EDWARD C. PRADO, Circuit Judge:
ANR Pipeline Co., Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., and Southern Natural Gas Co. (collectively, "appellants") own interstate natural-gas pipelines subject to a 25% ad valorem tax under Louisiana Constitution article 7, § 18. They brought and won a state-court suit alleging certain intrastate pipelines were unconstitutionally given more favorable tax treatment by being taxed only at a 15% rate from 1994-2003,
Appellants brought suit in federal court on August 9, 2010, alleging Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause violations, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, resulting from the revaluation process. Specifically, they contend that the process violates Louisiana law in various ways and denies appellants the 10% in taxes that they paid under protest that they are "owed." Appellants also bring the same constitutional claims for the 2004-2009 tax years as raised in the pending state-court litigation. On appeal is the district court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss. We hold that the district court properly dismissed appellants' suit because their federal claims are barred by the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
Appellants own interstate natural-gas pipelines subject to a 25% ad valorem tax under the Louisiana Constitution. Article 7, § 18 of the Louisiana Constitution ("Ad Valorem Taxes") provides that "public services properties[] excluding land" are subject to a 25% tax whereas "other property" is subject to a 15% tax. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(B). Section 18(D) outlines how property subject to the ad valorem taxes is valued. It provides that: "Each assessor shall determine the fair market value of all property subject to taxation within his respective parish or district except public service properties, which shall be valued at fair market value by the Louisiana Tax Commission [("LTC")] or its successor." Id. § 18(D). Under Louisiana Law, "public service properties" are "the immovable, major movable, and other movable property owned or used but not otherwise assessed in this state in the operations of each . . . pipeline company," among other entities. LA.REV.STAT. § 47:1851(M). "Pipeline companies" are defined as:
Id. § 47:1851(K).
Because all interstate pipelines running through Louisiana are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
For all the applicable tax years, appellants had been taxed at the 25% rate and had their pipelines' FMV calculated by the LTC. Appellants filed their taxes under protest during tax years 1994-2003 because they believed the different tax rates for intra- and interstate natural-gas pipelines were unconstitutional. In 2005, appellants filed suit in the 19th Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish ("the 19th JDC"), claiming the differing tax rates violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Louisiana and United States constitutions, the Commerce Clause, and the uniformity requirement of the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, appellants argued that intrastate PSC-regulated pipelines ("PSC pipelines") were impermissibly classified by the LTC as "other property" and taxed at the 15% rate, rather than at the 25% rate.
Appellants won their suit. The 19th JDC determined that the PSC pipelines received preferential treatment and that the LTC's disregard for the uniformity requirement in the Louisiana Constitution violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions. The court pretermitted deciding the facial constitutionality of the tax regime under the Commerce Clause, on the ground that appellants would receive a full remedy on its other claims. Rather than simply award appellants the taxes they had paid under protest, the court decided they would receive the exact same treatment as the PCS pipelines. That is, appellants' pipelines would be treated as if it were "other property" for purposes of both the lower rate and the FMV-evaluation process. The local parish assessors thus had to first determine appellants' pipelines' FMV for the 1994-2003 years, calculate the taxes owed for those years using the 15% FMV calculation, and then refund appellants the difference—if any—between the taxes paid and the taxes owed under the new calculation. The 19th JDC remanded the case to the LTC with instructions to require the local parish assessors to revalue appellants' pipelines in a timely manner.
Appellants appealed the remedy fashioned by the 19th JDC to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing that their due process rights would be violated by the reassessment. The First Circuit rejected the appeal on the ground that the remedy was proper under Louisiana precedent and that it did not violate their due process rights because there were ample state-law protections. ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 923 So.2d 81, 93, 97-98 (La.Ct.App.2008) ("ANR VI"). It also rejected appellants' appeal of the 19th JDC's failure to decide its Commerce Clause challenge, on the ground that such a ruling was unnecessary to the extent appellants obtained adequate relief through re-assessment and refund of any taxes paid. Id. at 99. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied appellants' writ petition, ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, 925 So.2d 547 (La.2006), and the United States Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of certiorari, ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, No. 05-1606, 2006 WL 1662255 (U.S. June 15, 2006), writ denied, 549 U.S. 822, 127 S.Ct. 157, 166 L.Ed.2d 38 (2006), both of which challenged the remedy provided and the revaluation process as violating appellants' rights.
With regard to the 2004-2009 tax years, appellants again paid their taxes under protest and brought suit in the 19th JDC seeking refunds on the same legal grounds as the 1994-2003 suit. In their Complaint in federal court, however, appellants argue that the protracted state-court litigation involving the 1994-2003 claims shows it has no adequate remedy under Louisiana law for the violations.
Appellants brought this suit in federal court on August 9, 2010, for injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for various Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause violations arising out of the 1994-2003 tax years' revaluation process and raised anew the constitutional challenges to its being taxed during the 2004-2009 years under an allegedly unconstitutional scheme.
Appellants seek as damages the 10% difference in taxes paid under protest, and seek injunctions preventing the defendants from (1) proceeding with the 1994-2003 tax revaluation process, including the judicial review proceedings; (2) proceeding with
The defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the district court granted in its January 18, 2011 order. ANR Pipeline Co. v. La. Tax Comm'n, No. 10-2622, 2011 WL 163547 (E.D.La. Jan. 19, 2011). It dismissed the Commerce Clause claim on multiple grounds, including the expiration of the prescriptive period for § 1983 tort actions; the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341; the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; and general comity principles. It dismissed the due process claims arising from the 1994-2003 tax revaluations on the grounds that they failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and are likewise barred by the Tax Injunction and Anti-Injunction Acts and principles of comity. It dismissed the 2004-2009 claim for relief on the grounds that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity deprive the court of jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review "de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, applying the same standards as the district court." Del-Ray Battery Co. v. Douglas Battery Co., 635 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir.2011) (citation omitted). "We also review de novo a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Id. (citation omitted). "A plaintiff fails to state a claim when the complaint does not contain `enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 728-29 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 134, provides that: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." According to the Supreme Court, this statutory text should be interpreted to advance its purpose of "confin[ing] federal-court intervention in state government." Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826-27, 117 S.Ct. 1776, 138 L.Ed.2d 34 (1997) (citations omitted). "Embodied within the statute is the duty of federal courts to withhold relief when a state legislature has provided an adequate scheme whereby a taxpayer may maintain a suit to challenge a state tax." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, "the Tax Injunction Act is a broad jurisdictional impediment to federal court interference with the administration of state tax systems." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
It is undisputed that appellants seek to enjoin Louisiana's ad valorem tax-assessment and collection proceedings against them, and seek repayment of taxes paid under protest for the 1994-2003 tax years. These are the classic remedies that the Act bars the federal courts from providing. See Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351,
"State courts are equipped to furnish a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy if they provide a procedural vehicle that affords taxpayers the opportunity to raise their federal constitutional claims." Home Builders Ass'n, 143 F.3d at 1012 (citing Smith v. Travis Cnty. Educ. Dist., 968 F.2d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1992)). That is, "a state's remedy is adequate when it provides taxpayers with a complete judicial determination that is ultimately reviewable in the United States Supreme Court." Id. Important for our review, "the state remedy need not be the best of all remedies. [It] need only be adequate." Id. (quoting Alnoa G. Corp. v. City of Hous., Tex., 563 F.2d 769, 772 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam)) (alteration in Home Builders). We have further explained:
Washington, 338 F.3d at 445 (quoting Bland v. McHann, 463 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir.1972)).
Louisiana provides a procedural vehicle for raising constitutional claims— suit in the state district courts—and appellants have exercised this remedy. See LA. REV.STAT. § 47:1856. Appellants brought suit in the 19th JDC for Commerce Clause harms incurred during the 1994-2003 tax years, sought review by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, and sought writs for review from the Louisiana and United States Supreme Courts. We have made clear that "potential failure in state court `provides no basis for circumventing the jurisdictional bar imposed by the Tax Injunction Act.'" Washington, 338 F.3d at 445 (quoting Smith, 968 F.2d at 456 (citations omitted)). Appellants have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim, and have not been deprived of a remedy simply because the Louisiana courts have found that it is unnecessary to reach that issue in order to provide appellants with the relief they sought. That appellants have taken advantage of Louisiana's system for challenging unconstitutional taxation is enough to defeat federal subject-matter jurisdiction under Home Builders and Washington.
We will nevertheless address the remainder of appellants' arguments that they have been denied an adequate procedural vehicle in the Louisiana courts to remedy the Commerce Clause violation. To the extent appellants argue that the Act is no bar to federal jurisdiction because the revaluation remedy provided by the 19th JDC for the due process and equal protection harms is inadequate to
Finally, the fact that appellants have thus far been unsuccessful in consolidating the twenty home-parish judicial review actions in the 19th JDC does not mean that the remedy provided by the 19th JDC is not plain, speedy, and efficient. Appellants are not entitled to "the best of all remedies"; rather, the state-court remedy need only be adequate and "not unduly burdensome." Alnoa G. Corp., 563 F.2d at 772. While challenging individual tax assessments in twenty parishes is not the most efficient way of ultimately determining appellants' new tax liability, it does not rise to the level that was found inefficient in Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 72 S.Ct. 321, 96 L.Ed. 335 (1952) (finding the remedy inefficient where the procedure for halting tax executions by affidavits of illegality would have required filing of over 300 separate claims in 14 different counties). Furthermore, in Redwine, the Supreme Court dismissed an alternate remedy—suit for refund after payment of taxes—on the ground that this remedy applied to only 15% of the taxes in controversy. Id. at 303 & n. 11, 72 S.Ct. 321 ("An adequate remedy as to only a portion of the taxes in controversy does not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over the entire controversy."). Here, appellants' suit for a refund of taxes paid under protest applies to the full refund to which appellants may be entitled.
In short, appellants have raised their Commerce Clause claim in state court, and the Louisiana courts have heard it. Louisiana's remedy for vindicating this alleged injury does not cease to be plain, speedy, efficient, or adequate simply because appellants have brought—and lost—numerous state-court appeals arguing that the Louisiana courts have misapplied Louisiana law at practically every step in the FMV-reassessment process. The federal courts therefore lack jurisdiction over this claim, and the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss.
All of appellants' Due Process and Equal Protection claims stem from the FMV-revaluation process ordered by the 19th JDC, and have been the subject of extensive state-court litigation. Appellants seek to enjoin ongoing state tax revaluation proceedings, recover a refund of taxes paid under protest, and limit the amount of taxes Louisiana can collect from them in the future by being subject to a unique form of taxation under Louisiana law—a 15% tax rate with FMV determined by the LTC. For the same reasons as explained above, the federal courts lack
Appellants bring a tax-refund claim for taxes paid under protest in 2004-2009 on the same grounds as raised in the still-pending state-court proceedings: that the ad-valorem tax scheme violates appellants' due process, equal protection, and uniformity rights, and violates the Commerce Clause. The federal courts lack jurisdiction over this claim for the same reasons as expressed above.
Finally, we feel compelled to address appellees' assertion on appeal that appellants may not have an adequate procedural vehicle for raising their new Commerce Clause claim in Louisiana court. Specifically, appellees baldly state—without a single case citation or shred of legal support—that the Louisiana courts "are powerless to declare a provision of the Louisiana Constitution unconstitutional" because they "derive their authority exclusively from the Louisiana Constitution," and that the district court therefore potentially erred in concluding the Tax Injunction Act presented a subject-matter-jurisdictional hurdle to deciding appellees' new Commerce Clause claim.
At heart, appellants challenge what they perceive to be mistreatment at the hands of the state courts. The Tax Injunction Act, however, deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over suits that seek to interfere with the administration of state tax systems so long as the state provides an
AFFIRMED.