Filed: Apr. 13, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 13, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-21069 (Summary Calendar) _ ROBERT L. WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL, Defendants, SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:04-CV-2822) - Before SMITH, WIENER and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
Summary: United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 13, 2007 FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk No. 05-21069 (Summary Calendar) _ ROBERT L. WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL, Defendants, SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee. - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (4:04-CV-2822) - Before SMITH, WIENER and OWEN, Circuit Judges. P..
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United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
April 13, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-21069
(Summary Calendar)
_____________________
ROBERT L. WOODS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL,
Defendants,
SHELDON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
---------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(4:04-CV-2822)
---------------------
Before SMITH, WIENER and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Woods appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Sheldon
Independent School District (“SISD”) on Woods’s claims of race
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”). We affirm.
I. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Woods is a former special education teacher for the SISD.
During the 2003-04 school year, the principal of the high school at
which Woods taught informed him that her concerns about his job
performance and professional judgment would lead her to recommend
that the SISD Board of Trustees (“the Board”) not extend his
employment contract beyond its then-current term.1 SISD requires
its supervisors to make such contract recommendations for all
professional employees each February. It is also common practice
for supervisors to inform teachers of recommendation decisions
before presenting them to the Board.
In March 2004, the Board voted to accept the principal’s
recommendation not to extend Woods’s contract. Two days later,
Woods submitted a letter to SISD indicating his intent to retire at
the end of the then-current academic year, 2003-04.
In May of that year, Woods filed a discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Commission
terminated its investigation of his complaint and issued a right-to-
sue letter later that month. Woods filed suit in the district court
the following month, alleging that SISD and several individual
1
Like many Texas ISDs, SISD’s teacher contracts have two-
year terms, which, if all goes as anticipated, are extended
annually and thus have a second year in place at all times,
unless the district does not extend the contract. In such a
case, the contract would expire at the end of the second or
following year, not the year in which non-renewal occurs.
2
defendants had discriminated against him based on his age and race.2
Woods, an African-American, was 69 years old when he notified the
SISD of his intent to retire. Several months later, the district
court dismissed Woods’s claims against the individual defendants.
SISD then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district
court ultimately granted. Although the court granted Woods’s motion
for reconsideration, it ultimately confirmed its earlier decision.
Woods now appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the district court.3 Summary judgment
is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 Once
the party seeking summary judgment makes the initial showing
negating any disputed, material fact, the non-moving party must
offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of one or
more genuine issues of material fact.5 All facts and reasonable
inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
2
On appeal, Woods has abandoned any claim of race
discrimination.
3
Chacko v. Sabre, Inc., 473 F.3d 604, 609 (5th. Cir 2006).
4
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
5
Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507
(5th Cir.2003).
3
party, but summary judgment may nevertheless issue when no discrete
facts are shown that raise a contested material fact issue.6
B. Discussion
To prove age discrimination in employment, the employee must
either provide direct evidence of discrimination or show
discrimination by indirect or circumstantial evidence under the
burden-shifting mechanism established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green and its progeny.7 Under that rubric, the employee must first
make a prima facie case of discrimination.8 If he does so, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to offer one or more
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the allegedly adverse
employment action it took against the plaintiff.9 If the employer
produces such a reason or reasons for its purportedly adverse
employment action, the inference of discrimination drops from the
case, and the employee assumes the burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s explanation is
false or merely a pretext for discriminatory animus.10
Alternatively, in a “mixed-motive” case, the employee may show that
the employer’s proffered reason for taking the adverse employment
6
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970).
7
411 U.S.792 (1973).
8
Id. at 807.
9
Id.
10
Id.
4
action, while non-pretextual, is only one of the reasons for its
conduct, and that another “motivating factor” is the plaintiff’s
protected characteristic.11
As Woods produced no direct evidence of age discrimination, he
was required to make a prima facie case of age discrimination by
showing that “(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the
position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of
discharge; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone outside the
protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise
discharged because of his age.”12 In granting summary judgment and
dismissal, the district court ruled that Woods failed to prove that
he was discharged at all,13 so his ADEA claim failed. We agree.
None disputes that Woods was not terminated, but elected to
retire or resign.14 Woods contends, however, that he was
constructively discharged because the actions of his supervisor, the
school’s principal, created a work environment so intolerable that
he had no choice but to resign. In determining whether a reasonable
11
See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312
(5th Cir. 2004).
12
Id. at 309.
13
We note that an employee subject to adverse employment
action short of discharge can also make an ADEA claim, and we
limit our requirement for proof of “discharge” to cases such as
this, in which the adverse action alleged is loss of employment.
14
On appeal, Woods insists that he resigned, but his March
2004 letter to SISD indicates his intent to “retire.” The
distinction is of no moment to our analysis.
5
employee would feel compelled to resign, courts typically consider
whether the employee has been subjected to (1) a demotion, (2) a
salary reduction, (3) a reduction in job responsibilities, (4)
reassignment to menial work, (5) reassignment to work under a
younger supervisor, or (6) badgering, harassment, or to humiliation
by the employer, that is calculated to encourage an employee’s
resignation; or has been offered early retirement or continued
employment on less favorable terms.15
Woods does not discuss these factors specifically on appeal,
but the record makes clear that he (1) was not demoted, (2) actually
received salary increases each year of his employment, (3) did not
have his responsibilities reduced, (4) was not reassigned to menial
work or to a younger supervisor, and (5) was not offered “early”
retirement16 or less favorable employment terms. As such, Woods’s
constructive discharge argument rests solely on his allegations that
his principal’s conduct forced him to choose either to “quit or be
fired.” Specifically, Woods points to (1) correspondence in which
the principal expressed her concerns with his performance and her
desire to resolve his employment status prior to delivering her
recommendations to the Board, including one instance in which she
15
Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th
Cir. 1994).
16
In Texas, teachers are eligible for retirement if the sum
of the teacher’s age and years of service equals 80. See Tex.
Gov’t Code § 824.202. Under this formula, Woods had been
eligible to retire for more than five years when he notified SISD
of his intent to retire.
6
stated that if he did not resign, she would terminate him,17 (2) the
principal’s increased scrutiny of Woods’s teaching and methods, (3)
remarks by the principal indicating her desire that Woods no longer
be employed at her school.
The district court found that the principal’s correspondence
with Woods, in which she voiced her concerns about his performance
and her intent to recommend that his contract not be extended, was
merely an attempt to carry out her job responsibilities dutifully
and did not rise to the level of forced resignation. Regarding the
single incident in which the principal mistakenly presented Woods
with the choice between resignation or retirement and “termination,”
the court ruled that, under the circumstances, a reasonable employee
who had yet to complete the first year of a two-year contract would
not have viewed resignation or retirement as his only alternative
to termination, but instead would have sought clarification of his
employment status. Moreover, the district court noted Woods’s
admission that the principal, at an earlier meeting, had told him
that she was going to recommend that the Board take no action on his
contract, i.e., let it expire on its own terms, not terminate it.
We agree with the district court’s reasoning on this issue, and we
pause only to note further that Woods had 23 years of experience
working in Texas public schools and had to know that a school
principal cannot unilaterally terminate a teacher’s employment.
17
The principal acknowledges referencing “termination” in
one note to Woods, but claims that she did so only by mistake.
7
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the district court correctly determined that Woods
was not constructively discharged. Consequently, he failed to make
a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.
Thus, his ADEA claim fails. We need not address, therefore,
Woods’s “pretext” or “mixed-motive” arguments, except to note that
they are ably rebutted on appeal in SISD’s brief. Accordingly, the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to SISD and
dismissing Woods’s action is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
8
