche was a supplier to Quevedo, Agent Zafra
acknowledged that Quevedo had another supplier who could deliver
21 kilograms of cocaine. Compare United States v. Pineiro,
377
F.3d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds,
125
S. Ct. 1003 (2005)(defendant was an “exclusive supplier” for the
criminal activity). Further, it was another conspirator, Craig
Hector Rivera, not Areche, who paid the participants, including
Areche. Compare
Pineiro, 377 F.3d at 474 (defendant directed and
paid several couriers). In sum, we conclude that the record is
devoid of facts showing that Areche organized or led Quevedo.
Accordingly, Areche’s sentence is VACATED and the matter is
REMANDED for resentencing. See United States v. Ronning,
47 F.3d
710, 713 (5th Cir. 1995).
Areche also challenges the district court’s imposition of a
two-million dollar fine. He argues that the court imposed the
fine because remained silent rather than cooperate with the
probation officer. “It is undisputed that the guidelines place
the burden of proving an inability to pay a fine squarely on the
defendant.” United States v. Fair,
979 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir.
1992); see U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). The district court’s statements
at sentencing, when read as a whole, indicate that the court’s
No. 04-40783
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reason for imposing the fine was the burden set forth in U.S.S.G.
§ 5E1.2(a), not Areche’s failure to cooperate with the probation
office. The Fifth Amendment thus was not implicated.
Areche contends, for the first time on appeal, that his
sentence was imposed in violation of Blakely v. Washington,
125
S. Ct. 21 (2004). Although Areche’s brief was written prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738, Areche
noted the pendency of Booker and he asserted that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker might validate his argument. Because
we must vacate Areche’s sentence due to the misapplication of
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), we do not reach this argument. See United
States v. Southerland, F.3d , No. 03-11319,
2005 WL 729469
at *7 (5th Cir. Mar. 31, 2005).
VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.