Filed: Mar. 31, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED March 31, 2008 No. 07-50435 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appellee v. MARIA SERA DE AGUIRRE also known as, Maria M Aguirre also known as, Magdalena Aguirre Defendant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-01992 Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Maria Se
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED March 31, 2008 No. 07-50435 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff - Appellee v. MARIA SERA DE AGUIRRE also known as, Maria M Aguirre also known as, Magdalena Aguirre Defendant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CR-01992 Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Maria Ser..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 31, 2008
No. 07-50435 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
MARIA SERA DE AGUIRRE also known as, Maria M Aguirre also known as,
Magdalena Aguirre
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:06-CR-01992
Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Maria Sera De Aguirre pleaded guilty to importing and possessing more
than 50 kilograms of marijuana. At sentencing, she claimed that she was
entitled to a two-level reduction in her offense level because she met the “safety
valve” criterion in USSG § 5C1.2(a). The district denied her the two-level
reduction and sentenced her to 30 months in prison. De Aguirre now appeals,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 07-50435
contending that the district court misapplied the safety-valve standard. Finding
no error, we AFFIRM.
1. We review the district court’s findings of fact pertaining to a safety-
valve reduction for clear error and the district court’s legal
interpretation of the safety-valve standard de novo.1 Under USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(11), a defendant is entitled to a two-level reduction in her
offense level if she can meet the safety-valve requirements found in
§ 5C1.2. That provision requires “the [district] court [to] find[] that
the defendant” has met five conditions.2 Only the fifth condition is
relevant here; it provides:
[N]ot later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant [must have] truthfully provided to the
Government all information and evidence the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or
plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or
useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall
not preclude a determination by the court that the
defendant has complied with this requirement.3
The rule, by its plain terms, requires “the [district] court [to]
find[] that the defendant” has “truthfully provided to the
Government” all relevant information about the offense.4 In other
words, the district court must find that the defendant has actually
been truthful.
1
United States v. Miller,
179 F.3d 961, 963–64 (5th Cir. 1999).
2
USSG § 5C1.2(a).
3
Id. § 5C1.2(a)(5).
4
Id. § 5C1.2(a).
2
No. 07-50435
2. De Aguirre contends that the court below mistakenly thought
this fifth condition required it to determine only whether the
government believed she was telling it the truth—not whether
she was in fact telling the truth. De Aguirre reaches this
conclusion by focusing on one statement the district court
made at sentencing: “Motion for continuance is overruled.
It’s plain to me that the Government does not find her credible,
so it’s just a waste of time.” (emphasis added). This
statement, however, must be read in context. Just prior to
this statement, De Aguirre asked the district court for a
continuance so that she could speak to the government and
clear up any confusion it might have about what she said. The
statement, then, was a response to that request. The district
court was overruling the request for continuance because
there was no need to give De Aguirre more time to confer with
the government when the government already did not believe
her. In other words, the request for continuance would be, in
the district court’s words, “just a waste of time.”
After this exchange, the district court asked De Aguirre
if she had any other objections. She responded that she had
none. She did not complain to the district court that it was
not independently determining whether she had been
truthful. Nor did she ask for an explicit ruling on her request
for an evidentiary hearing.
Once the district court’s comment about the government
not finding De Aguirre credible is put into context, nothing
else suggests that the district court applied the wrong legal
standard. Instead, it appears that the district court agreed
3
No. 07-50435
with the government’s argument that De Aguirre was not
being honest when she said she had been collecting
information on a drug organization for 30 years. The district
court’s implicit factual finding that De Aguirre did not provide
truthful information to the government is not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
denying De Aguirre safety-valve relief.
AFFIRMED.
4