PER CURIAM.*

Juan Geraldo Arredondo appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to participating or assisting in a riot at a federal prison. Arredondo challenges the district court's guidelines sentence range calculation, arguing that there was insufficient reliable evidence to support an increase in his base offense level. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for summary affirmance based on the appeal waiver in Arredondo's plea agreement.

We review de novo whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal. United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, we conclude that the waiver was knowing and voluntary as the record shows that Arredondo knew he had the right to appeal and that he was giving up that right by entering into the plea agreement. See United States v. Higgins, 739 F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2014). Arredondo's argument that the appeal waiver should not be enforced because of an alleged violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) is unavailing. See id. at 736-37; United States v. Alvarado-Casas, 715 F.3d 945, 955 (5th Cir. 2013). Also, although Arredondo suggests that we should adopt a miscarriage of justice exception to the enforcement of an appeal waiver, we have previously declined to do so. United States v. De Cay, 359 F. App'x 514, 516 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

Accordingly, we GRANT the Government's motion to dismiss and DENY the alternative motion for summary affirmance.

APPEAL DISMISSED.