PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
The petitioners James R. Fisher and Odyssey Residential Holdings, LP (hereinafter, collectively, "Fisher") seek a writ of mandamus directing the district court to recognize that Fisher is a crime victim within the meaning of the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. We deny the petition because our current understanding of the record persuades us that the district court was not clearly and indisputably wrong to find that Fisher failed to prove that he had been directly and proximately harmed by Ronald W. Slovacek's criminal conduct. We also deny each of Fisher's pending motions, for reasons we explain below.
This mandamus proceeding arises out of the public-corruption prosecution centering around former Dallas City Council Member Don Hill. At issue here is a conviction arising out of Count 10 of the superseding indictment in this matter, which alleges that Hill and various other members of Dallas city government conspired to solicit and accept things of value in exchange for providing official assistance to the defendant Brian Potashnik in his pursuit of City approval and funding for various affordable-housing-development projects. One of the things of value Hill and his coconspirators solicited was the award of construction subcontracts on Potashnik's developments to the defendant Ronald Slovacek. A jury eventually convicted Slovacek of this conspiracy charge.
The petitioner in this proceeding, Fisher, was a competitor of Potashnik's who was seeking City approval of his own affordable-housing developments. Fisher and his company spent approximately $1.8 million on two such projects. Neither of those projects ever received approval or financing from the City. After Slovacek was found guilty of participating in the criminal conspiracy, Fisher sought restitution. He argued that the conduct of Slovacek and his coconspirators had rendered his $1.8 million investment worthless. The district court found that Slovacek's criminal conduct was not a direct and proximate cause of Fisher's $1.8 million loss and declined to order restitution.
The CVRA gives "[a] crime victim. . . [t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law."
The CVRA requires us to "take up and decide" Fisher's mandamus petition within seventy-two hours of the petition's filing.
The CVRA's "directly and proximately harmed" language imposes dual requirements of cause in fact and foreseeability. A person is directly harmed by the commission of a federal offense where that offense is a but-for cause of the harm.
Fisher's mandamus petition comes before us in an unusual posture. The district court denied Fisher's request for restitution on the record during a sentencing hearing after hearing testimony from Fisher. No written order has issued; the transcript of the hearing contains the only explanation of the district court's decision. A transcript of this hearing is not presently before us, but this does not change the fact of the statute's 72-hour deadline. As a result, we must review the district court's decision based upon the factual narrative presented to us by the briefs and the transcript of a prior sentencing hearing during which Judge Lynn rejected Fisher's request for restitution from Slovacek's co-defendant Brian Potashnik.
Fisher advances two arguments as to why Slovacek's criminal conduct was a but-for cause of his approximately $1.8 million financial loss. First, Fisher argues that had he been aware of Slovacek's ongoing criminal conduct, he would not have made the approximately $1.8 million investment he made in two competing affordable-housing developments. As Fisher explains in his petition, "the conspiracy's concealment was a `but for' cause of inducing these investments." This argument's exclusive focus on the concealment of the conspiracy is misplaced: the target of the but-for inquiry is the conspiracy itself.
Nor can Fisher prevail on the related argument that but for the conspiracy, his $1.8 million investment would not have been for naught. This argument depends on the assumption that the City Council would have approved Fisher's competing developments had the conspiracy not taken place. The district court found that this assumption was too speculative to support a finding of but-for causation.
Second, Fisher argues that he was "denied a level playing field in having his projects fairly considered by the Dallas City Council." In support of this argument, Fisher cites a handful of cases in which other courts have held that the loss of a fair competitive opportunity is a sufficiently concrete and cognizable injury to support standing under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Although this doctrine also finds application in the Equal Protection— and antitrust-standing context, neither this Court—nor any other court we are aware of—has ever determined whether it is properly deployed for a final restitution-liability determination under the CVRA or the MVRA.
We can—and hereby do—deny Fisher's petition without answering that question of law. We rest instead on two alternative grounds, each of which is independently sufficient to support our decision. First, the district court found that the claim that Fisher would have had a fair opportunity or a level playing field in the absence of the conspiracy was too speculative to support an order of restitution. The court also found that it was too speculative to conclude that competing on a level playing field would have enabled Fisher to avoid his $1.8 million loss. Neither of these findings was clearly erroneous. Second, and relatedly, Fisher advanced an identical lost-opportunity argument at the
Because the record presently before us does not establish that Fisher clearly and indisputably proved that he was a victim under the MVRA and the CVRA, we deny the petition for mandamus. We deny the petition without prejudice to Fisher's right to file a petition for rehearing or a motion for reconsideration once an official transcript of the sentencing hearing is filed (but in no case later than twenty days from today).
In addition, we deny as moot Fisher's motion to waive the statutory requirement of decision upon a petition for mandamus within 72 hours under the CVRA.
Finally, we also deny Fisher's motion to consolidate the mandamus petition with his appeal raising identical issues, treat the petition as an opening brief on the merits of the appeal, and consolidate decision on the appeal. We deny this motion without prejudice to any right of appeal Fisher may enjoy. Nothing we say here should be read to imply any view on the proper answer to the question of whether the CVRA gives a putative victim the right to file a direct appeal.
PETITION DENIED.